The united front

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The united front

The united front is one of the most abused concepts of the British left. Every type of heterogeneous movement – from the Anti-Nazi League to the Campaign For Nuclear Disarmament – has been characterised as a united front. Radical left opponents of revolutionary communists always criticise us for rejecting the united front. The Workers Socialist League, for example, attacked the Labour Movement conference on Ireland organised by the Smash the PTA Campaign for going ahead '(literally) under the green banner of the Revolutionary Communist Tendency' for not organising it 'through a trade union body but their own SPTAC, giving their party address for contact'. The author of a polemical article directed against the RCT in the Socialist Workers Party's theoretical journal noted: 'It is significant that I have yet to encounter in the RCT's works one reference to the concept of the united front.'

Below we examine the tactic of the united front, explain its historical origin, show how this tactic bears no relationship to the radical left's 'united front' and argue why this tactic is inappropriate for the task of building a revolutionary party in the present circumstances. The editors of the next step are prepared to publish the contrasting views of other political tendencies in future issues of the review.

The origins of the united front tactic

MANY left-wing organisations use the concept of the united front as a synonym for united action. This loose usage of the concept fails to understand the specific background that led to the formulation of this tactic and its objectives.

The immediate period following the end of the First World War saw the split of the European labour movement into its revolutionary and reformist wings. Until the formation of the Communist International (CI) and of communist parties throughout Europe the division between reformists and revolutionaries had little organisational expression. For Lenin and the Bolsheviks a break with the existing social-democratic organisations and the establishment of revolutionary parties was essential for the forward march of the proletariat. In the revolutionary wave that followed the war large communist parties were built in Western and Central Europe. Even in countries like Britain and Austria, where the social-democratic parties remained powerful, the advanced sections of the working class gave their allegiance to the communist parties.

By 1920 stable capitalist relations were re-established and the revolutionary wave had begun to subside. It had become clear to the CI that the European revolution was not immediately on the agenda and that a protracted period of struggle lay ahead of the communist parties. The problem facing the CI was this: although the communist parties had won the vanguard of the working class they had not yet won the mass of the proletariat. In certain countries, like Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, the communist parties had become the dominant parties of the working class. But these were the exceptions. More typical were Germany and Italy where the communist parties constituted from one quarter to one third of the labour movement.

The tactic of the united front was formulated at a meeting of the Executive of the CI in December 1921. The problem which this tactic attempted to address was how to win the mass of the proletariat to the banner of communism. Trotsky noted that at the Third Congress of the CI 'a new stage begins: the parties take into account that they have yet to win the masses and that an assault must be preceded by a more or less protracted period of preparatory work. There opens up the zone of the united front' (L Trotsky, The first five years of the Communist International, Vol 1, Pathfinder).

The aim of the united front tactic was to organise joint actions between the communist and reformist parties. United action in the interests of the working class was necessary for combatting the capitalist offensive. But more than that, reformist workers would, in the course of these struggles, experience the communist parties in action and overcome their suspicion towards revolutionaries. Since reformist parties fear the revolutionary potential of the mass movement more than anything else they would try to contain the scope of the struggle. Thus the CI felt that workers would come to see that social-democratic parties were unable to defend their class interests. As Trotsky noted: 'we are apart from all other considerations, interested in dragging the reformists from their asylums and placing them alongside ourselves before the eyes of the struggling masses' (The first five years. . .).

The united front tactic was designed to win the mass of the working class who through their experience of struggle would learn to reject their reformist leadership. How? It was expected that after a certain point the reformist parties would retreat from the struggle and argue for its termination. This would show the reformists to be the real splitters, for they would rather break up the united front than defend the interests of the working class:

'In many cases and perhaps even the majority of cases, organisational agreements will be only half-attained or perhaps not at all. But it is necessary that the struggling masses should always be given the opportunity of convincing themselves that the non-achievement of unity in action was not due to our formalistic irreconcilability but to the lack of real will to struggle on the part of the reformists.' (The first five years. . .)

According to the CI the exposure of the reformists would only be achieved and the masses only won to communism if revolutionaries maintained their political independence and challenged the politics of the social-democratic parties. As Trotsky argued: 'any sort of organisational agreement which restricts our freedom of criticism and agitation is absolutely unacceptable to us. We participate in a united front but do not for a single minute become dissolved in it. We function in the united front as an independent detachment' (The first five years. . .).

The misconceptions about it

To recapitulate: the united front was not simply united action – it was united action designed to expose the reformist leadership of the labour movement and to win the mass of workers to the already existing vanguard parties.

It is quite clear that present circumstances are different from the problems the tactic of the united front sought to address. Today there are large Stalinist and social-democratic parties and revolutionary parties barely exist. Today the problem is to win a significant section of the working class to communism, not to win the masses to an already existing vanguard. The tactic of the united front is inappropriate today if for no other reason than the fact that the revolutionary wing of the united front does not exist! This tactic is irrelevant to situations where revolutionaries cannot lead the struggle of the masses. In 1922 when Trotsky argued for the adoption of this tactic he also outlined the circumstances where the united front was misplaced.

