Showdown in Zimbabwe

Showdown in Zimbabwe Today the war in Zimbabwe rages more fiercely than at any time since the fighting began in December 1972.1 In the last year more than 250 Rhodesian soldiers have died; in the first three months of 1979 about 1000 guerrillas were killed? A major escalation in the war has taken place since the Internal Settlement was signed on 3 March 1978. Events in Zimbabwe have become the focus of world attention, bearing witness to the seriousness with which imperialism regards the outcome of the struggle.

The result of the struggle in Zimbabwe will determine the future of Southern Africa. The potential threat to South Africa's vast interests in the area is something that the imperialist powers, and in particular Britain, cannot ignore.

The need to maintain spheres of influence within profitable investment and a ready supply of raw materials can be assured has made Southern Africa of paramount importance for imperialism.

It is not only the imperialist nations which want a stable solution in Zimbabwe. The Front Line states of Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania and Angola have made numerous attempts to clamp down on the nationalist forces.

The intensification of the war and the failure of lan Smith's Rhodesian Front (RF) to defeat the armed guerrillas has badly disrupted the economies of Zambia and Mozambique.

The tacit support which the Front Line states give to the Patriotic Front (PF) means that the war inevitably extends onto their own terrain. The raids on refugee and guerrilla camps have become a regular feature of the fighting. As 'Rhodesia's top soldier', Lieutenant-General Sir Peter Walls, put it: "There is no single day of the year we are not operating beyond our borders'.3 The direct threat to stability in these countries forces them, too, to seek a rapid settlement through negotiation. to succeed, any settlement must include the nationalist guerrilla leaders. Their parties retain considerable support in Zimbabwe and they are vital to its long-term stability. The war can only be ended by including the PF or one wing of it within an all-party settlement - a solution which has so far proved elusive.

The guerrilla war has pushed the Rhodesian economy to the limit. Together with subsidies for crops necessitated by sanctions and the fighting, the war accounted for 40 per cent of government spending and 15 per cent of Gross of 19784 In Domestic Product (GDP) by the beginning July 1979, lan Smith announced that the cost of the war had quadrupled in the previous five years, Rh$0.26m to Rh$1.Im a day.5 The public sector is one of the few expanding areas of the economy. It grew by 24 per cent in 1977, largely because of the mounting cost of military and civilian security.6 Since 1975 real GDP has fallen by 13 per cent? In 1977 alone the output of the manufacturing sector declined by 9.4 per cent? When account is taken of an overall population increase of 13 per cent since 1974, it is clear that living standards have fallen by 25 per cent.® The effect war on the economy is shown by the decline in investment, especially in the manufacturing and service sectors; gross fixed capital formation fell from 23 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 17.4 per cent in 1977.10 30 In a country where whites make up less than four per cent of the population, military call-up has created a shortage of skilled white workers. This shortage has been compounded by high rates of emigration. More and more people have chosen to leave the country as conditions have deteriorated. They include many of the 45 per cent of the white population which came to the country in the 10 years after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.11 A major exodus has begun; the white population fell by 11 000 in 1977 (3.5 per cent) and by a further 14 000 in 1978.12 In the first four months of 1979 a further 4500 settlers left the country - more than twice the total for the same period in 1978.13 Casualties on both sides have grown enormously since the Internal Settlement was signed. According to the RF 7000 guerrillas died between December 1972 and March 1978. In the following nine months at least another 6000 were killed - 800 of them in September alone. 14 figures exclude the thousands killed in attacks on refugee and training camps in Zambia and Mozambique.

Despite heavy losses the ranks of the guerrillas have continued to swell. Since 1977 the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) has expanded its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) Two groups of guerrillas have finished their training in Tanzania, putting a force of at least 15 000 under the command of ZANU leader Robert Mugabe. The Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), numbered 10 000 in 1978, with a further 17 000 under training in Angola and Zambia 15 ZANLA has borne the brunt of the war in Zimbabwe: it has more than 10 000 guerrillas in the country, while ZIPRA forces number The effect of the war on the African population has been catastrophic. As part of the 'war effort' Africans have been thrown off the land into camps known as 'protected villages' (PVs). Many have been made landless, losing their subsistence; at the same time Rhodesia's agricultural productivity has been reduced. In May 1977 there were 203 PVs, containing 580 000 Africans, more than double the officia figure of 250 000.17 The occupants of these camps have been used as forced labour to build a more extensive road network. Hundreds of curfew-breakers have been shot by the security forces and many more have been tortured for helping the guerrillas. 18 These are the measures the RF has been forced to adopt to regain control of the countryside.

Repression has not deterred rural support for the guerrillas. Many Africans refuse to pay school or cattle.

dipping fees to the government. By the end of 1977 the non-payment of dues to the African Councils - the local government bodies in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) - had bankrupted 50 out of a total of 240.19 Rural administration has almost disintegrated. In the same year 36 000 children were boycotting school in the eastern TTLs. By June 1978 some 750 schools had been forced to close because of unpaid fees, and a further 63 had been burnt down by guerrillas20 By the end of the year 986 black primary and secondary schools had been closed, leaving 300 000 African

without education and 6000 teachers without Increased guerrilla activity in rural areas has widely disrupted agricultural production. Work on tea estates and white-owned farms in the eastern part of the country has been halted. ZANU has frequently shelled Umtali, a town at the centre of an area in which 70 per cent of white-owned farms have been abandoned 22 Of the country's 6100 white farms, some 2000 are now deserted as a result of the fighting. In August 1977 a Rhodesian official in the eastern part of the country admitted that the whole economy of the Honde Valley was near collapse, and that the area was being run by guerrilla forces 23 Since the Internal Settlement the rapid spread of martial law, which now covers 95 per cent of the country, has revealed the inability of the security forces to control the rural areas. The successful destruction of 14 PVs in May 1978 by ZANLA forces and the subsequent escape of the 30 000 occupants confirm this fact. By early 1978 Mugabe could claim that at least two thirds of the country consisted of 'semi-liberated areas'.24 The Smith regime has attempted to stem the growing influence of the Patriotic Front within Zimbabwe. Immediately after the Internal Settlement was signed the government lifted its ban on ZANU and ZAPU within the country in a desperate attempt to end the war. But the shooting down of a Viscount airliner and the killing of 10 survivors, allegedly by ZIPRA guerrillas, put an end to this strategy.

Selective martial law was introduced and the leaders of the internal wings of ZANU and ZAPU were thrown into prison25 At the same time the Zimbabwe Times, owned by the British-based Lonrho company, was banned by the RF for openly supporting Nkomo,26 In the last few months the growth of private armies attached to the nationalist parties supporting the Internal Settlement has added a new dimension to the war. Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU/ANC) are reported to control around 6000 armed auxiliaries throughout the country?

Recently the Pfumo Revanhu (Spear of the People), an auxiliary militia drawn from Sithole's and Muzorewa's private armies, has been formed. Although these militias include a few guerrillas who have left the Patriotic Front to join the Internal Settlement, most have been recruited from the urban unemployed. Peter Walls, head of the security forces, explained the relationship between the private armies and the Government: "These guerrillas are under the control and direction of the Let me clarify one They are on-side point. We call people who are fighting against the Goverment come on-sides with the Government, we call terrorists. If they them puerrillas 28 Many of these 'guerrillas' were trained abroad in Zaire, Libya. Malawi and the Sudan. 29 They were instrumental in coercing the African population to vote for their respective parties in the Internal Settlement elections in April 1979. Without them the Interim Government and the security forces would have been severely stretched The 1979 Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka has shown that the Internal Settlement has failed to achieve the stability that imperialism requires. One way or another, imperialism must preserve capitalist relations in Zimbabwe and strengthen its position in South Africa. However, whether it uses the smooth diplomacy of Commonwealth politicians or direct repression, imperialism postpone its ultimate defeat. It cannot contain the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

RHODESIA: A SETTLER STATE

The foundation of the white regime Since the turn of the century imperialism has maintained its interests in Zimbabwe through the white settler community The privileges granted to the white settlers ensured their support for imperialism. In this way, imperialism was guaranteed access to the country's raw materials while the Because of their imperialist connotations we reserve the terms 1 Rhodesia and Rhodesian for creations of British imperialism, such as the settler state and the security forces. The terms Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean are used in connection with the country's territorial boundaries and the struggle of the African masses. Financial Times, 1 May 1979 The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1978.

(EIU), Quarterly Economic Economist Intelligence Review, first quarter 1978, p3.

Financial Times, 27 July 1979. (Rh$1=£0.71, July 1979, Ed] 5 rhodesienne en 1977 et ses perspectives pour 1978', Marches Tropicaux, 15 October 1978, p2470.

7 Financial Times, 12 April 1979 EIU, op cit, fourth quarter 1977, p3.

Financial Times, 12 April 1979 Calculated from Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, 10 Central Statistical Office (CSO), Salisbury, April 1979, рб Rhodesia: white racism and imperial response, 11 M Loney, Penguin, 1975, p197. Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO, Salisbury, April 1979, pl.

12 Marches Tropicaux, 8 June 1979, p1562.

13 Rhodesia after the Internal Settlement, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIR), in consultation with the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (CCJP), 1978, p18; "Bright spots in the gloom", Financial Mail, 6 Oct- The Observer, 23 April 1978.

The Daily Telegraph, 23 April 1979.

I Atkinson, 'Counterinsurgency and terror against the African Revolution in Zimbabwe 7, Intercontinental Press, Val 15, No 39, 24 October 1977, p1172 In a policy codenamed Operation Turkey, the security forces have been driven to use food as a weapon of war. They have prevented rural Africans from feeding the guerrillas by allowing them their immediate food requirements alone. Grinding mills and shops have been closed down over wide areas, making the African peasantry bear the brunt of the war. Financial Times, 19 I Atkinson, 'Obstacles to mass mobilization', Revolution in Zimbabwe 6, Intercontinental Press, Vol 15, No 38, 17 October 20 International Herald Tribune, 17 June 1978.

'Private armies cause problems, New African, No 137, January 1979, p34. The health sector has seen the closure of 122 clinics 22 'Zimbabwe - a case of diminishing options, Africa, No 187, November 1978, p35. 23 Zimbabwe: the facts about Rhodesia, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, November 1977, p46.

24 'The war round Salisbury', Financial Mail, 24 February 1978 In early 1978 ZANLA leader J Tongogara claimed that there were 'not less than 15 000 active ZANU workers inside Rhodesia. They include guerrillas, village chairmen, secretaries and other political officials in areas which ZANU administers See Africa Confidential, Val 19, No 10, May 1978, pl.

The Times, 11 September 1978.

"Bright spots in the gloom', op cit.

International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1979 Rhodesia after the Internal Settlement, op cit, p14.

29 New African, May 1978, p31.

31

unhampered exploitation of the indigenous population was secured. Capitalist exploitation went hand in hand with the denial of democratic rights to the black population national oppression. Today this provides the backcloth for The colonisation of Zimbabwe was first undertaken by South Africa Company (BSAC) in the 1890s. The colony was named Rhodesia in his honour.

Anticipating mineral wealth comparable to the deposits discovered in the South African Rand, the company made large investments to develop the infrastructure of the region 30 But when the BSAC's initial optimism proved unfounded it turned to European settlement to make the colony pay. Settlement provided the BSAC with firmer control over the territory and greater security for its assets.

