The rape of Zaire

The rape of Zaire *The scramble for Africa is on again. The capture of Kolwezi by the French signals the end of almost two decades of formal obeisance to the notion of African independence .. Politically as Africa is being recolonised. That does not well as economically, mean that history is being re-run or that the new map of Africa will be the old colonial one, with the states simply shown in different The detail of govemcolours. It is infinitely more complicated.

ment is in African hands. Foreigners can, as a last resort, be shown the door. But African governments are more and more being maintained by money and weapons from overseas and are known to be so maintained. This seriously limits their freedom of action.'!

In May 1978 hundreds of French paratroopers were airlifted into Kolwezi, a mining town in the Shaba province of Zaire. Their mission was to maintain political stability in a region which is rich in mineral resources and lucrative for foreign investment. When Belgium conceded national independence to the Congo in 1960, after 52 years of colonial rule, it made sure that this area remained under the control of the imperialist powers.? Within months of the formation of the Republic of the Congo Belgian and United Nations (UN) troops had intervened to safeguard the interests of foreign capital.

The fate of Zaire is determined by the world economy.

crisis of the 'seventies has resulted international in the stagnation of industry and agriculture, and in poverty, unemployment and famine. It has also exacerbated ethnic and regional conflicts. At the same time the recession drives the imperialist nations into a battle for the resources and markets of the backward capitalist world. Imperialism is compelled to adopt more direct means of control in its former colonies. The military invasion of Zaire, following almost 20 years of formal independence, signified a return The attempt to establish a stable regime in the Congo in the early 'sixties took a heavy toll on the masses. With the assistance of Furopean troops, the newly appointed local rulers crushed popular resistance to imperialism and eliminated the last remnants of bourgeois democracy. This process culminated in the accession of Mobutu's corrupt and murderous military dictatorship in 1965. Once the country had been stablilised through force of arms, the expansion of the world market in the late 'sixties permitted a limited development of its economy. Encouraged by the state, a massive influx of foreign capital enabled the Congo to take advantage of rising copper prices. The result was an unprecedented period of economic growth. Rising conin national independence was indicated by the country's change of name from the Congo to Zaire in 1971.

The crisis of the "seventies has exposed the fragility of capitalism in Zaire and the precariousness of the nation's independence. When in 1974 rocketing oil prices were followed by the collapse of the world copper market, the effect on Zaire was catastrophic. Despairing of the impotence of his ruling clique in the face of the international recession, Mobutu could only ask 'are we responsible for the dollar crisis, for the energy crisis, world inflation, the spectacular fall in raw material prices and for unemploy- The predominance of imperialism in Zaire leaves no independent role for an indigenous bourgeoisie. For the masses of Zaire the crisis means further immiseration and 20 repression. Nothing less is compatible with the survival of imperialism: this is the message that the French paratroopers brought to the Zairean people.

THE BELGIAN CONGO

Han one in the mention enter he lan a mal administration played the leading role in opening it up to capitalist exploitation. The state granted freehold rights for the extraction of mineral resources and encouraged plantation agriculture in coffee, groundnuts, palm oil, rubber, bananas and sugar. Most investments were controlled by the state and Belgian finance capital, which operated through four huge holding companies. 4 The state encouraged capital accumulation by providing a cheap supply of labour. Compulsory recruitment forced workers into mines and plantations." Legislation enforced low prices for agricultural produce, which allowed wages to be kept down in the mining sector. The state also established the infrastructure necessary for capitalist development. In 1928 the government completed a rail/river link from Katanga province to the Lower Congo, which to this the most important internal route for the day remains transport of Katangan copper. Roads, railways, bridges and an extensive administrative structure were financed by extortionate taxes on the local population.

Production in the Congo was geared to the export of agricultural products and minerals, from which enormous profits were repatriated. Total capital outflow for the period 1887 to 1955 was £4300 million. In the five years preceding independence the net outflow of capital reached massive proportions. More than a third of the surplus-value produced in any given year during colonial rule went abroad 6 The plantations provided cheap foodstuffs for export and for the growing urban population. Agricultural developmeni remained stunted. It rested on low wages or forced discouraged investment in modern farm equipment. Profits from the plantations were directed into mining or the economic infrastructure. Agriculture itself remained backward and under-capitalised.

Until the late fifties the Congolese were prohibited from owning property and denied access to loans or credit, thus frustrating the emergence of an African bourgeoisie.

their own smallholdings, the Prevented from securing peasants were condemned to poverty and backwardness.

Many migrated in search of work to the expanding mining sector. But the state quickly stepped in and introduced stringent controls on the recruitment of miners so as to maintain a stable workforce on the land.?

As the rural population expanded so the position of the peasants deteriorated. Many were forced to cultivate some of which, such as cotton, were particular crops, unsuited to the climatic conditions. Vast tracts of land were appropriated for national parks or allocated to foreign companies and settlers.® Villages were broken up and

relocated by the colonial authorities - often along roadsides or on barren land. The appropriation of the land and the compulsory cultivation of cash crops provoked rural resistance to the colonial regime. The emergence of urban petit-bourgeois opposition to Belgian rule in the 'forties and 'fifties found an immediate resonance among the disaffected Since then the country areas have always to support radical nationalist resistance to The gradual post-war expansion of capitalism in the Congo created a petit bourgeoisie largely composed lower level employees of the colonial civil service: clerks, teachers and junior officials. The growth of commerce gave rise to a small African bourgeoisie. In Leopoldville in 1956 there were 7000 self-employed persons, several with incomes of over $20 000 per year. 10 The growth of mining and commercial agriculture and the emergence of processing industries that were closely related to these sectors stimulated a rapid expansion of the working class.1 On the eve of independence, 37 per cent of adult males in the Congo were wage-earners and 24 per cent of the population lived in towns. Although the Congolese working class was larger than that of many other African countries, its limited strength was exposed by the minor of the late 'fifties. The slowdown in economic migration caused unemployment. This allowed wages to be forced down as production was rationalised Domestic servants and workers in the state apparatus were important components of the urban population. In the provincial capital of Bukavu, for example, more than a third of African wage-earners were domestic servants.12 The fragmentation and repression of the working-class prevented large-scale political organisation. The only effective union employees in the civil service. This small stratum, together with other discontented sections of the petit bourgeoisie, gave voice to the antagonism between all sections of Congolese society and the colonial order.