'In cases where the Communist Party still remains an organisation of a numerically insignificant minority, the question of its conduct on the mass-struggle front does not assume a decisive practical and organisational significance. In such conditions, mass actions remain under the leadership of the old organisations which by reason of their still powerful traditions continue to play the decisive role. . .

'But wherever the CP already constitutes a big, organised, political force, but not the decisive magnitude; wherever the party embraces organisationally, let us say, one fourth, one third, or even a larger proportion of the organised proletarian vanguard, it is confronted with the question of the united front in all its acuteness.' (The first five years. . .)

Where in Europe do revolutionaries embrace organisationally one fourth or one third of the working class? Just posing this question shows that those who call for a united front today mean something quite different by this tactic than the concept's originators. So why is the radical left so fascinated with a tactic that it is in no position to pursue? Let's look at the matter more deeply.

Its misapplication

Through a combination of taking initiatives in united mass struggles and the exposure of the reformist leaders, the tactic of the united front was designed to extend the influence of the communist parties. Unfortunately the implementation of this tactic suffered from a number of problems. A minority of parties, such as the Italian one, were reluctant to unite with the social democrats and therefore allowed the reformist bureaucrats to take the initiative. A more widespread error was to subordinate the communist programme to the united front. At the Fourth Congress of the CI, Zinoviev, its president, congratulated the German party for achieving a degree of success with this tactic. 'But', he went on, 'we have often seen that our German party did not always emphasise sufficiently the independence of our line of action; for with us the insistence upon the independence of communist agitation is the main thing. They were not always successful in this' (Bulletin of Fourth Congress of the Communist International, No 2, 12 November 1922).

Most communist parties were politically too immature to understand the united front tactic. Hence many of them saw it simply as a unity pact with reformist parties. As a result communist parties united with the reformists on issues that were acceptable to the latter and failed to agitate around broader questions. Criticism was muted for the sake of unity, and many communist parties argued that differences should only be raised once the immediate objectives of the united front were achieved. This opportunist approach to the united front was particularly marked in Britain. A few weeks before the election of the first minority Labour Government Palme Dutt, the leading theoretician of the CPGB, argued:

'Therefore the first need for all of us at the present moment, whatever our differences, whatever our criticisms and distrusts, is to unite in support of a Workers' Government and its supremacy first and foremost, and to exert all our forces one and all to fight on its behalf foursquare against the whole capitalist world.' (Labour Monthly, January 1924)

These arguments for a Labour government altered in practice the basic premise of the united front tactic. Instead of pursuing communist politics in unity in action the British party merely pursued unity. Hence these tactics served the Labour Party and not the communists. In effect through the misapplication of the tactic the building of the revolutionary party was counterposed to the united front as unity with the reformists always came first.

Through the years the opportunistic application of the united front tactic led

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to its practical reinterpretation. Its original objectives were lost sight of and anybody who wanted to justify unity with social democrats invoked the united front tactic. In the 'thirties the now Stalinist communist parties even extended its scope to embrace all 'democrats', including capitalist parties. A few years later this form of class collaboration was renamed the 'Popular Front'. It should be noted that one of the original aims of the united front was precisely to prevent the emergence of this form of an all-class political bloc. Trotsky argued:

'One of the most reliable methods of counteracting inside the working class the moods and ideas of. . .a bloc between the workers and a certain section of the bourgeoisie against another section of the bourgeoisie is through promoting persistently and resolutely the idea of a bloc between all sections of the working class against the whole bourgeoisie.' (The first five years. . .)

The misapplication of the tactic along opportunistic lines gained such coherence that by the 'thirties even revolutionary elements failed to grasp the past significance of the united front.

The radical left's usage of the term and its application of the tactic represent the contemporary expression of this opportunist trend. A recent statement by the SWP Central Committee on the united front is almost identical to the approach of the CPGB in the mid 'twenties.

'However, in the present situation, the major problem is to develop activity in opposition to the Tories and the right wing. The exposure of the lefts can be left to events provided we maintain a clear independent SWP political presence.' ('Problems of united front work', SWP Internal Bulletin, November 1980)

The afterthought 'a clear independent political presence' could only mean a physical not a political presence, for without challenging the Labour lefts any 'united front' will be dominated by the politics of the reformists.

Not just a misunderstanding

But the zealous adherence of the radical left to this tactic isn't just a simple misunderstanding of the history of the united front. The radical left itself is a product of the Stalinist degeneration of the CI. This degeneration, which contributed to the defeats of the working class, has pushed revolutionary groups to the sidelines. Throughout the last fifty years there has been no revolutionary organisation in Europe able to lead mass struggles. Unable to influence events, even subjectively revolutionary elements have given up the struggle to lead the working class through their independent activity.