The value of its mines, railways and land increased considerably and BSAC was able to realise a substantial profit on its investments by selling land to the settlers. By 1923 more than 35 000 whites had settled in Zimbabwe and the region had been integrated into the British Empire 31 The invasion of European settlers had a drastic impact on the African population. They took the most fertile land and pushed the Africans onto the worst land. By 1922, 64 per cent of the population was confined to tribal reserves 32 A series of laws was passed forcing Africans to work on European farms and enterprises. Their wages were kept down through the Masters and Servants Act, which empowered the settler to dispose of his 'servant' at will.

Legislation was also introduced to curtail the free movement of Africans. African farmers were prevented from growing certain cash crops, guaranteeing European settlers a monopoly over profitable agriculture. Systematic discrimination against the African population was essential for the establishment of a viable, European settler community. The political oppression of the African population provided the framework for capitalist development in Zimbabwe. It is still necessary for capital accumulation today.

The white working class also played an important role in consolidating the hold of imperialism over the country.

Drawn to Zimbabwe to take up jobs in mining, transport and services, white workers from Britain and South Africa could earn much higher wages than in their home countries.

Their privileges depended on forcing Africans to play a subservient role in the economy. In this they shared a common interest with the bourgeoisie, and with the white farmers in particular. Both supported the repression of the black population the workers to maintain their higher wages and skilled status, the farmers to guarantee their control of the land The strength of the coalition between white workers and the bourgeois farmers and mine-owners allowed them to achieve a degree of independence from colonial control.

The introduction of 'Responsible Government' in 1923 made Southern Rhodesia a self-governing colony most of Britain's other colonies. Although still subservient to Britain, it had its own parliament, army and police The dominance of the white settlers over the African population was consolidated by legislation introduced in the 'thirties. The position of the white farmers was strengthened by the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, which institutionalised the racial allocation of all land. The privileges of European workers were further protected under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934; it stipulated that the term employee 'shall not include a native' 34 The same year saw the formation of the United Party (UP), which represented the common interests of Rhodesian whites without interruption for the next 28 years. This coalition of class interests could only be maintained through 32 the political oppression of the African masses. Capitalist domination took the form of national oppression - the denial of the most basic rights of the African majority.

Settler power The Rhodesian economy flourished after the Second World War. Between 1945 and 1953 GDP grew in real terms at an average annual rate of 10 per cent. 35 New local industries in the manufacturing sector expanded, encouraged by a policy of import substitution. Gross manufacturing output rose from £3m in 1938 to £14m in 1945; by 1957 it stood at £105m.36 The contribution of manufacturing to national income rose from nine per cent before the war, to 15 per cent in the early 'fifties and to over 18 per cent in the early 'sixties.37 The expansion of the economy was speeded up by the concentration and centralisation of capital, and a modern manufacturing sector began to emerge.

Nowhere was the concentration of capital more apparent than in the mining industry, and in particular in gold mining.

The closure of many small mines reduced the number of gold workings from 1754 in 1935 to 301 in 1956.38 Despite a decline in the contribution made by mining to GDP, from 25 per cent in 1938 to 10 per cent in the early 'fifties and to only five per cent in the early 'sixties, total output The expansion of agricultural production was stimulated by high prices on the world market. The total value of output soared from £4m in 1938 to £42m in 1957. The cultivation of tobacco accounted for a major part of this increase.40 Between 1948 and 1958, production trebled, the value of output increased fourfold, and the number of growers rose from about 1000 to 2669.41 Tobacco became the most important foreign exchange earner; between 1947 and 1953 exports jumped from £23m to £64m 42 Although in 1939 tobacco had made up only about 10 per cent of exports, by 1945 this figure had reached 27 per cent.43 The boom following the Second World War allowed the white working class to achieve higher living standards and strengthen its privileged position. A clear division of labour was established. White workers were assured of skilled jobs in the towns while the emerging African working class was consigned to unskilled labour in industry White supremacy was reinforced by the constant influx of new settlers anxious to share in the benefits of a prosperous Capital's strategy in Rhodesia was determined by the need for a regular supply of labour in the manufacturing industries and stable class relations in the countryside.

Much of the peasantry was dispossessed and an African working class emerged, expanding from 254 000 in 1936 to 377 000 in 1946. By 1955 it numbered more than half a million.44 As the conditions of the Africans in the reserves deteriorated they were forced to seek employment in the As the African working class grew black workers began to form their own trade union and political organisations In the late forties the struggle against economic exploitation precipitated a series of strikes. This militant action was seen by the white working class as a threat to its privileged position. Its privileges rested directly upon the subordination of African workers, and any attempt by blacks to bargain with capital on the same terms as white workers challenged their differentials. During the 'twenties the white labour movement had made clear its feelings on migrant labourers and the African peasantry, referring to them as 'potential blacklegs whom employers might use one day to undercut

white wages' 45 On every important occasion since then the white working class has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Rhodesian bourgeoisie in denying democratic rights to the African masses. The emergence of a militant African working class in the post-war period and the growth of the nationalist movement posed a direct threat to the entire white community. It was met with a united response. A revised version of the Industrial Conciliation Act introduced in 1959 protected white workers from African competition by discriminating in favour of skilled European workers. It allowed the state to maintain control over the black working class by regulating the formation of black trade unions. As the Minister of Labour said at the time: 'It could be argued that to provide for these associations is nothing more than a control measure and let me be perfectly frank, it is.45 Workers not covered by this Act, such as labourers and domestic servants, were employed under the terms of the Masters and Servants Act of 1901. This barbaric piece of legislation sets out a series of penalties for workers erring in the course of their employment. Further attacks on the African working class followed, with the introduction of measures such as the Unlawful Organisations Act, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Detention Act.

In the past 20 years the preservation of European privilege has required more intense political oppression.

Under the 1969 Land Tenure Act, the division of land into white and black areas was laid down, 'for all time'.47 New laws were passed to protect the reservation of skilled jobs for European workers. Even white semiskilled and unskilled workers in the lower echelons of the civil service and the immune to African competition.48 control of apprenticeships makes it nearly impossible for Africans to enter certain skilled trades.49 Political oppression has been a constant feature of life for the African masses, 'Responsible Government', through UDI, to the present Internal Settlement.

UDI: IMPERIALISM AND THE AFRICAN

WORKING CLASS

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the "illegal' Smith regime in 1965 merely represented an extension of 'Responsible Government'. UDI ratified the dominant social and political position of the European settlers. It was a recognition of the fact that power could not be transferred to an African middle class without infringing the privileges jealously guarded by the European community. The stabilisation of Smith's new government depended on its ability to contain the only consistent adversary of imperialism in Zimbabwe - the African working class.

Imperialism came to accept UDI because the strategy it had tried in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, the strategy of decolonisation, had failed. The attempt at decolonisation had been a response to the emergence of a militant African Industrial militancy, which reached a high point in the General Strike of 1948, was followed by rural unrest after the implementation of the 1951 Land Husbandry Act. To contain this rising resistance the settler regime sought the support of the nascent African middle class.

The 'fifties therefore the adoption of a new strategy of 'racial partnership', the aim of which was to build a buffer between the settler state and the African masses. It was hoped that a stratum of better-off Africans in the towns and countryside could be created and used as a stabilising influence on the African masses. The Land Husbandry Act was passed with the aim of concentrating land in the hands of a small number of African farmers.

introduced, leading to the establishment of multiracial schools and a 10 per cent annual growth in the number of teachers and pupils between 1956 and 1959.50 The electoral system was also modified to enfranchise the white regime's intended black friends. Fully supported by intemational capital, the European settlers carried out these measures to contain mass opposition and provide stability throughout Southern Africa. The new approach was summed up by Prime Minister Huggins: *we shall never do much with these people until we have established a native middle class?51 The other motive behind 'racial partnership' was to win acceptance for the proposed Central African Federation (CAF) from the African middle class of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia (now Malawi and Zambia). The aim of the CAF was to bring these two countries together into one economic unit under the domination of Southern Rhodesia.

The CAF was to take responsibility for the large debts which Southern Rhodesia had incurred and to control the investment of the revenue from sales of Northern Rhodesian copper. The backward economies of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were to become protected markets for the growing manufactures of Southern Rhodesia. The formation of the CAF was strongly encouraged by Britain and South Africa, which saw this new economic unit as a potentially profitable area for investment and a means for strengthening the hold of imperialism throughout the region.

The settlers' strategy foundered on the contradictions inherent in their own social position. This attempt to extend and consolidate settler power aroused African nationalist 30 G Arrighi, 'The political economy of Rhodesia' in G Arrighi & J Saul, Essays on the political economy of Africa, Monthly Review Press, New York & London, 1973, p336 31 C Stoneman, "Foreign capital and the prospects for Zimbabwe', World Development, Vol 4, No 1, 1976, p28 32 Arrighi, 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', in Arrighi & Saul, op cit, p202.

33 Loney, op cit, p15 P S Harris, "Industrial relations in Rhodesia", South African 34 Journal of Economics, Vol 42, No 1, 1974, p66.

C Stoneman, 'Economic development with unlimited supplies 35 of capital: the case of Southern Rhodesia, South African Labour Bulletin (SAL.B), Vol 2, No 7, February 1976, p4 36 L Tow, The manufacturing economy in Southern Rhodesia, mimeo, Washington, 1960, p4.

37 Arrighi, "The political economy of Rhodesia', op cit, p353.

38 Loney, op cit, pl14. Arrighi, 'The political economy of Rhodesia', op cit, p35.

39 I Atkinson, "The superexploitation of African labour, Inter- 40 continental Press, Vol 15, No 35, 26 September 1977, p1045.

41 Arrighi, 'The political economy of Rhodesia', op cit, p351.

42 M Faber, "Economic structuralism and its relevance to Southern Rhodesia's future', The Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No 36, p 29.

G Kay, Rhodesia: a human geography, University of London 43 Press, 1970, p47. 44 Stoneman, 'Foreign capital and the prospects for Zimbabwe', op cit, p31 Harris, op cit, p65. 45 46 Quoted in P F Sitholc, 'Major problems in union formation in Rhodesia in the 'seventies', SALB, March 1975, p6.

47 R Riddell, 'The land question', From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, CHIR, No 2, 1978, p5. P S Harris, 'Black industrial workers in Rhodesia', Mambo 48 Occasional Papers, 1974, p16.

49 P S Harris, 'Job reservation Rhodesian style', SALB, March 1975, p47. Arrighi, "The political economy of Rhodesia', op cit, p360.

51 Quoted in ibid. 33

sentiment in all three regions. Strong opposition to the CAF developed among the African population of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and resulted in the eruption of conflict within Southern Rhodesia itself. Most urban Africans saw the CAF as nothing more than an instrument of white Rhodesian domination over the other regimes in the federation. 1963 the CAF became completely and was dissolved. While Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were granted independence, imperialism was turn to more direct oppression to maintain its rule in Southern Rhodesia.

The emergence of political opposition to the CAF showed the settlers that, rather than containing unrest, 'racial partnership' fuelled it. Led by the Dominion Party (forerunner of the Rhodesian Front) the European settlers became determined to resist any arrangement which could set a precedent for majority rule. The reformist strategy fell foul of the settlers' interests. UDI, the institutionalisation of European privilege on an extended scale, was to ensure that everything would remain as before.