The decay of colonial rule Towards the end of the 'fifties Belgium began to lose its grip on events in the Congo. Falling demand for raw materials led to a steady rise in unemployment which, when combined with a drop in living standards, stimulated the growth of a mass anti-colonial movement. At first this was based in the towns. But soon youths, forced to return to the countryside because of high unemployment in the cities, spread a wave of nationalist sentiment into the rural areas. The whole of Leopoldville province was thrown into political ferment. The same mood swept through provincial centres such as Stanleyville.

the petit bourgeoisie was reliant on the colonial administration, it was denied real power under Belgian rule. In the late 'fifties long-standing resentment turned into outright opposition. Because of its education and social position, the petit bourgeoisie was able to channel the anger of the masses against the colonial regime.

The colonial authorities were caught unawares by a aggressive temper of the nationalist movement led to numerous confrontations. ville in January 1959 showed that the Belgian administration was no longer in control. The imprisonment of leading nationalists could not halt the upsurge, nor could major counter insurgency operations - even though these left more than 500 dead. The Belgian administration could not contain the nationalist explosion. The cost of maintaining direct rule 21 in the face of open revolt increased alarmingly as the country's economic problems worsened. By 1960, the service of the public debt took up 24 per cent of the total budget.13 So it was that the colonial administration eventually conceded the demand for independence. But Editorial, The Guardian, 22 May 1978 The Congo Free State was carved out in the late nineteenth Originally the personal fief of King Leopold II, it became a Belgian colony in 1908.

The Daily Telegraph, 23 March 1979 The capital invested by these was as follows: Societe Generale (41 companies) - £28m; Banque de Bruxelles (16 companies) - £2.25m; Groupe Cominiere (9 companies) - £2.5m; Groupe Empain (S companies) These four groups controlled 75 per cent of all Congolese capital in private hands King Leopold's legacy, the Congo under Belgian rule 1908-1960, Oxford University Press, 1966, p113.

The most drastic method of appropriating a surplus from the Congolese was the use of a labour tax of 40 hours per month.

This was instituted in 1903. The diary of an American missionary reveals the suppression of the people that rubber collection entailed: Each time the corporal goes out to get rubber, cartridges are given to him. He must bring back all not used and for everyone used, he must bring back a right hand! ... As to the extent to which this is carried on, he informed me that in 6 months they, the state, on the Momboyo river had used 6000 cartridges, which means that 6000 people are killed or mutilated. It means more than 6000, for the people have told me repeatedly that soldiers kill children with the butt of their Quoted in ibid, p7. By 1944 the required period of labour in kind had been raised to 120 days per year.

W Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar-es-Salaam, 1972, pp 166-67.

Colonial pateralism stabilised the mining workforce. From Miniere de Haut Katanga (UM), the leading Belgian mining company, offered renewable three-year contracts, four days holiday each month and better housing and welfare facilities. Turnover and recruitment were reduced so that by 1940 approximately 78 per cent of UM's employees were prepared to renew their contracts and more than 25 per cent had worked for UM for over 10 years. Anstey, op cit, By 1944 12 million hectares had been taken over by Europeans.

M Merlier, Le Congo de la colonisation belge a l'independence, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1962, p70.

Joseph Kasavubu, an early popular critic of colonial rule who became first President of the Republic of the Congo, played upon these aspirations of the peasantry for land ownership. He gained widespread support with a speech in 1946 on the theme of 'the right of the first occupant.

G Brausch, Belgian administration in the Congo, Institute of Race Relations, London, 1961, pp4-5.

In 1955 Elizabethville had 1309 African traders who eared a total of over 50 million francs per year. J Denis, Le phenomene urbain en Afrique centrale, Academie royale des sciences coloniales, Bruxelles, 1958, p339.

Growth of wage-earning population 399 144 1950 1930 962 009 1932 291 961 1952 1 070 346 C Young, Politics in the Congo, Princeton University Press.

1965, p206. The decline in the number of wage-earners during the world slump of the carly 'thirties shows the close relationship between the fate of the Congolese working class and the fortunes of imperialism. 12 This was twice the proportion in other cities because low wages encouraged European houscholds to employ two or three servants. Denis, op cit, p245.

13 Young, op cit, p65

Belgium insisted on a transitional period to ensure that the interests of foreign capital would be preserved.

The end of an era The Belgian administration wanted to hand over power to a stable pro-capitalist government. There was, however, no ready-made African bourgeoisie to administer such a Belgians could not this Though the create regime. bourgeoisie overnight, they did try to groom a leadership with a stake in the preservation of order and capitalist property relations. But, much to the chagrin of the imperialists, African politicians who were seen to compromise with the old order were summarily rejected by the masses.

The storm of popular protest made stable decolonisation impossible. After a trip to the Cataract district in August 1959, the Belgian Vice-Governor General reported: 'Everyone I met unanimously agrees that at the political level contact with the population has become impossible. Directives, advice, efforts at persuasion, attempts at dialogue, every thing which emanates from the Administration, from Europeans in general, or from Congolese viewed as collaborators of the whites, is rejected To retain popular support, the African political parties were disobedience.15 Leopoldville province the ABAKO and the PSA even began to exercise quasi governmental functions such as the supply of water and electricity, as did the MNC(L) in Orientale.

The resistance movement took different forms in the diverse provinces of the Congo. In the more backward regions of Kasai and Equateur the administration managed to maintain social order. In Katanga, the main centre of industrial advance, resistance was weakened by the longof UM. The leading political party was the CONAKAT.16 Under Moise Tshombe it became subordinated to Western interests, working to contain the popular revolt in close collaboration with the authorities and UM. Despite this, in the Congo as a whole the mass movement was powerful enough to destroy the administrative framework which the Belgians sought to pass on to their African stooges. independence, the Even before appreciated that the mass movement was a threat to their aspirations to power. To safeguard they tried to tame the popular movement. However, in the more militant parties, and especially in the MNC(L), the radical youth was in command of the local organisation.

In these parties a high proportion of the membership was unemployed. Their militancy was born of the frustration of colonial society - they were denied secondary education and barred from most urban employment. They were not to be placated easily by their moderate leaders.

After the 1960 elections, the gulf between the rank and file and the petit-bourgeois leadership widened further.

While the politicians deliberated in parliament, their supporters stayed on the streets. In this turmoil the political parties underwent repeated divisions; each faction had its own militia led by the urban youth. These citizen armies were an intolerable challenge to the African politicians who moved rapidly to disband them. In March the newly elected Executive College, which included both Kasavubu and Lumumba, voted to dissolve all militias.17 Predictably, this had little effect on any of the armed factions.