As a result the radical left has sought to compensate for its numerical weakness and social insignificance by forming 'united fronts' with each other and reformist tendencies. In the 'sixties the proliferation of social movements among students, women, black people, gays and others reinforced this trend. Increasingly the 'broad' character of these movements was counterposed to the narrow terrain of the revolutionary party.

These movements were broad only in comparison to the insignificant radical left. In fact the focus of broad appeal narrowed down the political character of these movements to what was acceptable to all the participants. Most left groups claimed that they had an 'independent presence' but in practice were indistinguishable from each other in their search for the broad masses. This method of political work had important political consequences. Increasingly the particular nuances of each radical left group's programme became irrelevant for all practical purposes. For what counted was the broad movement and the demands that could be made within each of its sections. In practice the building of a revolutionary party was abandoned in favour of operating within broad movements.

The present-day trend of entering the Labour Party amongst the radical left characterises the latest phase of this broad movement approach. But even groups like the SWP who have not physically entered the Labour Party are desperate to find a movement to survive in. This is the meaning of the SWP's exhortations on the united front tactic. As its Central Committee concludes: 'we must seek to put ourselves at the centre of any significant movement of opposition to the Tories, national and local, whenever we possibly can. Therefore we have to involve ourselves in united front work, both informal and formal, whenever any opportunity or half opportunity offers' ('Problems of united front work').

The price of the broad front

Our difference with the radical left's usage of the united front isn't a linguistic one. To be sure the left calls anything – formal, informal, local, national – a united front. Our difference relates to the character of political activity. Today the concept united front justifies the inability of the left to maintain an independent political existence and a refusal to struggle for influence in the labour movement around a revolutionary programme. The left always baulks at raising even its own more radical demands lest it should alienate others in the 'united front'.

There are many examples. Radical left groups like the SWP and the IMG are formally committed to support the demand for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Ireland. Yet these organisations have set up numerous 'united fronts' which ignored these demands and advanced slogans which were not anti-imperialist just so they could bring in others to the 'broad' movement. They call this a clever tactic. But it's more than that. Their own programme has no consequence, for it is overshadowed by the practice of searching for broad fronts. These groups maintain only an organisational independence – their political activity is dictated by the character of the 'broad movements'.

The reason why the RCT puts such an emphasis on its independent activity is not because of an abstract love for independence. It is because our own demands are inconsistent with those of the existing 'united fronts'. We are not prepared to fight for objectives which do not advance the interests of the working class for the sake of unity. We have established the Smash the PTA Campaign because the existing campaigns refused to take up the fight against British imperialism in Ireland. Similarly we have launched our own anti-racist campaigns – ELWAR, SOLWAR – because the radical left campaigns are not prepared to fight all immigration controls and build workers' defence against racist attacks.

Unity in action

We are for unity in action as long as it is unity around objectives which are in the interests of the working class. What we oppose is the trend which places unity before class interest. Anti-Tory unity with the Labour Party does not unite workers around their independent interests but unites workers around the capitalist policies of the Labour Party.

As far as the tactic of the united front is concerned its irrelevance to today's struggle should be evident. Those who seek to pursue this tactic are blind to the realities of the day.

Reformist politics dominate the European working class and strongly influence even its militant sections. Tactics and strategy must relate to this state of affairs. The immediate task is to transform the most active section of our class into a class conscious vanguard. But this cannot be done by remaining in the shadow of reformist politicians and building incoherent broad fronts.

Precisely at a time when active workers see no alternative to their traditional parties the independent activity of revolutionaries assumes a momentous significance. The reformists can shrug off episodic criticisms and even vehement denunciations. They know that their left critics will not go too far and question their leading position in the labour movement. In Britain radical left criticisms of the Labour Party are more a form of advice than an alternative. What conclusion will workers draw when they read in Socialist Worker and Socialist Challenge that they should support Benn against Healey in the contest for the deputy leadership of the Labour Party?

The reason why independent revolutionary activity is so important is because no significant section of the working class will break with reformism unless they see an alternative in the here and now. Those who call for a united front against the Tories or a vote for Labour are not offering an alternative in the present. They are telling active workers to stick with the traditions of the past and wait for an alternative in the future.

First the great divide

The struggle against reformism cannot be left to theoretical journals and symposiums. It has to be carried onto the field of the class struggle. It requires concentrated revolutionary propaganda which coheres active workers into a political force. It requires independent activity which utilises every experience of struggle to clarify the need for a political alternative.

At present the working class is united around the banner of social democracy. The formation of a vanguard necessarily means the destruction of this unity. Those who criticise our independent activity are in reality criticising our determination to polarise political opinion in the labour movement between those who want to reform capitalism and those who want its overthrow. Yet the working class will have to be politically divided before it can be a united force. But then it will be united around its own revolutionary leadership and not as at present around a capitalist Labour Party.

Frank Richards

[Caption]

The Smash the PTA Campaign labour movement delegation to Derry: unity in action in support of the Irish hunger strike splits anti-imperialist workers from the labour bureaucracy.

The Anti-Nazi League: unity under reformist control led anti-fascist youth and workers into bureaucratic passivity.