The economics of UDI In the late 'sixties Britain could not openly support the To retain their influence in black Africa the imperialists were forced to distance themselves from UDI. However, it was only in 1968 that full mandatory sanctions were imposed. By then the RF was ready for the gradual imposition of sanctions. Smith had withdrawn most of Rhodesia's reserves from London to South Africa before to freeze them. Thus, when Britain withheld payment of a sum of £5.Im owing to Rhodesian investors, Rhodesia retaliated by blocking the transfer of £8.8m due to Britain - netting £3.7m in the process.52 The initial effect of sanctions was to reduce Rhodesia's export earnings, and hence its capacity to import.53 Rhodesia responded by re-routing its trade through South Africar niddlemen 54 Foreign firms - with the exception of South African ones - became 'Rhodesianised' and were prevented from freely repatriating their profits. The state assumed control of industry to encourage the diversification of the Rhodesian economy. International companies were pressurised to re-invest locally and to diversify their production in line with the state's guidelines for import substitution 55 State intervention was used to direct foreign exchange away from commerce towards industry. The state found jobs for white workers facing unemployment. Often whites retained their jobs while local African workers were fired: they in turn were saved from massive lay-offs by the repatriation of These measures led to the recovery of the economy.

Between 1967 and 1974 the annual growth of the Rhodesian economy averaged eight per cent in real terms.57 Diversification led to a massive 212 per cent growth of secondary industry between 1966 and 1974. During the same period the volume of production rose by 110 per cent.58 The number of firms doubled as a result of the encouragement given to small companies by the state 59 The boom in manufacturing led to a transfer of capital from agriculture to industry. In 1964 agriculture contributed 21 per cent to GDP, more than any other single sector of the economy. Six years later manufacturing accounted for centsoer cent of GDP and agriculture for only 15.5 per Sanctions had the effect of weakening the position of the tobacco industry. Previously the main source of foreign exchange, tobacco had to be subsidised by the state after sanctions were imposed. Together with sugar, tobacco 34 was stockpiled while the state took measures to encourage the diversification of agriculture!

The RF used every opportunity to stabilise the economy, passing the costs of sanctions onto the Africans. The standard of living in the African areas fell drastically. Rural African income dropped from £15 per head in 1956 to £11 in 1968.62 The buttressing of the economy at the expense of the Africans resulted in a period in which profitability was high for international capital. South African capital, intertwined with British investment, maintained its strong position in the Rhodesian economy. UDI appeared to work The African working class UDI was also advanced as a solution to African working class working class grew during the "forties and 'fifties the African trade unions emerged as the main opposition to white rule in the urban areas. The bare fact that Africans were organising in defence of their interests posed an immediate threat to the settler state and to the privileges of white workers. The simplest trade union demands brought the black working class into political conflict with the Rhodesian state.

To stem the tide of African militancy the bourgeoisie introduced comprehensive state control over the trade unions. Under the amended Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 all unions were forced to register with the state. The restrictions imposed on union activity were such that strikes were practically banned; since 1959 there have been no "legal' strikes. The ability of the black working class to resist oppression was undermined by its own trade union bureaucracy. The union leadership's strategy was to restrict workers' activity to the narrow framework of wage arbitration. Politics was left to the nationalist movement.63 The legal trade unions could only survive in so far as they accepted the restrictions on their activities imposed by the settler state. Consequently the primary aim of the bureaucracy was to work within the system, even at the expense of the workers' immediate interests. The African trade union bureaucracy began to police the working class rather than defend it. Such strikes as did take place came up directly against the opposition of the union bureaucrats. As one observer noted: 'It is more common for strikes to "break out" in the plant or organisation and union leaders only appear on the scene, or are called in, after the crisis has arisen. Their role then is usually a mediating and moderating one, of negotiating with management and sometimes of trying to get the workers to go back to work 64 The trade union bureaucracy's control over the working class has been strengthened by the difficult conditions that workers face. Workers going on strike are threatened with immediate dismissal. Insecurity of employment is maintained through the existence of a large reserve army of labour.

Any vacancy can be filled at once. The scarcity of jobs is reinforced by a system of migration both inside Zimbabwe and from other states, especially from Mozambique and Malawi - a system which is used to keep wages low and to discipline the working class. Migration laws also ensure a high labour turnover and undermine the formation of a stable union membership 65 The evolution of African trade unions in a conservative direction was continually encouraged by imperialism. The creation of a moderate, pro-capitalist union leadership was assisted by financial aid from the AFL-CIO (the American

equivalent of the TUC) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The ICFTU in particular attempted to ensure that African trade unions followed a pro-Western policy in international politics. It supported various key trade union bodies in an effort to moderate the struggles of the African working class. In 1971 the ICFTU 'It is probably true to say that this country has received in recent years more intemational trade union other country on the African Conassistance than any tinent 66 This financial aid enabled the trade union bureaucracy to maintain its position.

The pro-imperialist politics of the trade union bureaucracy was personified in Reuben Jamela, the leader of the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SR TUC). Jamela resisted any move to involve the unions in the struggle for national liberation. When the National Democratic Party the leading nationalist organisation, called for a political strike, he protested: 'I cannot destroy industry when at the same time I want the same industries to flourish so that my followers may get better and higher wages 67 The trade union leadership did not merely play the role of strike breaker. It further disorientated the African workpropagating a pro-capitalist ideology.

Though it protested against the excesses of the repressive settler regime it collaborated in the defence of the social system. One candid trade union leader spoke for the whole bureaucratic stratum when he explained his attitude to 'Well in the capitalist economy the strike weapon is a legitimate necessity, not to wreck the economy but to build it, because there are tendencies in employers which militate against economic growth. When the policies are no longer progressive, you have to shift control to the employce and the only effective weapon to do this is a strike .... When the strike weapon is used at the correct time it will help to improve the economy. 68 The ICFTU had invested its money wisely in the moderate trade unions of Southern Rhodesia.

The significance of UDI The essential factor that made UDI a viable solution and spurred the confidence of Smith's RF supporters in their new regime was the weakness of the anti-imperialist movement. At the root of this weakness lay the fragmentation and oppression of the black working class and the dissipation of its struggles by the class collaboration of the trade union bureaucracy. After UDI the RF turned on the unions and viciously crushed militant opposition to the new regime. The number of work stoppages fell from 138 in 1965 to 57 in 1966 and to 19 in 1971.69 The state had no hesitation in using its full military and police apparatus to attack the black working class. The already spurious right to strike was formally removed. On the few occasions when strikes did erupt the state used emergency powers to maintain 'industrial peace' In June 1972, for example, the RF invoked these powers to order troops to operate services during the busdrivers' 52 J Kombo Moyana. "The political economy of sanctions and implications for future economic policy, Journal of Southem African Affairs, Vol 2, No 4, October 1977, pp503-4.

Exports fell from Rh$322m in 1965 to a low of Rh$193m in 1968: by 1972 they had risen to Rh$350m. Imports regained their 1965 level by 1970. National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, CSO, Salisbury, 1972, p51. These figures must be used with caution because many of the transactions between Rhodesia, South Africa and Mazambique were not revealed • Burgess, 'Interdependence in Southern Africa'. EIt/ Special 54 Report, No 32, p23. 55 Kombo Moyana, op cit, p504.

Ibid. 56 Stoneman, Economic development with unlimited supplies of 57 capital', op cit, pll. 58 I C Chitty, Recent trends and likely developments in industry, July 1976, pl. Stoneman, 'Economic development with unlimited supplies of capital', op cit, p10. About 60 per cent of these firms employed SO workers or less. Kombo Moyana, op cit, p506.

A Hoogvelt & D Child, 'Rhodesia: cconomic blockade and development', Monthly Review, October 1973, p45 The RF guaranteed the market for a fixed, but declining quota for tobacco. As a result, 900 of the country's 2600 farmers stopped growing tobacco between 1966 and 1977. Kay, op cit, EIU, Annual Supplement, 1976, ps.

TE Mswaka put this very clearly in his Presidential Address to the Southern Rhodesia African Trade Union Congress (SRATUC): 'It is high time all of us rcalised that we cannot use this organisation as a political platform for our political ends. 1 hate to have a political boss in the Trade Union Movement and I hate to lead this Organisation on politically borrowed Icader ship because this would be grossly misleading indeed. The workers must be prepared to follow us because we are their Trade Union leaders and not because we support this or that • politicians must stop interference into either directly or indirectly through individuals in the Trade Union Movement, and stop wrecking this Organisation? Sec SRATUC, Second annual conference, Gwelo, 28-29 September 1963. In an even more reactionary vein, the African Trade Union Congress (ATUC) did not consider that 'one man, one vote was a possibility in 1965: "It is not an immediate proposition for two reasons: first, it creates an immediate sense of insecurity in the minds of the minority settlers some of whom have invested colossal sums in property and established permanent homes and trust in our country; it is feared that the policy of Onc Man One Vote may bring about political changes overnight, which are tanta mount to a political revolution and rebellion.' Sce W W Nyangoni, African nationalism in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Liniversity Press of America, 1977, pl21 64 C M Brand, 'Race and politics in Rhodesian trade unions", African Perspectives, 1976, p65. This spirit of class collaboration logically led ATUC President P F Sithole to become acting Secretary-General of ZANU/ANC, and to side with the Internal Settlement. Reassuring white businessmen about nationalisation under majority rule, he declared: 'There are those who think nationalisation is proper. We feel not, and we want to ensure the rights of the individual to property... There are many situations where the common man may want nationalisation and we want to say from the start NO to such pressures as the government of the day. Quoted in Africa Confidential, Vol 19, No 7, 31 March 1978, p4. In 1956, 60 per cent of the workers were foreign Africans; in 1975 they still formed 34 per cent of the workforcc. D G Clarke.

"The unemployment crisis', From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, CIR, No 3, 1978, p22. The influx of unskilled workers, especially the agricultural and domestic sectors, undermined the stability of the labour markot. In 1975 less than seven per cent of the African workforce was unionised Letter from W Lawrence of the ICFTU/ITS, 14 July 1971, to H M Mutekwe, Gencral Secretary of National Federation of Unions (NAI-U). He added: 'there is not a union here which has not received assistance either directly or indirectly in recent ycars.... Ibid. p2.

67 Quoted in C M Brand, 'Politics and African trade unionism in Rhodesia since federation, Rhodesian History, Vol 2, 1971, 'Interview with P I: Sithole, President of the ATUC, SALB, Vol 2, No 7, February 1976, p20.