By 30 June 1960, the date appointed as independence day, the administration had already collapsed. Leaders of rival parties were in open conflict for control of the new republic. Lumumba became Prime Minister, while Kasavubu was announced President. From its inception the new Government could not exercise authority over large parts of the country. Foreign intervention and national resistance In the absence of a stable capitalist government imperialism was forced to intervene in the Congo almost immediately after independence. Belgium wanted to hold on to the mineral-rich Katanga province where important investments were at stake. But this area was the scene of dramatic events and a source of instability which highlighted the fragility of the new Government.

Within days of independence the African rank and file of Force Publique mutinied against their European officers in a spontaneous uprising.18 The revolt was swiftly crushed by a Belgian invasion - ostensibly to protect European lives. Soon afterwards the CONAKAT declared the secession of Katanga. It was supported by UM which, labelling the Lumumba Government pro-Soviet, directed taxes into the coffers of the CONAKAT. Lumumba, who had little control over his own army, was unable to oppose the Belgian intervention and accepted it in the hope that secession would be reversed. When it became clear that this was not the Belgians' intention, he turned to appeal for Russian and UN assistance. the secession of Katanga Inspired by the Belgians, was the signal for the disintegration of the Congo. It could not be halted by the new regime, which was forced to consolidate its power along regional and ethnic lines The ABAKO raised the demand for tribal autonomy for the Bakongo, and Kalonji - the leader of a regional split from the MNC - declared South Kasai an independent state for the Baluba people. The farcical character of the Government was confirmed in September 1960, when Kasavubu and Lumumba simultaneously sacked each Imperialism could not stand idly by in the face of mounting chaos. The Congo was of vital strategic importance in central Africa. There was the ever-present danger that political instability might spread to neighbouring Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).

countries such Imperialism reasserted military control in the Congo in the guise of the UN. In July 1960 an intervention force invaded and established martial law.

were subordinated to the army and Lumumba, who insiston the unitary state proclaimed in the constitution, was removed from office. Despite his willingness to compromise with the Belgian authorities, as shown by his agreement to disband militias, Lumumba became the focus of popular resistance to the invasion. Matters came to a head when he tried to reach his political stronghold in Stanleyville, where the PSA had established an opposition government. As General Von Horn, commander of the UN force, observed: "To put it bluntly had Lumumba got to Stanleyville, the whole Congo might have gone up in flames'.19 Lumumba was murdered before he reached his destination.

required if the Action on two fronts was urgently general interests of imperialism were to be preserved. Firstly, the Belgian-supported secession of Katanga had to be reversed. The independence of Katanga was to Belgium's through UM and the CONAKAT, it advantage because, exercised firm control over the province. However, secession threatened the stability of the country as a whole and created a dangerous precedent for other African nations.

of imperialism in Africa demanded The overall interests that Katanga be reabsorbed into the Congo. The UN was the best instrument for effecting the reabsorption Katanga into the Congo2° Secondly, the popular movement and its leadership had to be destroyed.

The first air was achieved through military intervention. Throughout 1961 and 1962 the UN and the Congolese 22

mercenaries. Tshombe Subsequently in the Congo had lasted three years.

its hold. Even so, in a coup of 1965 driven into prison or exile.

Table 1 1 2 Industries 3 4 5 Total output army fought Tshombe's Katangan gendarmes and his hired eventually succumbed, announcing the end of Katangan secession in January 1963. The UN force remained in the Congo until 1964 to supervise the integration of Katanga into the Republic of the Congo.

The second objective proved more difficult to achieve.

Although there was no unified opposition to the UN constant unrest undermined the various attempts that were made to find a stable solution. The new state waged a long and bitter war of attrition against the In April 1962 the Union of Congolese Workers led a national strike in protest against unemployment, by this time at a level of 50 per cent. Like other sporadic outbreaks of organised opposition, this was crushed by troops.

Kasavubu sacked half the Cabinet. Later in the year the of the popular movement were forced into exile in Brazzaville, where they set up an impotent provisional government. It included Gizenga (PSA), supporters of Lumumba's MNC and the Katangan Baluba. But pressure inside the Congo mounted. Kasavubu was forced to shut down parliament in September 1963 and concentrate his attack on the opposition movement. Bourgeois democracy months the anti-imperialist movement was destroyed before it could achieve anything.

The suppression of mass opposition by the army, the UN, Belgian troops and Katangan mercenaries - who joined in the bourgeois offensive when Tshombe was integrated into the goverment - allowed imperialism to consolidate the inherent weakness of the bourgeoisie meant that the new regime was built on shaky foundations.

the state had to be bolstered up by military dictatorship. When Mobutu, head of the army, seized power there was no one left to oppose him.

Exhausted by half a decade of civil war, the mass movement offered no resistance. Any remaining opponents were The Congo was devastated during the five years of internecine strife. Between June 1960 and the end of 1964 the volume of production fell by a quarter.21 Agricultural output slumped; between 1958 and 1966 its share in the of production fell from 40 per cent to 25 Economic growth in Zaire, 1958-7222 Value million francs Commercial agriculture 11 Mines and metallurgy 10 4 Buildings, public works, public utilities 3 28 Value of foreign trade and proportion of total output 5 Value of state services and proportion of total output g 19 20 21 22 1958 Value Per cent million Zaire 40 27 33 54 18 15 12 9 100 108 16 41 29 50 23 While the masses faced famine imperialists and their local allies prospered. They made 14 Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (CRISP), Congo 1959, Bruxelles, 1960, p129.

All of the petit-bourgeois organisations which came to represent anti-colonial sentiment emerged in the period of militant activity just before independence. None had a cohcrent tradition of political work. Most had grown out of radical reading groups set up during the 'fifties. They included: (a) The Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), led by Kasavubu. Organised since 1950, it only became a party in 1959. It demanded independence for the traditional homeland of the Bakongo, the dominant tribe of the Lower Congo, but found little support beyond this key area. (b) The Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), led by Antoine Gizenga and also founded in 1959. This was a federalist organisation formed in opposition to ABAKO. Its fedcralist ideology gave it a weak leadership with the result that in many arcas its militant youth membership maintained substantial autonomy.

MNC(L). This was Patrice Lumumba's majority faction of the MNC which split in the summer of 1959. The MNC had been the first centrally organised nationalist party. Unconstrained by ethnic divisions, pre-election period. In the 1960 elections it emerged as the largest single party. Out of 137 seats, it won 33 outright and closely on Kwame Nkrumah, was the popular and outspoken ideologue of radical petit-bourgeois nationalism.

Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga, founded CRISP, Congo 1960, Vol 1, Bruxclles, 1961, pp75-76.

Force Publique was a paramilitary group, created by the Belgian administration to suppress tribal disturbances and enforce the collection of taxes. Quoted in I Archer, Congo - the birth of a new nation, Bailey Bros, Folkestone, 1971, p134 This upset the more short-sighted sections of the bourgeoisie.

US Senator Barry Goldwater spoke out strongly against the UN: We have seen the inexplicable and disgusting episode in the Congo when the United Nations, financed by $40 million of US money, brought war into Katanga, the one part of the Congo where there was peace and a growing prosperity, and insisted that the government there submit to a Communist dominated central authority'. Quoted in ibid, p158.

Rapport Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967, p38 Rapport Banque du Zaire, 1968-69, p32; 1972-73, p68; J L Lacroix, Industrialisation au Congo, structures economiques, Paris, 1966, p30.

1966 Value million Per cent Zaire 25 91 50 163 16 102 43 9 100 399 168 38 46 172 and repression the Mouvement National Congolais (Lumumba) - the the MNC(L) grew rapidly in the immediate Lumumba, who modelled transformation des 1972 Per cent 22 41 25 11 100 42 43

sure that the production of refined copper was maintained; foreign capital kept control in this key sector of the economy. Table 2 opper output? housand metric tonne 1960 1965 pper mine producti fined copper producti The emergent national bourgeoisie strengthened its position in trade and commerce. Trade as a proportion of total output leapt from 16 per cent to 38 per cent between 1958 and 1966. Although state revenues were limited as a result of the breakdown of the tax system, the national bourgeoisie's control of the available resources allowed it to use government funds for its own benefit. The money supply more than trebled between June 1960 and the end of 1964, while the salaries of state officials were kept up and even increased 24 The bourgeoisie's solution to the weakness of the economy was to tighten the screws on the working class and the petit bourgeoisie; this was the objective of Mobutu's monetary reform of June 1967.25 By the mid 'sixties the remnants of opposition had been wiped out and the territorial integrity of the country re-established. The stabilisation of Mobutu's autocratic regime allowed the Congo to emerge from the turmoil that followed independence into a short period of rapid growth.

CAPITALISM IN ZAIRE

growth in the advanced capitalist countries during Steady the 'sixties created a continuous demand for the Congo's raw materials. The economy expanded, largely as a result of state-supported foreign investment in mining and the economic infrastructure. The extent of these investments was strictly limited by the amount of money that the state could borrow on Western capital markets. Development policies were tied to the accumulation of capital in the imperialist countries. The facade of economic independence was quickly torn away at the first sign of trouble in the Western capitalist world.

Zairean capital Under the Mobutu regime the feebleness of the national bourgeoisie led the state to become the major driving force of the economy, providing most of the capital inyested in mining, transport and telecommunications. It also had a major stake in manufacturing industry, trade, and to a lesser extent in banking and insurance.26 Largescale state involvement in the economy continued the pattern laid down in the colonial era. Widespread destruction of the productive forces during the first five years of independence forced the state to step in to reorganise production. The decline in the public sector investments which underpinned the economy was only halted after the stabilisation measures introduced by Mobutu in 1965.27 Though the state held a dominating position in the Congolese economy it could not insulate it from the laws accumulation. This became clear when world copper prices plummeted: the Congo suffered a substantial 24 reduction in revenue. Though the average annual price of copper fell by 27 per cent between 1970 and 1972, mine output and refined production rose by less than 15 per cent 28 Public sector investment programmes could only be maintained by heavy borrowing from the imperialist Foreign capital Throughout the boom foreign investment dominated the most profitable sectors of the economy. In 1967 output from foreign dominated enterprises accounted for per cent of Zaire's Gross National Product (GNP).29 A degree of political stability made possible a substantial increase in the input of foreign capital. As production expanded the imperialist powers became more and more in manufacturing industry. They further encouraged by liberal trade relations and generous concessions. By 1967, 41 per cent of foreign investment was going into manufacturing, being channelled into the profitable processing sector that had grown up around mineral extraction and commercial agriculture.30 processing accounted for 16 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and took up 43 per cent of foreign direct investment. 31 As the colonial era came to an end Belgium's rivals began to penetrate the Congo. Although they made some advances in the manufacturing sector, they could not break the long-standing Belgian monopoly Even as late as 1967 Belgium still held 88 per cent of the foreign capital in the Congo.32 Most of this investment was in the mining industry, which provided the state with its primary source of revenue. The copper industry illustrates the inter-relationship between the state and foreign capital in the exploitation of the Congo's resources.

Copper from the Congo was as vital to the Belgian economy after independence as it had been throughout the period. Even after 1971, well over half of Belgium's imports of refined copper came from Zaire. 33 In 52 percent of the copper processed in Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, a 44 per cent UM-owned refinery in Olen, Belgium, was still supplied by Zaire. Throughout the 'sixties the emerging national bourgeoisie tried to take advantage of its most precious export by seizing control of In 1967 the government nationalised UM, the largest mining concern in the Congo and transferred the assets to the state-owned Gecamines. However, this change of ownership did not jeopardise Belgian interests, for the management of production and 'marketing was entrusted to a UM subsidiary - the Societe Generale des Minieres (SGM). Nationalisation revealed the full implications of the monopoly on technical expertise which the Belgians had jealously guarded over decades. This, together with control over financing, ensured continuing Belgian supremacy in the Katangan copper belt. The compensation agreement which accompanied nationalisation guaranteed SGM six per cent of the value of metal sold until 1982, and one per cent subsequently. An attempt in 1974 to terminate this agreement and establish direct control of the industry was unsuccessful 34 Power remained firmly in the hands of the Belgian company, whilst Gecamines continued to bear the full cost of extraction.

Foreign domination placed strict limits on the activity of the Zairean state. It was reduced to the role of a mediator between imperialism and the local bourgeoisie, borrowon the world market to finance This became particularly copper prices began to fall and the limitations of a development strategy based on a single industry were clearly

laintain its publi Table 3 villion Zai Fonds Belgo-Zairois

JSAID

ciete Generale de Banq rst National City Ban lorgan Crenfell and Tok lorgan Guaranty Trus Other bank: )ther public institutions Total financial debt The state compensation. Table 4 1958-7238 Mines and metallurgy Output Employment Productivity Manufacturing industries Output Prade maye financial crash. Table 3 shows the scale and diversity of Zaire's indebtedness to international banks: ire's slide into debt December To attract foreign capital, the state in Zaire had to do more than build roads and railways and install electricity networks.

If it was to create the right climate for foreign investors, it also had to suppress the working class. It was obliged to look after the interests of the layers of society on whose support the unstable state apparatus depended A major priority of the state was to rationalise production. In mining the organic composition of capital rose constantly in the drive to increase the productivity of labour. Rising investment created fewer and fewer jobs.

Between 1969 and 1973 investment worth Zaire 473 million provided employment for only 19 000 workers. 37 Employment in mining fell by. a third between 1958 and 1972, with only a small increase in manufacturing employment as Changes in output, employment and productivity 1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 1473 64 42 62 3 28 38 - 25 25 15 2 18 - 10 111 221 1966 1972 83 105 60 66 138 160 109 87 125 25 Table 5 (in thousands) Permanent wage employment From aman marmand otal permanent employment ercentage of populati du Congo, 1967, pp198-99.

Banque du Zaire, 1970-71, p94.

became relatively less important.

J Houyoux, 1967, 1968-69, 1972-73. The workforce in Zaire 39 1959 7650 663 167 830 World Copper Statistics since 1950, World Bureau of Metal The monctary reform devalued the Congolese franc to about 30 por cent of its former valuc, from an exchange rate of 180 Congolese francs = US $1 to 500 Congolese francs = US $1 (1 Zaire = 1000 Congolese francs). Rapport Banque Nationale The state had an 81 per cent share of the 'value added' in the mining sector, 97 per cent in metallurgy, 85 per cent in trans port and telcommunications, but only 10 per cent of banking and insurance. Its share in the capital of the enterprises it controlled was also very high: 89 per cont in mining, 38 per cent in manufacturing industries, 36 per cent in banking and insurance.

See 'L'entreprise privee ctrangere en Republique du Zaire', public sector's contribution to formation was less than a third of that of the private sector: by 1970 this proportion had risen to more than a half, although this was still far below the 1958 lovel. See Bulletin BCB, November 1959 and Rapport Banque du Zaire, 1968-69, p44 Calculated from various issues of World Metal Statistics, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, London.

H Hveen, "The extent and type of direct foreign investment in in C Widstrand, ed, Multinational firms in Africa, In 1971, 1972 and 1973 the share of Zaircan refined copper in total Belgian refined copper imports was 76, 70 and 67 per centrespectively. Calculated from World Metal Statistics, op cit.

A more serious challenge to Belgian capital came from rival imperialist powers searching for raw materials and keen to invest in Zaire. Two large consortia, the Japancse Societe pour le Developpement de l'Industrie Miniere au Zaire (Sodimiza) and the American-led Societe Miniere de Tenke-Fungurume, entered the fight for Zaire's copper in the early 'seventies.

Rapport Banque du Zaire, 1968-69, p105 and 1972-73, pp132, 143. There was also an important change in the composition of this debt during this period. Private lending by banks and financial groups increased substantially while public lending Ibid, 1967, pp38,69; 1968-69, pp34,67; 1972-73, pp64,68.

'Budgets menagers', Nutrition et Mode de vie a Kinshasa. PVZ., Paris, 1973, p23; Rapport Banque du Zaire, 1968 1972 9280 11 500 500 680 225 210 710 905 8 No 64, 1972, pl2 and Rapport

• he visi reserve army gave the bourgeoisie a powerful weapon with which to drive down wages. The defeats suffered by the mass movement during the years of civil war enabled the Mobutu regime to implement draconian austerity measures. Between 1960 and 1973 the minimum wage of workers in Kinshasa fell by about one half.40 The state also provided the funds necessary for the upkeep of the ruling class. Mobutu's regime was based on the small commercial bourgeoisie and the administrators of the state bureaucracy. This social stratum was funded by taxing profits. In 1970 value added taxes consumed twothirds of the surplus of Gecamines, which itself provided more than half of the state's tax revenue. Through its control of the state apparatus the bourgeoisie used taxes to maintain its social position and enhance its political power.

Limits to growth By 1973 Zaire appeared to be moving towards prosperity.

Revenues from copper had increased by more than 130 per cent between 1965 and 1970.41 In the same period GNP grew by an average of 5.7 per cent each year,42 Yet by early the limited scope for capitalist development had already become apparent. Even if copper prices had stayed high and production had continued to expand, export earnings would have been insufficient to pay for the oil Iood and the capital goods necessary for Zaire's industrial development. To meet its commitments the state had to expand its budget by 25 per cent in 1974.43 This massive increase in state spending was financed by further public borrowing, which shot up from a planned annual figure of £25m in early 1973 to £105m by December of the same To finance its industrial investment the state became even further dependent on export earnings from minerals in general and copper in particular. Between 1958 and 1972 the share of mineral exports as a percentage of total exports rose from 59 per cent to 82 per cent, The change took place mainly at the expense of agriculture; its share of exports declined from 41 per cent to 14 per cent. 45 The consequences of the narrow basis for capital accumulation became evident after 1973. Difficulties caused by the increase in the price of oil imports were compounded by a catastrophic fall in copper prices. 46 The state was forced to cut back drastically on its expenditure By 1974 it was clear that the transient boom made possible by rising copper revenues had failed to alter the structure of the Zairean economy. When the capitalist recession unfolded Zaire was still highly dependent on its narrow mineral base. In addition the penetration of imported consumer goods had risen substantially during the 'sixties. The strategy of substituting domestically produced goods for imports was a failure because of the restricted development of manufacturing and the grip of cheap foreign goods on the small home market. Even in this development had been only through state indebtedness - indebtedness to world imperialism. From 1967 to 1974 the ratio of debt repayments to export revenue climbed from 2.4 per cent to 11.7 per cent, the second highest in Africa 47 The backwardness of Zairean capitalism has been constantly reinforced by the world economy. Development in Zaire is reliant on the pace of accumulation in the imperialist countries. When the giants of the capitalist world were plunged into recession in the early 'seventies the outlook for the puny Zairean economy was bleak 26 Recession and intervention The world crisis generates powerful foreign intervention in Zaire. The recession has led to the breakdown of the domestic economy and to a sharp decline in both industrial and agricultural production. Unemployment, hunger and disease have provoked riots and resistance against a corrupt and incompetent regime which is finding it increasingly difficult to protect vital foreign investments.

At the same time deepening conflict among rival imperialist for the rich resources of Zaire compels each to strive for greater influence. Military force is becoming the only way to safeguard the interests of imperialism.