69 Harris, 'Industrial relations in Rhodesia', op cit, p75.

70 Brand, 'Race and politics in Rhodesian trade unions, op cit.

p6l. 35

The trade union leadership continued to play a central part in policing the African working class. Its pro-imperialist role became particularly clear in 1971, Rhodesian settlement was put forward?1 Only a handful of trade unionists voiced their opposition to this imperialist plan. As a result both Britain and the RF were under the impression that the acceptance of the settlement would be a formality. But when the Pearce Commission arrived in January 1972 to determine whether the proposals were acceptable to the African population it was confronted by strikes, demonstrations and widespread unrest. In some areas as much as 70 per cent of the African population took action. These strikes were called against the instructions of the trade union leadership. As an observer noted: "The union actually registered to represent the interests of the striking workers did not initiate the strike. In some instances, the union officials were openly hostile to the strike whilst in others they were powerless to persuade the striking workers to adopt the course of action that they regarded as advisable. 72 Once it had overcome the constraint of the trade union bureaucracy, the black working class demonstrated its strength on a massive scale. During the first two months of 1972 alone five major strikes, involving 6640 workers, led to the loss of 58 600 working days? 3 Although the African working class could break from the trade union bureaucracy, its political and organisational weakness prevented the emergence of a proletarian political party. While the working class was out on the streets protesting against the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals, the leadership of the national liberation struggle remained in the hands of the petit bourgeoisie. It is to this nationalist movement and its central role in the struggle against imperialism that we

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Resistance in Zimbabwe Origins of the nationalist movement The African nationalist movement in Zimbabwe was based on the petit bourgeoisie. The social position of this stratum, and in particular the access it enjoyed to education, allowed it to articulate the demands of the masses for democratic rights. Initially the political objectives of the African nationalist movement were limited to reforms designed to eliminate the obstacles restricting the development of this social group. However, the African petit bourgeoisie soon realised that it was too weak to wrest concessions from the settler regime. In the 'fifties it began to mobilise the masses in its support by extending its political platform to the demand for majority rule. The first organisation to voice this demand was the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC).

Established in 1957 under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, the SRANC was a fusion of different regional groupings. In contrast to other African political organisations, it called for the establishment of an African government elected by universal suffrage. It sought to reform the colonial system so as to gain political control. In addition the SRANC tried to pressurise the settler government to improve conditions for rural and urban Africans. In its gradualist approach, the SRANC failed to grasp that European domination could not be eliminated through reforms - that concessions would only be granted in so far as they stabilised settler rule. As a consequence it directed the energies of the masses towards narrow legal ends. Yet even this moderate strategy 36 represented a threat to the settler regime. In 1959 the SRANC was banned and other repressive laws were introduced against the nationalist movement.

These moves convinced the nationalists that little could be gained by putting pressure on the Rhodesian Government. Instead, they adopted the strategy of forcing Britain to implement the process of decolonisation which it had already initiated in other parts of Africa. They drew a distinction between the reactionary settlers and the more 'progressive' British imperialism. The NDP was launched in January 1960 with the goal of winning British support for majority rule and, more immediately, of obtaining representation at the Constitutional Conference in London called by Britain for the following year.

At the Conference the consequences of the nationalist programme became clear. Led by Nkomo, the NDP delegates accepted a constitution which provided electoral roll that gave 15 seats to Africans and reserved 50 seats for white voters.74 The NDP's agreement to this formula showed its willingness to drop majority rule for a few trifling concessions.

Nevertheless Nkomo portrayed this blatant sell-out as a major achievement. On his return to Zimbabwe he announced: 'We have moved the mountain an inch. Independence is around the corner.75 The membership of the NDP did not agree. Hostility to Nkomo's betrayal was so widespread that he was forced to reverse his decision and call for a boycott of the proposed referendum.

The significance of the Constitutional Conference was not lost on imperialism or the settler regime. Britain saw no reason to hand over political power to the Africans, given the evident willingness of the nationalist leadership to conform to its wishes. For the settlers the Conference acted as a signal to renew their efforts to achieve full independence under European rule. By contrast, the nationalist leadership learned nothing.

When, in 1962, ZAPU was established after the banning of the NDP, it adopted the same programme as its predecessor.

The nationalists still looked to Britain - and the United for a solution, so strengthening the illusion among the African masses that imperialism had a progressive role to play in Zimbabwe. ZAPU used the nation wide violence that broke out after UDI as a justification for calling on the British to show a sense of responsibility and militarily. Nkomo repeatedly called for a British The narrow political perspective of the nationalist leadership weakened the growing anti-imperialist struggle.

Aiming merely for short-term gains and a role in the administration of the country, it was soon rent apart by bitter internal rivalries. In the two years preceding UDI the nationalist movement split into two wings - ZAPU, led by and ZANU, led by the Reverend Ndabaningi The split was accompanied by fierce fighting between the two factions. Frustrated by the conflicts, many rank and file members of the two organisations decided to by-pass the leadership and begin a military campaign.

The radicalisation of African nationalism The wave of resistance provoked by UDI resulted in a series and demonstrations which confirmed popular hatred for the Smith regime. In November 1965 a major strike in Bulawayo was only defeated through large-scale arrests and the use of the police and army? Similar disturbances broke out in Que Que and Gwelo, while property belonging to white farmers and mining companies was destroyed in other areas 7ª The spontaneous upsurge of the masses lacked both organisation and leadership. While the people were on the

streets the exiled leaders of ZANU and ZAPU were still engaged in factional manoeuvres. To gain credibility they initiated a number of unsuccessful guerrilla actions in 1966; yet even at this stage their intention was to precipitate The failure of the military strategy embarked upon by ZAPU and ZANU, together with their growing isolation from the masses, forced them in a radical direction. They came to recognise more and more that constitutional change would not work and that European rule had to be overthrown. But their overall political weakness, compounded as it was by the difficulties of an enforced exile, ensured that insignificant differences came to the fore. Personal rivalries continued to plague ZAPU and ZANU. Ethnic tensions between the Shona and Ndebele led ZAPU to split in 1970.79 When fighting broke out in ZAPU camps the result was that the Zambian authorities arrested about 200 guerrillas and deported more than half back to Zimbabwe where a number were executed.80 Despite the infighting that beset the nationalist leadership, mass opposition to UDI flourished. A wave of political protests greeted the Pearce Commission in 1972. At one point Smith announced that over 1500 Africans had been arrested 81 Spontaneous in origin, the protests posed a real threat to imperialism, despite the attempt made by the newly-formed African National Council (ANC) to head them off. As the European representative of the ANC later noted of popular reaction to the Pearce Commission's 'Undoubtedly the meetings were full of excitement and passion, but the local ANC leaders were often the ones who quietened the meetings down, so that they could proceed. There were occasions when the underlying anger of the majority of the people against the Proposals erupted into anger against the few who accepted them.

While appreciating the reason for that anger, opportunity to call for calm and toleration.

Mass demonstrations and strikes forced the British Tory Government temporarily to abandon its efforts to reach a settlement with the RF. Moreover the emergence - the ANC - forced of an internally-based nationalist party a shift in imperialist strategy. The ANC's success in sidetracking the anti-imperialist movement showed Britain that any further negotiations would have to be founded on an agreement between the RF and the ANC.

Mass pressure forced ZANU to change its strategy from sporadic military infiltration to guerrilla warfare based on the politicised Africans in the rural areas. ZAPU and the of Zimbabwe newly-formed Front for the Liberation (FROLIZI) also began to step up military activity 83 The the bitter pressure towards unity could not overcome rivalries that existed among the different wings of the nationalist movement. Attempts to establish a joint military command met with little success.

Just as the events sparked off by the Pearce Commission threw the relationship between the African masses and the petit-bourgeois nationalist movement into sharp relief, so the mass response to the Muzorewa-Smith talks of 1973 highlighted the tension between African politicians and their supporters. In a dress rehearsal for today's Internal Settlement, ANC leader Bishop Muzorewa came out of clandestine talks with Smith with an agreement that called for a 75-seat Parliament in which Africans would be granted the privilege of no more than 23 MPs 84 The ANC rank and file remained unimpressed. Not only did they force the ANC Executive to reject the agreement, but they embarrassed Muzorewa enough to elicit a denial that he had ever made it.

The liberation struggle and its leadership Detente in Southern Africa The mass movement in Zimbabwe was considerably strengthened by the setbacks imperialism suffered i Mozambique and Angola. They enabled the guerrillas t ursue the war more vigorously. Imperialism was forced o on the defensiv 71 These British proposals were an attempt to grant independence to the Europeans while postponing majority rule until the year Salisbury United Omnibus Company to return to work.

73 Ibid, calculated from Table 2, p76. The strikes took place at Shabani Asbestos Mine, Trojan Nickel Mine, Blanket Gold Estates and Salisbury United Omnibus Mine, Hippo Valley They reflected the growing social weight of the African working class. Out of a total of 840 000 in employ- 1972, 336 400 worked in agriculture, manufacturing and 54 500 in the mining sector. More than one eighth of employed Africans were domestic servants for the European population. Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO, Salisbury, July 1978, p4 Educational and income requirements excluded blacks from any of the 50 rescrved seats. It was no coincidence that there were 15 members in the NDP national executive at the time 'Focus on Zimbabwe', African Revolution, Vol 1, No 1, p27.

75 Quoted in ibid. N Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, Andre Deutsch, 1965, p70 76 Although British Prime Minister Harold Wilson made it clear time of UDI that military intervention was 'not on, at the the nationalist leadership later admitted that this remained part of its strategy. J Chikerema, Reply to observations on our struggle, ZAPU, 1970. The fight for Zimbabwe: the armed conflict in K Mary, 77 Southern Rhodesia since UDI, Rex Collings, 1975, p54.

Ibid, p5S. According to government sources there were 80 78 incidents of sabotage betwen early November 1965 and mid There were also 36 cases of crop damage in the July 1966. three months following UDI. K Maxey, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, Fabian Research Series, No 301, 1972, p19.

79 Ibid, p28 A Wilkinson, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe', in Davidson 80 Stovo & Wilkinson, Southern Africa: the new politics of revolution, Penguin, 1976, p249 M Jones, Rhodesia: the white judge's hurden, Internationa 81 Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), London, May 1972, p18 E Miambo, No future without us - the story of the African 82 National Council in Zimhabwe (Southern Rhodesia), ANC.

London, 1972, p21. In a statement on 14 January 1972 the ANC further disassociated itself from opposition to the Pearce Commission: "We are in no way connected with the disturbance at a meeting called by the Chiefs... or with the disturbance of employees at Shabani who were complaining about the dismissal of their fellow workers. We believe that the RF Government is trying to find a pretext to undermine the activities of the ANC by trying to associate us with unpopular incidents... we call .. black and white.' for peace and calm among all people Quoted in African Contemporary Record (ACR), 1972-73, pB439. FROLIZI was formed in October 1971 from sections of ZAPU 83 and ZANU which shared a desire to overcome the divisions in the movement. It failed in its attempts to unify the nationalist struggle and became another distinct nationalist party.

were 23 Again, it was more than a coincidence that there 84 active members of the ANC National Executive to fill the 23 seats. "Focus on Zimbabwe', op cit, p27.

37

South Africa was particularly anxious to end the armed conflict, fearing that it would destabilise the entire surrounwas to replace the RF "The alternative', as former moderate African government.

South African Premier John Vorster put it, was 'too ghastly to contemplate 85 South Africa sought the co-operation of neighbouring African states through a policy of 'detente' them. Its diplomatic overtures support from Zambia, which, its economy hit hard by the capitalist crisis, saw 'detente' as a first step to a reopening of its border with Zimbabwe and a resumption of trade.

Detente, the preferred policy of imperialism, failed for two reasons. Firstly, the RF resisted any solution which threatened the privileged position of the European minority.