Breakdown In just two months copper prices in 1974 tumbled from a record level of $1.40 per pound to $0.60 - a price below the cost of production in Zaire.48 As a result of the Angolan civil war this disaster was made worse by the closure of the Benguela railway, the cheapest export route from the mining province of Shaba. There was an immediate contraction in the mineral and metallurgical sector - in 1975 by 3.2 per cent and by 11.6 per cent the following year. 49 Today the production of both copper and cobalt (which is largely extracted as a by-product of the same ore) is still falling. Copper output fell by 6.7 per cent in 1978.50 The most optimistic forecasts have predicted a level of output for 1979 a third less than that of 1977.

Manufacturing output also overall declined in each successive year after 1974.51 In 1974-75 there was a $0.5 billion deterioration in Zaire's balance of trade, a severe setback for a country with a GNP of only $3 billion. By the end of 1976 Zaire's external public debt was $3.3 billion 52 To repay its foreign borrowing Zaire became more dependent than ever on loans and capital goods. Between 1970 and 1976 debt service payments rose from 4.4 per cent to 11.7 per cent of the revenue from exports 53 In an attempt to finance this debt Zaire went still further into the red to pay for imports Rampant inflation was spread still further by high government spending, which exceeded revenues by a third.

Factories were forced to work at less than 50 per cent capacity. Even before the 1979 OPEC oil price rises, Zaire could afford no more than 60 per cent of its fuel requirements. Bureaucratic corruption ensured that 90 per cent of Zaire's fuel was consumed in the capital Kinshasa; Shaba, whose rich mineral deposits are the source of 60 per cent of Zaire's foreign exchange, was left with only minimal supplies 55 Unemployment reached astronomical levels. In Kinshasa province it was recently estimated at 80 per The crisis hit agricultural production heavily. By 1978 Zaire, formerly self-sufficient in agricultural produce, had run up a food import bill of $300 million. 57 This accounted for a third of all foreign exchange expenditure. Cultivation for the market was deterred by government controls on agricultural prices. For example, an index of the price of manioc, the staple food crop in the Western zone, declined from 126 in 1960 to 36 in 1974 (June 1967 = 100) 58 In a desperate bid to appease its creditors the Government continued to expropriate more than half the peasants' income through ruthless taxation.

The savage measures necessary to regenerate capitalism in Zaire force more and more workers to the brink of starvation. Since 1972 import controls have boosted the prices of imported foods. Successive devaluations and the efforts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to direct foreign exchange into debt servicing and productive industry

have cut living standards still further. The following table shows the fall in real wages since independence: Table 6 The fall in real wages in Kinshasa?

(1960=100 Minimue nice Real wax index 100 100 June 1960 100 May 1964 383 576 67 October 1971 960 1486 65 September 1975 1274 3100 41 March 1976 1530 5888 25 The Financial Times recently commented on the con sequences of these drastic wage cuts for the working class: "It is calculated that real wages in the cities are a fifth of what they were in 1960. The wage of an unskilled worker, some Zaire 4( a month, does not buy one bag of manioc flour, the staple diet. One bag feeds two people for a month 60 The results of driving wages below the poverty line include endemic malnutrition, high levels of infant and maternal mortality and short life expectancy. The poor health of the masses leaves them open to epidemics of infectious diseases One recent outbreak of cholera spread rapidly and killed 8500 people, 61 Resistance and repression The decaying social fabric of Zairean society gives rise to continual spontaneous revolts against the established order.

One such uprising took place in the traditionally prosperous region of Idiofa in January 1978; 2000 local people were killed. Smaller riots are almost everyday events.

The organised political opposition was recently (and not inaccurately) dismissed by Mobutu as 'the rotting corpses of the Today it consists of numerous groupings of Mobutu's rivals, defeated by him in the early struggles for power. Lacking support in Zaire, condemned to political isolation in Brazzaville, Brussels and The National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) has its origins in Tshombe's Katangan gendarmerie.

Many young exiled Shabans have been attracted by its radical anti-Mobutu rhetoric. Although the programme of the FNLC is nationalist, its support is confined to Shaba; it has won little sympathy in the country as a whole. Like most of the opposition factions it reflects divisions within the weak national bourgeoisie. Such movements, however, gain in strength as the pressures of imperialism Mobutu to alienate more and more sections of the ruling class. In Zaire there is a ready response for any appeal to nationalism against foreign interference. However, as long as Mobutu's Western backers are forthcoming with military and economic aid, the fragmented opposition has little hope of success. The working class has no organised representation on a national scale. There are no nation-wide independent trade unions. The Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Zaire (UNTZA), which was formed in 1967 from three major federations, is a government institution. Genuine trade union organisation is illegal and all strikes are banned The spontaneous revolts in Zaire have exposed the weakness of the state. The ruling stratum has no hesitation 27 in putting down resistance, though it lacks the strength and cohesion to deal with the ill-organised but widely dispersed opposition. The Government receives expert guidance, training and equipment from the West to assist its repressive activities, but it is still incapable of keeping order.

Exacerbated by the crisis, conflicts within the national bourgeoisie now extend into the state apparatus. The army has been kept weak to prevent it becoming a pole of opposition to the Government. Soldiers are for the most part untrained, and often unpaid; this is why they are usually more interested in looting than in supremacy is ensured by granting concessions to the army on political and ethnic grounds. The Presidential Guard of four battalions, drawn mainly from Mobutu's home province Equateur, is well paid and trained by European advisers.

Any opposition within the army is crushed remorselessly.

After an attempted coup in 1975, seven generals, twelve colonels, eighteen majors, thirteen captains and eleven lieutenants were charged with complicity; after summary courts martial, a number were shot.62 In March 1978, thirteen alleged conspirators against the state, including nine army officers, were executed.

The civilian population is policed by the National Documentation Centre. It conducts counter-insurgency operations, using special "re-education' camps such as the one at Locanda in Kivu province. Refugees who had fled to Angola from the fighting in Shaba in 1978 have been singled out for repression on their return. Many have been tortured and imprisoned; others have disappeared and are presumed dead. 40 Lacroix, op cit, p203; Rapport Banque du Zaire, 1967, pp 182, 185-86,190; 1968-69, pp72,190; 1970-71, p97; 1972-73, pp93-95 41 Calculated from World Metal Statistics, op cit and from Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), World Outlook, 1979, p105.

World Bank, World Tables, 1976.

42 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, first quarter 1974.

43 Rapport Banque du Zaire, 1967, pp38,121-24; 1970-71, pp20, 75; 1972-73, p200 46 The price of copper fluctuated wildly throughout the early EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, first quarter 1977, pб.

48 C Young, 'Zaire: the unending crisis, Foreign Affairs, Vol 7, No 1, 1978, p171 49 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, annual supplement 1978, African Business, June 1979, p36.

EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, annual supplement 1978, 52 World Bank, Annual Report, statistical annex, 1978, p124.

Ibid, p126. 53 54 The volume of imported capital goods relative to the total touction of industrial goods remained at a very high level of S5 Africa Research Bulletin, 15 January-14 February 1979, p4989.

56. Ibid. Ibid, 15 March-14 April 1979, p5057.

57 58 Young, 'Zaire: the unending crisis, op cit, p176.

59 See Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zairois, 'Positions concernant la politique des salaires, cited in J Ryneman, 'Comment le regime Mobutu a sape ses propres fondaments, Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1977. 60 Financial Times, 12 February 1979.

61 The Guardian, 1 February 1979. Lack of official statistics makes it difficult to trace the attack on the working class in Zaire. The International Labour Office Yearbook for 1978 contains no entries for population, employment, hours of work, wages and salaries, accidents or disputes.

62 New African, July 1978, pls.

The crisis plunges Zaire into deeper and deeper chaos.

The Belgian Foreign Ministry recently summarised the breakdown of economic and political order: 'As far as Kinshasa is concerned, difficulties can break out any day. There are already local riots and demonstrations carried out, in some cases by unhappy and disaffected troops of the Zaire Army.

There is a real danger of fighting between these armed gangs and other units of the Zaire army. Kinshasa is in danger also because food is becoming more and more scarce. The people have nothing to eat and there is little or no medicine. Serious riots are now threatened and the Zaire Army cannot guarantee security to the Europeans 63 The implications of this statement are clear: if the Government cannot keep order, then foreign troops will be obliged to step in. Imperialist strategy 'If the almost indefensible President Mobutu is to be defended, his helpers are entitled to impose conditions 64 The prospect of imperialist interference in Zaire was brought closer by the inability of the Government to pay its debts.

In June 1975 Zaire fell behind on its interest payments; subsequently it has failed to meet other commitments. In January 1976 Chase Manhattan was obliged to suspend a nine year loan of $227 million, and $250 million of US export credits were postponed indefinitely. 65 The IMF, the agency which advances the general interests of imperialism in Zaire, has imposed more stringent controls and conditions on the national bourgeoisie. It is less concerned with the amount of capital at risk (only $400 million, divided among 120 banks) than with the circumstances that led to today's unprecedented moratorium on loans to Zaire. The imperialist nations are anxious to discourage other countries with weak economies, such as Peru, the Sudan and Turkey, from reneging on their debts. The IMF dispatched top troubleshooter Erwin Blumenthal to run the Bank of Zaire. He acted swiftly to control the use of foreign exchange: *Banks cannot now open a letter of credit unless they have the foreign exchange in their own hands. They cannot add to existing debt, and 30 per cent of export receipts must be automatically sent to the Banque du Zaire. The remaining 70 per cent has to be split according to a strict set of guidelines: 35 per cent to raw materials, spare parts etc, 33 per cent to food and pharmaceuticals, cent to invisibles, 2 per cent to energy and 5 per cent to The IMF must show that debts can be paid; it must insist on the imposition of the measures necessary to achieve financial solvency, The problem that confronts imperialism at every turn is the inability of the national bourgeoisie to defend the interests of capital. The difficulty is that debt repayment requires not only the pauperisation of the workers and peasants, but also attacks on sections of the bourgeoisie.

This threatens the very foundations of Mobutu's regime.

Inevitably the Government has proved incapable of carrying through the demands of foreign capital. This became clear in August 1978 when Zaire failed to raise the security necessary for a $250 million Eurocredit.67 Bofossa, then Governor of the Bank of Zaire, pleaded that further talks on the rescheduling of commercial loans should be postponed for at least six months.

The patience of Zaire's creditors began to wear thin when it became obvious that little was being done to restructure the economy. It was further strained by the obvious fact that much revenue was consumed by a profligate and decadent ruling clique instead of being used to revive the economy. Bourgeois cynics at the Economist Intelligence Unit gave vent to the exasperation of metro- 28 politan usurers at the misuse of their credit: 'Repression and inequality that might be tolerated if they led to rapid capital formation in Zaire are insupportable when they result in the conspicuous consumption of an unproductiv lite and the banking of funds in Switzerland' 68 Imperial ism's need to force Zaire to repay its debts and make better use of foreign exchange points to the need to assume direct political control. In Zaire the imperialist powers are caught in a contradiction of their own making. They need to maintain Mobutu for the same reason that they have always backed him - he can pursue the interests of foreign capital and contain the potential threat from the masses more efficiently than direct European occupation. Yet the deepening world recession daily reveals the incapacity of Mobutu's dictatorship to safeguard foreign interests. Increasingly, these pressures force imperialism to resolve its problems through military invasion. Imperialist rivalry Most advanced capitalist countries have important investments in Zaire. At the end of 1975, foreign investment was valued at over $1 billion.69 Fiat, British Leyland and General Motors all have assembly plants there - all working today at a fraction of capacity. In the fiercely competitive climate generated by the recession, each imperialist nation must try to increase its share of the market and secure cheap raw materials at the expense of the others. The scramble for Zaire is encouraged by the weakness of Belgium, the traditional colonial power. It is wide open for redivision amongst the contending forces of world imperialism.

Belgium's share of Zaire's import market fell from 22 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent in 1975. In these years of expanding investment the major part of capital and commodity imports came from the countries with the most productive economies. The USA led the field in the sale of high technology goods, the share held by it and Canada rose from 12 per cent to 20 per cent between 1970 and 1975. In the same period West Germany's import share rose from 9 per cent to 15 per cent.?° The pattern of foreign investment in Zaire has changed over the last few years. The USA has been less prepared to risk capital in the trouble spots of central Africa. However, nations like France and Belgium, which are more dependent on Africa and have less solid domestic economies than the USA, cannot afford to be so discriminating71 The US share of the agricultural equipment market declined to the advantage of European suppliers, encouraged as they were by government export guarantees.

Japan has also sought a share in Zaire's market, offering the most competitive investment terms of all the imperialist powers. Recently the Ishicawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Company and five other Japanese firms won a $172 million contract to build a suspension bridge across the river Zaire??