Secondly, and most importantly, those nationalist leaders prepared to compromise with imperialism quickly lost all credibility with the mass movement. They could not hold back the armed struggle. Today this remains a fact of life in Zimbabwe; despite repeated attempts, leading African politicians have been unable to win mass support for a compromise with imperialism and the settler regime.

The first important test for detente was the Lusaka Agreement of 1974. Arranged by South Africa and Zambia in an effort to end the war, its aim was to eliminate political rivalry among the nationalist leaders so that a united discussion with the Smith regime could begin. Pressure from the Front Line states forced ZAPU, FROLIZI to unite under the leadership of Muzorewa's ANC. South Africa for its part put pressure on Smith to release Nkomo and Sithole from prison to take part in the Agreement. But all was in vain. The signatories could not sell their sell-out to the guerrillas.86 Sithole, who put his name to the Agreement on behalf of ZANU, was not taken seriously by the organisation's rank and file. Those sections of the nationalist movement who were most sensitive to mass pressure, such as ZANLA, turned it down and denounced Sithole into the bargain. Finally, the Executive of ZANU threw the Agreement out altogether - despite The Front Line states persisted in their attempts to unite the nationalist parties around a common negotiating position. But these only reinforced rivalries between Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema as each fought to gain control of the guerrilla camps. The only thing the warring nationalist leaders could agree on was their common fear of the more radical elements in ZANU/ZANLA, whom they saw as the main obstacle to a negotiated settlement. In March 1975 the assassination of ZANU Chairman H Chitepo, key figure in the guerrilla struggle, provided them with the pretext they needed for an attack on this section of the movement87 The Zambian state moved quickly to arrest 1200 ZANU/ZANLA members and took their camps under The political rivalries precipitated by detente widened the gap between the nationalist leaders and their supporters The guerrilla camps rejected the factionalism of their petitbourgeois leadership. One group stated: 'We must take a fresh look at the factions. Clearly they do not constitute a road to national unity and independence. Instead via factions we are heading for a bitter civil war, if not perpetual colonial bondage. This is because factional leaderships hanker after persona rory even at the cost of national unity and independence. 8B Similar feelings of mistrust for the leadership pervaded the guerrilla camps. Dismissing Nkomo out of hand, a memorandum signed by 44 officers from the Mgagno camp in Tanzania criticised Sithole, Muzorewa and Chikerema in the following terms: 'In our opinion, the three leaders are incapable of leading the ANC. An executive member who has been outstanding is Robert 38 Mugabe. He has demonstrated this by defying the rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique.... We will not accept any direct discussions with any of the three leading members of the ANC we have described above. We can only talk through Robert Mugabe to them 89 Mugabe's role in organising the armed struggle in Mozambique allowed him to maintain a following9° The 'Mugabe Diary', which contained his denunciation of the efforts to stifle the armed struggle that were made following Chitepo's assassination, won him considerable support.91 Eventually he was able to gain control over the guerrillas in Tanzania and Mozambique and strengthen his position as leader of

ZANU.

Detente failed because it polarised the nationalist movement. Although imperialism was able to get African politicians around a table, it could not control the struggle for national liberation. Formation of the Patriotic Front During the period leading up to the formation of the Patriotic Front (PF) the Front Line states, aided by imperialism, tried to achieve a negotiated settlement. At their instigation, a war council consisting of nine members from ZANU and ZAPU was formed in late 1975 to lead the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). The Front Line states hoped to overcome the fragmentation of the nationalist movement by creating a new united leadership out of the military wings of ZANU and ZAPU. Their aim was to establish a leadership under their political control - a leadership which would fall in line when the time was right for negotiations.

Mean while, increased repression in Zimbabwe forced them to accept the need for guerrilla war. As Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, explained: 'We are forced back to the alternative strategy outlined in the Lusaka Declaration of 1969 - support for non-peaceful methods of struggle. Unfortunately, but inevitably, the armed struggle in Rhodesia will have to be resumed and intensified until conditions are ripe for realistic negotiations 92 This recognition of the need for 'non-peaceful' methods came at a time when the armed struggle had drastically declined. By the end of 1975 the Rhodesian security forces were able to claim that there were only between 50 and 80 guerrillas left in the north-east of the country93 Detente and the squabbles among the nationalist politicians had had a dem oralising effect on the armed struggle. But the formation of ZIPA stimulated the thousands of Africans who had fled to Mozambique to join the guerrillas and provided the impetus for a new offensive.94 Following the victory of the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) against South African intervention, explicit detente became impossible. The Front Line states were forced to renew their support for the armed struggle, bombastically declaring that majority rule could only be won 'on the battlefield' 95 For many in the nationalist movement ZIPA appeared to mark a decisive break with the past. It seemed to be a revolutionary alternative to the perennial rows of the politicians and to hold out the hope that the armed struggle could be articulated as a genuine political movement. Yet ZIPA could not remain immune from the bitter political rivalries prevailing in the nationalist movement. Initially, it had tried to distance itself from the politicians. When ZAPU and ZANU each claimed credit for its military victories, ZIPA bluntly stated: 'Neither faction is in control of the army, and neither faction deserves any kind of credit for the army's work,96 But tensions within ZIPA were exacerbated by Nkomo's attempt to arrive at a settlement with Smith. In a series of discussions beginning in December

1975. Nkemo proposed a compromise formula that would have guaranteed the privileged position of the European settlers.97 Differences of opinion arose over these negotiations, and by May 1976 military clashes were taking place between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas within ZIPA. This led to the effective break-up of ZIPA and ZIPRA guerrillas were withdrawn from Mozambique.

Diplomatic pressure from Britain and the USA in September 1976 forced Smith to declare his commitment to majority rule within two years. At the Geneva Conference one month later the present-day line-up of the nationalist movement emerged. Nkomo and Mugabe, each of whom had guerrilla support, came together to form the uneasy alliance known as the Patriotic Front. Those politicians like Muzorewa and Sithole who had no following among the guerrillas were forced to return to Zimbabwe and negotiate directly with the Smith regime.

The PF did not gain the full confidence of the guerrillas overnight. Even the much-favoured Mugabe did not have clear authority over ZIPA forces. While the PF, Muzorewa and Sithole were negotiating in Geneva, ZIPA condemned the Kissinger Plan as an 'imperialist plot and sent its own delegation to the Conference to forestall a sell-out. ZIPA leader Nhongo explained why: *We are going to Geneva to guarantee the independence of the people against the political and personal ambitions of the opportunists and the defenders of monopoly capitalism... and to prevent the racists, their imperialist allies and the apologists of monopoly capitalism to create a neo-colonialist Zimbabwe 98 Given the past enthusiasm shown by Nkomo and others like him for secret negotiations and reactionary deals, this mistrust was well founded.

The programme of the Patriotic Front The need to present a united negotiating force at the Geneva Conference provided the initial impetus for the formation of the PF. Such an alliance held obvious advantages for both ZAPU and ZANU; it gave ZAPU a degree of credit for a war that was being fought mainly by ZANU, and enabled Mugabe to consolidate his control over ZANU's guerrillas. 99 and economic support ZAPU received from the Soviet Union was also important to ZANU, which was poorly armed,100 It was also clear that neither party was strong enough on its own to negotiate with the RF.

The emergence of the PF and the international support it enjoyed prompted both ZAPU and ZANU to assert their authority over the guerrilla forces. Mugabe simply eliminated the radical military wing of ZIPA; in early 1977 Machingura and other ZIPA leaders were arrested in Mozambique and a further 90 ZANU guerrillas imprisoned in Tanzania 101 The social basis and the programmes of the two wings of the PF are essentially the same. Both aim to democratise the present political structure; both accept the permanence of capitalist social relations.

The PF's desire to establish capitalism with an African face stems from the class interests of its petit-bourgeois leadership. Only the RF's refusal to make any concessions has forced it to advocate the use of violence. Conversely, the PF has only been able to mobilise mass support because its limited opposition to the existing state has coincided with the democratic demands of the reactionary consequences of petit-bourgeois politics have yet to become apparent to the African masses those politicians who compromised with imperialism again and again, petit-bourgeois politics itself has not been discredited. The guerrillas have only rejected the obvious 39 degradation of the national struggle. Their commitment to military methods is no alternative to petit-bourgeois nationalism. The petit bourgeoisie supports the armed struggle as a means for speeding up political but not social change. The narrow focus of the PF's programme is particularly striking in its treatment of the land question. In Zimbabwe the denial of land to Africans has been fundamental to the maintenance of European privilege; the transformation of Zimbabwean society will require the nationalisation of land and its redistribution to the peasantry. Yet ZAPU has argued for capitalist land reforms which will do nothing to change the present system of land ownership. ZAPU's internal wing, the ANC(Z), agrees that there should be no expropriation of the large white commercial farms, except where they have been abandoned or are not being used productively. 102 Chinamano, Nkomo's spokesman in Zimbabwe, announced that the ANC(Z)'s land policies broadly coincided with those of the RFNU, the white farmers' association. In May 1977 he assured a meeting organised by the Association 85 ACR, 1974-75, pB511. The RF for its part never intended to honour the Agreement.

86 As soon as it was signed the RF called on the nationalist forces to surrender unconditionally. It was primarily through the intervention of South Africa that further attempts at negotiations were made. G Matatu, 'Who killed Chitepo?', Africa, May 1975, p23.

87 88 'A way with factions, Chimurenga Newsletter, No 3, ZIPA, 1976, pl. 89 Quoted in ACR, 1975-76, pB643 C Legum, Sousher Africa: the year of the whirlwind, Rex 90 Collings, 1977, p21. ACR, 1975-76, pB641. Quoted in C Legum, 'Southern Africa: how the search for peaceful change failed', ibid, ppA54-55 "The continuing fight for Zimbabwe', African Pers- By March 1976 the security forces had been compelled to deploy 60 per cent more men than three months earlier. It was estimated that there were 500 guerrillas operating from the north-east, 200 on the eastern border and many more attacking from across the border. Ibid, p103.

Predating the Internal Settlement of 3 March 1978, the formula called for immediate political control by Africans, but with 36 black and 36 white voting constituencies, plus a further 72 seats to be contested on a qualified voting franchise such that 50 would be in black hands. ACR, 1975-76, pB654 "Zimbabwe - apres Geneve avant. La lutte continue", Liberation Afrique, No 19, January 1977, p8, our translation Mugabe was unsure how much support he had from the radical ZIPA faction led by Nhongo and Tongogara. Most of its members were still in prison for the Chitepo murder.

100 The formation of the PF also enabled ZANU to use Nkomo's influence on Kaunda to secure the release of some of its military and political leaders from Zambian prisons. The leaders included Mudzi, Kangai, Gumbo, Hamadziripi, and eventually Tongogara - on trial for Chitepo's murder, but also a vital intermediary between ZANU and ZIPA/ZANLA.

Africa Confidential, Vol 18, No 22, 4 November 1977, p3.

101 had previously led opposition to the Geneva Conference and had become an obstacle to the front Line states' efforts to unite the newly-formed PF and ZIPA. In early 1978, opposition within ZANU was also suppressed; Gumbo.

Hamadziripi and other leading members were arrested. Complaints about the arrests resulted in a further 100 men being imprisoned. Ibid, Vol 19. No 7, 31 March 1978, p2. It has long been the practice of all the nationalist factions to suppress opposition in this way. 102 Ibid, Vol 18, No 14, 8 July 1977, p3.

of Rhodesian Industries that 'gainfully used land will not be touched'.103 Nkomo confirmed Chinamano's position: 'No, we don't confiscate anything 104 ZAPU clearly presents no threat to the existing social order. ZANU, however, claims to be guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to be engaged in a 'people's war' This approach has won ZANU support from the radicals in the mass movement; but, despite its militant rhetoric, ZANU's programme has little to offer the African masses.

Following in the tradition of the Russian Mensheviks and international Stalinism, it promulgates a two-stage theory of revolution. Confining its aims to the democratic revolution, it postpones the struggle for socialism to a later, unspecified date. This is how LANU puts it: The driving force behind the revolutionary movement in Zimbabwe has been the broad front of workers, peasants, soldiers, and students, and the lumpen proletariat in both ZANU and ZAPU.

•..At this national democratic phase, all elements of the oppressed and colonized people have to be mobilised to fight against the common enemy in Zimbabwe.

• .. At this stage, even the petit bourgeoisie and traditional chiefs and headmen who are opposed to the enemy can and should join the struggle...

"The second state (sic) of the socialist revolution will be undertaken by a movement with a proletarian ideology after political independence has been won. But, the success of this process in the second stage, depends on the emergence of the working lass move.

ment with a proletarian ideology during the first phase.

The experience of the African people has again confirmed that in the imperialist epoch there is no possibility of a democratic revolution' capitalist in a backward country. The oppression of the people of Zimbabwe is not merely the consequence of settler reaction; it is the only way that capitalist social relations can be maintained. As long as capitalism exists the masses will be denied their democratic rights. Throughout black Africa the ruling classes have been unable to afford the trappings of bourgeois democracy. All over the continent capitalism takes the form of one-party states and military regimes.

The low level of development of the forces of production in Africa means that capitalism cannot grant democratic rights. Bourgeois democracy cannot be guaranteed even in the less developed areas of Western Europe - Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey have all experienced the denial of democratic rights during the post-war period. In Africa the anti-democratic tendency of capitalism exists in a much more direct form. That is why the programme of a "democratic revolution' can only condemn workers and peasants to the ruthless oppression necessary for the survival backward capitalism. The struggle of the Zimbabwean masses for democratic rights requires the overthrow of the social relations defended by the settler regime. The 'unity of the people' around the objectives of the democratic revolution is, in reality, the unity of workers and peasants around the class interests of the petit bourgeoisie. Despite radical promises, it is a unity which acts against the interests of the African masses.

ZANU's programme represents the convergence of petit-bourgeois nationalism and Stalinism. The Stalinist trend is an expression of the influence of the ruling bureaucracies of the Soviet Union and China, since the isolation of the nationalist movement has inevitably led it tolook to these countries for assistance. Rivalries between these two states have reinforced the divisions between the two wings of the PF. Soviet assistance to ZAPU and Chinese support for ZANU flow from their common commitment to international detente and to the reactionary politics of the national road to socialism. Little separates the interests of petit-bourgeois nationalism from those of Stalinism.

Both provide a means of reconciling class antagonisms.

40 The PF's failure to challenge the existence of capitalist social relations limits its political independence and debilithe struggle against imperialist domination. The petit-bourgeois leadership of the PF has proved again and again that it is prepared to subordinate the interests of the of imperialism. Its acceptance of the promises of the Anglo-American initiative at talks held at Malta and Dar-es-Salaam in 1978 is only another example of this.106 Indeed, the PF expects imperialism to play a progressive role. Thus an official ZAPU publication, The Zimbabwe Review, commented: 'If Britain and the United States, which appear to be assuming an increasing mediating role in our situation, wish to gain credibility in the eyes of the liberation movement, they will have to prove beyond rhetoric that they have now joined the forces that seek to bring the Rhodesian regime to its knees 107 More recently Nkomo pledged to cease cross-border guerrilla activity during the Queen's visit to the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. He explained: We have great deference to the Commonwealth and the role it plays internationally for the benefit of our struggle. Consequently, we will not engage in any activities at the Zambia-Rhodesia border undermine the conference i retext for the Rhodesian regime lo likely to provide a Nkomo's willingness to enter into secret discussions with Ian Smith and his deference to the Queen are not the result of a personal desire to betray the African masses. They are the logical outcome of his whole political strategy. Under imperialist pressure, petit-bourgeois nationalism can only degrade the struggle for national liberation.

ZIMBABWE IN CRISIS

The limits to capitalism Zimbabwe's economy has gone through years of crisis and war. UDI, an attempt to restructure capitalist social relations by means of state subsidies and protectionism, could only register the success it did when the world economy was booming 109 Once the international recession intensified the limits to this strategy became clear. The index for the volume of production in the sector most susceptible to economic downturn - manufacturing industry - fell from some 215 in 1974 to about 185 in 1978.110 Zimbabwe's economic downturn is not unique; every capitalist country has suffered the impact of the world crisis. But Zimbabwe has also had to contend with the cost of a war. The long-term viability of UDI always hinged on the outcome of the RF Government's attempts to maintain social stability while continuing the oppression of the African masses. UDI itself has frustrated these efforts by provoking mass opposition, which in turn has led to War, not sanctions, has undermined the development of capitalism in Zimbabwe. The commitment of the imperialists to oil sanctions has been desultory, as the Bingham Report made clear. In minerals the story is the same: Union Carbide, the leading source of American investment in Zimbabwe, has continued the export of minerals regardless of sanctions.111 More generally the settler regime has maintained foreign trade by channelling it through South Africa.

The main effect of sanctions has been to limit Rhodesia's access to foreign exchange and to undermine its tobacco industry 112 But these difficulties were clearly taken into account when the Smith regime embarked upon its strategy

of economic nationalism; the RF was quite prepared to stomach them in exchange for the long-term development of Rhodesian capital. Today the lifting of sanctions would do little to halt the decline of capitalism in Rhodesia.

According to one bourgeois observer it would relieve the country's shortage of foreign exchange by only £140m a Nor can state intervention, even though it has expanded enormously, extricate the economy from crisis. Public sector investment rose 169 per cent in real terms in the eight years preceding 1973, when it accounted for 44 per cent of all investment. 14 As the crisis has deepened and the war has spread, the state has been forced to increase its subsidies to all sectors of the economy to overcome the reluctance of domestic capitalists to invest. Much of the European farming sector has only survived because increased state subsidies which, together with loans, totalled Rh$138 million between 1969 and 1976.115 state's frantic attempts to bolster the economy have not prevented real GDP from falling since 1975 To finance its subsidies the state has borrowed money abroad, particularly from South Africa,116 In addition it has resorted to domestic loans - it raised £90 million in the first three months of 1979 and the same amount again in the first month of the Muzorewa Government 117 This has only resulted in further indebtedness. By April the war was costing £675 000 a day, making the state less and less able to prevent economic collapse.

The state-organised protection of industry in Zimbabwe has been weakened by the penetration of world imperialism.

Although the Smith regime has closely controlled the activities of international companies in order to defend domestic industry, foreign capital has suffered little. Indeed, between 1966 and 1976 there was a net inflow of foreign capital of about Rh$350m; if reinvestment is included, foreign investment over the same period totalled Rh$1 billion,118 Moreover, South African imperialism has been able to integrate the Rhodesian economy into its sphere of influence, particularly as it acts as the conduit for Rhodesia's trade. South African firms and British companies based in South Africa have established a dominating interest in the Rhodesian economy.119 They have consolidated position through takeovers of domestic firms, especially in beverages, tobacco and in the non-gold mining sector. Domestically owned companies have been restricted to less profitable operations. The growing hold of imperialism over Rhodesia reveals the limitations of the strategy of economic nationalism. movement will be forced to confront.

The war economy The impact of the war in Zimbabwe goes beyond the cost of military defence. The extension of the liberation struggle and the closure of borders with Zambia and Mozambique have driven transport costs up and have disrupted trade.i2o New distortions to the economy have arisen as a consequence.

As one bank reported in 1976, '10 years of import control have left the economy with an ageing capital stock for which replacement and renewal is long overdue!121 The war has 103 Ibid, p4. 104 Quoted in Zimbabwe Information Group Bulletin, No 5-6, December 1977-January 1978, pll.

41 105 'Political education in ZANU: Abridged Commissariat Lectures'.

Zimbabwe News, Vol 10, No 1, ZANU, January-February 106 At Malta the PF agreed to a number of imperialist proposals.

They included the holding of 'free elcctions' under 'impartial supervision' and the establishment of a transitional period in which British High Commissioner Lord Carver would rule and in which the UN would have a role. The Observer, S February 1978. The PF made further concessions in Dar-es-Salaam in April 1978. It concurred in giving full executive authority for defence and for law and order to the Resident Commissioner, and agreed to the UN 'peace-keeping force' to ensure 'free and fair' elections, Zimbabwe News, Vol 10, No 2, ZANU, March- April 1978, p40. Although disagreements emerged over whether the PF should be in a predominant position during the transitional period, it nevertheless accepted all the fundamental points of the Anglo-American proposals The Zimbabwe Review, Vol 6, No 9, ZAPU, 1977, Pp33-34.

108 The Guardian. 7 July 1979 Before UDI, manufacturing accounted for 18-19 per cent of 109 GDP; it now accounts for more than 24 per cent. The volume index of manufacturing production more than doubled in the decade after 1964. C Stoneman, 'Foreign capital and the reconstruction of Zimbabwe', Review of African Political Economy (RAPE), January-April 1978, pp69-70.

110 Monthly Digest of Statistics, op cit, April 1979, p8. In 1974 manufacturing accounted for 25.8 per cent of investment; by 1977 it took only 22.5 per cent. Calculated from Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, op cit, April 1979, pб.

With the help of its global network of subsidiaries, Union 111 Carbide has been able to conduct nearly all of its dealings with Zimbabwe 'in house'. This makes sanction-busting practically impossible to uncover. B Ragers, White wealth and black poverty - American investments in Southern Africa, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1976, pp221-22 112 Even in the early 'seventies state aid could not protect every tobacco plantation. As one farmer put it in 1972: Tobacco growers are receiving subsidies to the tune of Rh$ 12m, yet they cannot make the grade. If we are redundant tell us now.

And don't tell us not to rock the boat. We are no longer in it.'

ACR, 1972-73, pB460. 113 P Ellman, 'Rhodesia: time runs out', Financial Weekly, 27 July 1979. 114 Stoneman, 'Foreign capital and the reconstruction of Zimbabwe', op cit, p72 115 Riddell, op cit, p12. In spite of this the total area of land farmed fell by over 1 million acres between 1975 and 1976 Ibid, p13. Most of the finance for the war has comc from foreign loans.

116 Because most are secret no precise figures exist.

117 The Guardian, 30 July 1979.

118 Stoneman, 'Foreign the reconstruction capital and ot Zimbabwe', op cit, p82. Foreign capital supplied some 37 pcr cent of investment during the decade, compared with 25 per cent for the 1962-65 period. Ibid, p68.