The immediate conflict over Zaire is between France which increased its share of the and Belgium. France, Zairean import market from 8.6 per cent in 1970 to 14 per cent in 1975, is crucially dependent on Africa,73 However, since the recession began to bite in 1974 the French Treasury has been unable to finance all its African commitments. French companies have been forced to complement state grants by borrowing at punitive market rates of interest (12-13 per cent in 1978). France can no longer compete with other national capitals. In 1975 it lost out in the negotiations at the Lome Convention; German support for free trade triumphed over its attempts to check US and Japanese intrusions into a traditional European market by keeping preferential relations in Africa. France has been

obliged to adopt a more belligerent policy to compensate for its economic weakness.

France has established firm military links with the French-speaking countries of Africa. One commentator explained the simple logic behind these moves: 'By organising armies to be dependent on French logistics and training, France can exercise a degree of control over these countries' national politics ..!74 In addition to this extensive assistance, France maintains 12 500 troops of its own The French military build-up has provoked Belgian wrath. The Belgian Foreign Minister pinpointed the root of his country's animosity towards France in his polemic against its intervention in Zaire in 1977: 'France is particularly interested in Zaire's natural resources and Belgium resents this as international rivalry? Indeed, France's crass attempts to stake a claim in Zaire have antagonised not only Belgium but also Britain, Germany and the USA.

The reconquest of Zaire? 'Ideally Africa should be left to the Africans. But its resources are vital to the West! 77 Copper and cobalt are both vital to imperialism. Copper is a ctucial raw material for the telecommunications, electrical and engineering industries. Cobalt is necessary for the production of cutting tools, jet engines and permanent magnets. Zaire contains almost two thirds of the known world deposits of cobalt.78 And, to Western powers now sources of energy, Zaire offers rich reserves of uranium 79 Continuing difficulties in the production and supply of these important minerals force the imperialist powers into action. Supplies and investments in Zaire are under constant imperialist rivalries. These difficulties are compounded by the political instability of the surrounding countries. Despite US encouragement to a rapprochement between Zaire and Angola, the activities of UNITA (National Front for the Total Independence of Angola) guerrillas have frustrated efforts to reopen the Benguela railway. The southern transport route to South Africa, which at present carries more than 15 000 tonnes of copper per month, is liable to close at any time as a result of the war in Zimbabwe. 80 Imperialism cannot tolerate interruptions in its supplies.

Capital invested in mining is of a high organic composition with a long period of turnover. The demand for metals, and the risks involved in their extraction, mean that foreign powers will take over if the indigenous ones cannot maintain suitable conditions for production and distribution. Urging some form of intervention, one leading mining capitalist summarised the situation as follows: "Unless these countries are going to be content to sit on their copper resources without developing them, it seems inevitable that they will have to attract foreign capital, and to attract it will require the establishment of conditions which will be different to some of those ruling today. It is for this reason that I believe some of the present political constraints which I have mentioned earlier could be greatly modified 81 May 1977 was the first time since Mobutu came to power that foreign troops saw active service in Zaire.

Supported by French troops, Moroccan soldiers were deployed in a two month battle to repel FNLC guerrillas entering Shaba province from bases in neighbouring Angola.

A year later, a much more substantial force including many Shaba exposed the vulnerability of Mobutu's regime by capturing the important mining centre of Kolwezi.

This time European soldiers had to be drafted in; 600 French legionnaires were rapidly followed by 1000 Belgian paratroopers.82 Once Kolwezi had been recaptured and the immediate danger contained, the European forces were withdrawn.

An 'inter-Africa force' composed mainly of Moroccans and Senegalese, together with token forces from Togo, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, took over the supervision of law and order in Shaba.83 Zaire today provides a glimpse of the forces of barbarism unleashed by the capitalist recession. As the people turn to subsistence farming to escape starvation, the imperialist prepare to do battle for the country's mineral powers wealth. The process of decolonisation destroyed the antiimperialist movement, and today foreign troops can easily suppress resistance to Mobutu and the West.84 For the present imperialism has been able to hold back the popular struggle. But imperialism cannot develop the productive forces of Zaire. The future lies with the only force that can - the working class. Alan Harding 63 Africa Research Bulletin, Vol 16, No 2, 15 March 1979, p5167.

64 Editorial, The Economist, 27 May 1978, p14.

Euromoney, February 1979, p10 65 Circular No 156 dated 1 September 1978, quoted in ibid, p11.

66 67 Zaire could not raise the $130 million as required by Citibank to be deposited in the Bank for International Settlement in Basle. In fact it was forced to withdraw a further $18 million.

EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, second quarter 1978, p3 68 US Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Report, 69 Marketing in Zaire, April 1977, pl8 70 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, annual supplement 1976, p19 and 1978 p24 71 The US Department of Commerce observed at the end of 1976 that the only 'new machincry being bought to re-equip the forestry industry was German, supplied by Belgian companics with a long term relationship and willing to extend credit' Marketing in Zaire, op cit, p7.

72 Africa Report, March/April 1979, p36 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, annual supplement 1976, 73 p19 and 1978, p24 T Jallaud, 'France's intervention in Africa', Africa Background, 74 1979, p52 75 France keeps five military bases in Africa: in Djibouti, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Mayotte.

intervention in Africa in 1978, The World Today, February Africa Research Bulletin, May 1978, p4858.

Editorial, Daily Mirror, 31 May 1978.

700 000 out of 1.1 million tonnes. Africa Research Bulletin, 15 March-14 April 1979, p5057. Sixty-five per cent of US imports of cobalt originate in Zaire. Africa Report, September/ October 1978, p15. This is a major concern of France which has embarked on a massive programme of investment in nuclear energy. Africa Research Bulletin, 15 May-14 June 1978. p4705 The Guardian, 15 March 1979 Sir Ronald Prain, 'African mining in the doldrums, African Business, pre-issue, September 1978, p15.

The Belgian army, lacking the immediate strike capacity of the French, was backed up by the USA. Although no US troops werc sent to the war zone, the 82nd Airborne Division was placed on alert and used to fly in food and supplies. Africa Research Bulletin, May 1978, p4855. President Carter, speaking at a NATO summit, welcomed the Franco-Belgian initiative in Zaire, and all efforts by NATO member countries 'to work for peace in Africa and support nations and peoples in need'. fbid, All foreign soldiers were due to pull out in summer 1979. As they provide the only security for 3000-4000 white technicians who remain in Shaba, the prospects for complete military withdrawal are remote 84 In February 1979, for example, Belgian troops were used to quell popular unrest around Kitona, 200 miles from Kinshasa.

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