119 It has been estimated that Britain now accounts for almost 60 per cent of all foreign investment. New African, August 1979, p82. South Africa's share has increased massively. This was achieved through many large-scale investments, the establishment or cheap purchase of Rhodesian subsidiaries and the supply of old plant and stocks, in exchange for Rhodesian exports (no currency involved' deals). Stoneman, 'Foreign capital and the reconstruction of Zimbabwe', op cit, p69 120 Rhodesia's terms of trade deteriorated from a 1964 index of 100 to 81.9 in 1974 and 62.8 in 1978, Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, op cit, April 1979, p15. Since the closure of the Mozambique border, extra transport costs and bottlenecks have led Rhodesia Railways to make continual losses. Some reports claim that Mozambique was still carrying 60 per cent of Rhodesia's trade at the time and not the 20 per cent claimed by Salisbury; R Good, 'Rhodesia: more of the same with a difference, Africa Today, Vol 23, No 3, July- September 1976, p41. Furthermore in 1977 South Africa slapped a 15 per cont import charge on Rhodesian goods which cost Rhodesia Rh$20 million, Southern Africa, Vol 11, No 3, April 1978, p9 121 'Rhodesia: economic blues, Financial Mail, 15 October 1976.

highlighted the failure of the state to replace outdated plant and machinery, 122 The reopening of the Zambian border in 1978 provided a limited breathing space. Congestion on Rhodesia Railways meant a monthly loss of Rh$6.5 million of foreign throughout 1978.123 A guerrilla attack on oil depots at the end of the year led to further bottlenecks as supplies were replenished - the foreign exchange cost of the lost fuel amounting to about Rh$10 million 124 Another sector of the economy vulnerable to guerrilla attacks has been the tourist trade 125 This major source of foreign exchange only survives through heavy state subsidies. 126 The war has had severe repercussions for the mining industry. This was the most dynamic sector of Rhodesian capitalism during the UDI period; mining output almost fourfold from Rh$63.9m to Rh$230.5m 1965 and 1976.127 However, the effect of the war on the supply of skilled labour has slowed the growth of output.

In 1978 it was worth only Rh$252m, less in real terms than two years previously 128 In July 1977 Anglo-American Corporation announced that it was stopping exploration and recalling all its prospecting staff because of the war129 By April 1978 the President of the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines announced that all mining exploration throughout Zimbabwe had been terminated because of the 'deteriorating security situation. 130 Guerrilla attacks have led to the abandonment of large areas of farmland. In September 1978 it was revealed that 100 farmers had left their land in the previous year, bringing the number of departures since UDI to 400. Another 140 have been killed. In all, several million acres of land have been deserted since the beginning of the armed struggle in December 1972.131 The war threatens to bring the economy to a standstill.

This is why imperialism and its Rhodesian allies have increasingly come to accept the principle of African majority rule. For imperialism the continuation of capitalist rule in Zimbabwe depends on the political reorganisation of the state, through the introduction of that form of majority rule which will best preserve capitalist social relations. This is why major industrialists in Zimbabwe have been behind some of the most vehement calls for a negotiated settlement.

Indeed, the large mining firms began to prepare for majority rule as early as 1976. Anglo-American claimed to have instituted 'complex and comprehensive training raise the level of responsibility of black miners plans part, Lonrho decided to back the PF and developed a close 'working relationship' with Nkomo. When the war ends imperialism wants to be on the right side.

The African masses bear the burden The position of the blacks has deteriorated since UDI.

Whilst the Europeans have taken measures to shore up their privileged economic position, blacks have met with the barbaric consequences of the disintegration of agriculture and industry. They have also faced sharper political repression as the war for national liberation has come closer to the In the TTLs productivity is declining and there is more landlessness - in some areas more than 40 per cent of men have no land.133 The days of the subsistence sector are numbered, for 70 per cent of Zimbabwe's food requirements are now produced commercially 134 Even the more 'well-off black cultivators have been unable to compete with white farmers because of the small size of their holdings and their exclusion from state subsidies.

42 The crisis has accelerated the process of social differentiation within the Afncan peasantry. This has made rural poverty still more savage in its effects. Most African peasants have insufficient land to satisfy their subsistence requirements. At the same time the inroads made by capitalist social relations into agriculture have concentrated land in the hands of a small section of peasants owning plots some 20 times larger than the average.135 Although these 'large peasants' have different material interests from the working class and the mass of the peasantry they, too, suffer discrimination. For blacks the most serious feature of the decay of the Rhodesian economy has been rising unemployment. In the last four years the African workforce has shrunk from close to a million to less than 800 000.136 The ranks of the reserve army of labour are swelled by the run-down or closure of Rhodesian firms. Smith has had to admit that 100 blacks are being thrown out of industry each day as a result of the war, sanctions and the world recession,137 More importantly, they are enlarged by the continual influx of migrants leaving the rural areas. In mid 1978, 400 Africans entered Salisbury every day, with no hope of finding employment 138 These unemployed workers are a source of revolt against the government and provide a stream of recruits to the guerrilla camps Even at the height of Rhodesia's 1969-75 mini-boom, black employment grew by only 200 000. Taking account of the natural increase in the size of the employable population, this meant that capitalism failed to provide 37 000 jobs each year, 139 By the late 'seventies the political and social stability of Rhodesia was clearly threatened by the thousands of Africans seeking work. As the Minister of Finance was forced to concede: "Economically we are in bad shape. There is high unemployment in the country. This affects more blacks than whites. This vorries me. Unless we can come up with something that stops th var and gives confidence to big business. we are in trouble' The expansion of the reserve army of labour has enabled capital to force down the wages of African workers.

In 1975, when more than a third of employed Africans worked in agriculture, 85 per cent of farm labourers received wages less than half the Rh$40 subsistence level.141 All domestic servants and 63 per cent of Rhodesia's mineworkers have wages below this subsistence level.142 The differential between black and white wages, which widened Rh$1548 in 1965 to Rh$2969 in 1974, reached Rh$5568 in 1977.143 In the past four years black real incomes have fallen by an estimated 40 per cent.144 The growing unemployment and the drive to reduce wages below the value of labour-power forces Africans to the margin of capitalist society. A survey of the provincial town of Hartley revealed thousands of illegal taxi drivers, vegetable hawkers and many other service trades. 145 The rural areas exhibit a similar phenomenon because starvation level agricultural wages make thousands of Africans seek an alternative means of subsistence.146 The result is lowe agricultural productivity and the further ruination of th countryside.

ABORTIVE DECOLONISATION

Another phase in imperialist strategy Imperialist strategy is dictated by the need to maintair cap fans so of polai on a class of Africans prepared do

accommodate the needs of foreign capital in a more subtle way than their European predecessors. Zimbabwe must no longer appear as an imperialist colony; instead, through a process of decolonisation, it must gain formal independence from the political domination of the West - an independence that preserves the rule of capital. The hatred of the African masses for their oppressors must be eliminated installation of a pro-capitalist African regime.

This process is complicated by the presence of Zimbabwe's firmly entrenched European population. Although staunch defenders of capitalism, this minority has consolidated a privileged position which is threatened by African majority rule. In the 'sixties imperialism could accommodate the interests of the settler population in full. Harold Wilson's negotiations with Smith in 1966 and 1968, and the Tory proposals of 1971, were direct attempts to legalise UDI and grant independence. At that time it was enough for Britain just to cover its imperialist strategy with a few anti-racist gestures for the benefit of black African states. But times changed. Because UDI has been undermined by the growth of African opposition, it no longer gives Zimbabwe requires. In 1979 the strategy must be a different one. The deepening of the crisis and the upsurge of armed resistance demand a solution which politically integrates the liberation forces and creates a stable African middle class.

To ensure that the interests of imperialism are safeguarded, the USA has taken an increasingly interventionist role in Southern Africa. By 1976 the US government had realised that Britain was too weak to handle a peaceful transition to majority rule by itself. As a result it adopted a policy of 'enlightened' imperialism to smooth over the process. Senators and Congressmen rapidly became staunch opponents of apartheid. 147 The Anglo-American initiative and the accompanying diplomatic manoeuvres of Callaghan, Owen, Kissinger and Young expressed the changing strategy of imperialism. The central objectives of the Anglo-American proposals are to win time for the creation of a stable African government and to keep real power in the hands of Europeans.

They are to be realised by the establishment of a transitional government. During this period African politicians are to be tested out while Europeans retain control over 'law and order'. To assist the restoration of profitable accumulation a Zimbabwe Development Fund, financed by the imperialist powers to the tune of $1.5 billion, is to be set up These proposals have formed the framework for every imperialist initiative during the past three years. Proposals for a Bill of Rights contain the promise that existing property relations will be maintained: 'Protection from deprivation of property: this will confer protection from expropriation of property except on specified grounds of public interest and even then only on conditions that there is prompt payment of adequate compensation ... and that the compensation may be remitted abroad within a reasonable period. 148 The PF did not agree to the Anglo-American proposals.

Both ZANU and ZAPU found the general approach acceptable, but objected to the maintenance of European domin- 122 Although the goverment had previously lowered the amount of foreign exchange available to industry for the purchase of imports to an 'irreducible minimum', it was forced to reduce it further by 20 per cent at the beginning of 1978. Such a cut could only affect imports of new technology, since luxury items had been prevented from entering the country years before, EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, first quarter 1978, p9.

123 'Rhodesia: after the fire', Financial Mail, 22 December 1978.

125 The number of visitors to Zimbabwe dropped from 400 000 in 1972 to 100 000 in 1978, Monthly Digest of Statistics, op cit, April 1979, p2. New African correctly suggests that 'most tourists prefer their holidays without the excitement of rocket attacks and the restrictions of convoys', New African, April 126 In April 1978, following a series of hotel closures, the Rhodesian Hotel Association announced that only continuing government subsidies enabled the 132 remaining hotels to stay in business. 'Rhodesian tourism: tough but tangible', Financial 127 Monthly Digest of Statistics, op cit, April 1979, p7. Together with agriculture, mining accounted for 70-80 per cent of the Rhodesia: the grimness Financial Mail, 31 December 1976. The high rate of profit associated with mining made it attractive to capital, despite the fact that it accounted for only 8.3 per cent of GDP in 1976.

See EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, annual supplement 128 Monthly Digest of Statistics, op cit, April 1979, p7.

129 Financial Times, 25 July 1977.

130 Ibid, 21 April 1978 131 New African, September 1978, p22 132 Africa Confidential, Vol 18, No 2, 21 January 1977, p3 133 A KH Weinrich, African farmers in Rhodesia, Oxford University Press, 1975, p298. 134 This compares with 30 per cent in the early 'sixties. More food has therefore had to be imported into the TTLs. International Labour Organisation (ILO), Labour conditions and discrimination in Southern Rhodesia (Zimhabwe), Geneva, 1978, p38 African agriculture's contribution to GDP declined from 7.1 per cent in 1966 to 5 per cent in 1978. Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1979, calculated from Tables 8 & 11, pp6,8. 135 Riddell, op cit, p10. Cattle represent the other major form of wealth for rural Africans. In 1960, 66 per cent owned at least one cow; by 1978 the figure had fallen to about 50 per cent.

An increasing number of households own no cattle at all. Ibid.

136 Ellman, op cit, p2. 137 Africa Research Bulletin, Vol 15, No 1, January-February 1978, 138 International Herald Tribune, 26 August 1978 to poverty'. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, No 1, CIR, London, 1977, pll.

140 Quoted in Clarke, "The unemployment crisis, op cit, p8. Of course, for the bourgeoisie a more cynical view is possible. One industrialist put it like this: 'If it were not for the war and both the government and the guerrillas recruiting wildly, I do not know what half of these guys would be doing. Quoted in Southern Africa, op cit, p9.

Riddell, 'Alternatives to poverty', op cit, p12. These figures exclude 112 811 casual, seasonal and contract labourers whose wages are even lower. 143 ILO, op cit, p92. Calculated from Marches Tropicaux, op cit.

15 October 1978, p2470. It is estimated that up to 70 per cent of African households are primarily dependent upon wagelabour for basic subsistence. D G Clarke, 'African workers and union formation in Rhodesia', SALB, March 1975, p4.

145 R Davies, 'The informal sector: a solution to unemployment?'

From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, No 5, CIR, London, 1978, p10.

146 The numbers have been estimated at 300 000 in the rural arcas.

147 The change of attitude reflects the fact that majority rule - and a central role for the PF within it - today presents the best way of ensuring capitalist stability in Zimbabwe. Needless to say, the new position is justified in the best traditions of philosophy. Rejecting the claim made by RF Minister P Van der Byl that majority rule would amount to unconditional surrender and produce a Marxist-backed state, Senator George McGovern said 'If the Russians come out against smallpox, that's no reason we have to be for smallpox in order to show that we are patriotic Americans. Quoted in The Daily Telegraph, 5 December 1978 148 Rhodesia: proposals for a settlement, Cmnd 6919, HMSO, 43

during the transition period. The European settlers, for their part, viewed the proposals with suspicion. Although a settlement along the lines of the Anglo-American initiative would have preserved capitalism, it did not contain sufficient guarantees to maintain the settlers' privileges. Smith moved fast to consolidate their position - with the co-operation of the collaborationist wing of the nationalist movement he signed the Internal Settlement.

Although they had been outflanked, the USA and Britain did not oppose the Internal Settlement as such.

Owen called it 'a significant step towards majority rule' while for Young it was a 'step toward bringing all the parties together in a free election'149 However, imperialism saw this settlement as short-sighted, for it failed to integrate the mass movement and end the war. As Owen observed: 'An internal settlement which excludes one of the leading nationalist groups cannot bring about a ceasefire during elections or bring peace and stability to a newly-independent Zimbabwe. Nor would it eliminate the threat to international Imperialism understands that any internai settlement can only draw attention to the collaborationist role of the nationalist leaders involved, making it impossible for them to mediate between imperialism and the masses. That is why an all-party settlement is a key component of British and American diplomacy. The aim of imperialism is to bring at least one wing of the PF into government. Owen made this clear to Sithole in 1978: position is that if all were included, that would be desix- "My able.... If you can include one of the external nationalists then that would help in gaining recognition at the earliest time. They can't come without their men coming with them. ... Joshua has been realistic to me. ... His problem is that he cannot be seen to be breaking from Robert Mugabe before he gets a concrete offer...

Before he breaks with Robert he must be assured of success.

If you were to get both in so much the better, but at least get Joshua. 151 At present Zimbabwe is in flux. Imperialism wants the PF in government; pressure from rank and file guerrillas stops the PF from compromising with Smith. Imperialism must prevent any further deterioration of the war and must avoid provoking any escalation of Soviet involvement in the region 152 Any steps that might lead to a confrontation with the PF must be rejected for the time being.

In a brash statement shortly after her election victory, Thatcher indicated that she would not renew sanctions "would take in November and that recognition longer' 153 In mid May the US Senate voted 75 - 19 in favour of the Muzorewa Government and advised Carter to lift sanctions. But these steps do not represent a departure from the integrationist policy pursued by Britain and the USA. Carter said that he was 'absolutely convinced' that lifting sanctions would be neither in the best interests of the USA 'nor in the best interests of the people of Zimbabwe 154 Imperialist strategy remains the same integration of the PF into a stable pro-capitalist African The struggle continues The internal agreement which Smith signed with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau provides no long-term answers for imperialism. It signifies only a temporary gain for the European settlers. Van de Byl betrayed a misunderstanding of the realities of Zimbabwe when he declared: 'What we have achieved is a masterpiece as a politico-diplomatic exercise. No one could ever have believed that we could get internal leaders to agree to so much'155 Precisely because 44 the African collaborators have made so many concessions - Icaving the judiciary and police in European hands, for example - the internal agreement has no credibility among the African masses. The token changes in restrictions on land ownership, health and education merely replace racial discrimination with the criterion of ability to pay. This excludes all but a tiny percentage of blacks from education and social services. 156 European privilege has been preserved.

As Ian Smith put it: 'We have now got majority rule but not majority rule based on colour 157 The Muzorewa Government and its collaborator allies have not been able to restore stability. Their growing isolation from the African masses has heightened the power struggle within their own ranks. Muzorewa and Sithole have been unable to fulfil their promise to end the war. Four weeks alter the signing of the agreement only 100 guerrillas had surrendered 158 No sooner did the Government legalise ZANU and ZAPU and release 700 political prisoners than it reversed its concessions. As the war intensified ZAPU and ZANU were banned again and the detainees re-arrested.

The April elections were not so much an attempt to gain the confidence of the African masses as a catalyst for the fragmentation of the alliance of African collaborators.

Having received only 12 seats, Sithole declared that there had been "gross irregularities in the voting procedures.

Muzorewa promptly moved against him and rounded up 60 of his supporters 159 Recently private security forces killed 180 of Sithole's armed auxiliaries.

The political situation has been made still more unbalanced by Chikerema's defection from the UANC, the effect of which was to end Muzorewa's parliamentary majority, 160 The rejection of the Internal Settlement by the African masses was clear and immediate. The announcement was greeted by a series of bombs.161 In April police arrested 80 African protesters in Salisbury.162 Above all the war of liberation has been stepped up. The PF called the settlement a sell-out and promised to redouble its military Mugabe even called for a 'Marxist one-party state. 163 During the election campaign the African collaborators made regular tours around the country to promote the settlement. But when Smith, Chirau and Sithole made a trip to Wadza for this purpose, they found themselves addressing a gathering of only 300 Africans. Again, only 1000 out of an expected audience of 10 000 turned up to hear Muzorewa in Mangwende - despite his provision of free beer and food 164 This kind of rejection of the collaborators was particularly marked among African workers. Industrial unrest prevailed in two major industrial centres - the Wankie Colliery and the Shabani mining complex. On one occasion 3000 black miners armed with axes and bars assembled outside the offices of the Mangula copper mine, insisting on higher wages. In the event four miners were shot dead.165 On 23 August 1978, a black minister came out to speak at a meeting organised for the Wankie workforce, to be greeted by a grand total of seven of the 13 000 miners.

During the April elections the security forces were mobilised to force the African masses into voting. This method raised the turnout in Mashonaland Central to 108 per cent and in Mashonaland West to 101 per cent 166 European farmers drove their workers to the polling stations.

In the towns workers were threatened with immediate dismissal if they refused to vote. As one senior military officer summed up the success of the operation: "The way we are going about it, this country will end up with a White majority' 167 However, coercion alone cannot explain the eventual 64 per cent turnout among the African electorate.

In the rural areas the collaborators played on the widespread yearning for peace and for an end to the PVs and martial law. Their main slogan was 'Your Vote Can Stop the War". 168

Nevertheless the electoral charade failed to endow the Muzorewa Government with any credibility. There may be a new Prime Minister, but he is in no position to restore social stability. As a result the Muzorewa-Smith Government has been forced to continue the oppressive and unpopular policies of the European regime. Its only hope is that, with time, the African masses will come to accept it and thus The main obstacle to an imperialist solution in Zimbabwe is the determination of the African masses to achieve full national self-determination. Until now pressure from the masses has prevented the PF from reaching a compromise with the European-dominated regime. Ever since Nkomo's secret negotiations with Smith in August 1978 there has been no sign that the PF is prepared to accept the internal agreement. Nevertheless the political programme of the PF threatens to undermine the struggle of the masses. Nkomo's assurance in July 1979 of his support for the Commonwealth shows how vulnerable the PF is to imperialist pressure.

blood has been shed in the struggle of the Zimbabwean people. If the aspirations of the African masses are developed on the basis of proletarian sacrifice will not have been in vain. Revolutionary workers have an obligation to ensure that the struggle for national liberation is not subordinated to the interests of petitbourgeois politicians and careerists.

Workers in the towns and the rural masses face not only political oppression but the social domination of capital. A change of personnel will do nothing to alleviate the plight of the landless and the unemployed. The problem is not lack of resources, for Zimbabwe is potentially very rich.

The problem is the social relations of capitalism, which restrict production to the narrow limits set by the criterion of profitability - the same social relations which reproduce imperialist domination no matter who is in power. The liberation of the people in Zimbabwe and their final emancipation from imperialist domination depends on a relentless fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The British working class inspiration from the struggle of the Zimbabwean people.

Workers in this country have a responsibility to expose the manoeuvres of the British state in Africa and prevent imperialism from enforcing its solution in Zimbabwe. Like its Labour predecessor. the Tory Government has assisted the offensive against the Zimbabwean liberation movement.

It is time for British workes to assume responsibility for thwarting imperialism s designs in Zimbabwe.

149 New African, April 1978. p33.

150 Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January 1978, p4718.

Young later agreed: 'There can only be a settlement if the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Rhodesia decide to support it rather than continue to support the armed struggle'.

Quoted in ibid, 1-28 February 1978, p4756.

151 Africa Confidential, Voi 19, No 7, 31 March 1978, p2.

152 Brzezinski, Carter's top foreign policy adviser, has expressed his fears on this score with particular eloquence. The situation which he hopes never to see will have arrived when 'white nuns being raped by black guerrillas wearing red stars on their armbands start appearing nightly on television news'. Quoted in The Observer, 21 January 1979.

153 'Rhodesia: a waiting game', New African, August 1979, p47.

155 Quoted in 'Rhodesia after the settlement', op cit, pp9-10.

156 Only about 10 000 - 15 000 black families earn enough to send Brazzaville politics this Lake Karib: Unir ais can draw considerable

BOTSWANA

André Robinson 157 The Guardian, 1 June 1979 161 The Sunday Times, 5 March 1978.

163 Financial Times, 17 April 1978.

166 Financial Times, 23 April 1979.

April 1979, p23. 168 Financial Times, 24 April 1979.

45

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their children to white schools, to use white hospitals and live in white areas. Financial Mail, 20 October 1978, p216.

158 'A joumney without maps', Africa, May 1978, p13 159 'The Bishop's house of cards, New African, August 1979, p13.

160 In June 1979 Chikerema formed the Zimbabwe Democratic Party, taking eight seats from Muzorewa. This has made Muzorewa even more dependent on the RF. Ibid.

162 International Herald Tribune, 26 April 1978.

164 'Rhodesia after the settlement', op cit, pl1.

165 The Daily Telegraph, 16 August 1978.

167 'Rhodesia: violence escalates, morale slumps', New African,

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