Prolonging the death agony: the rise, fall and reconstitution of social democracy

PROLONGING THE DEATH AGONY

The rise, fall and reconstitution of social democracy

INTRODUCTION

survived the economic and political crisis of the 'thirties; even the official communist parties became integrated into the capitalist system. During the post-war reconstruction reformist working class parties successfully contained the struggles of the proleteriat. Today they stand ready to curb the heightened class conflict unleashed by the recession.

In this article we examine the material and ideological foundation of reformism in the European working class. In doing this it is essential to draw a distinction between the subjective intentions of reformists and reformism as an objective process. Anybody's commitment to reform rather than revolution may be an important individual choice, But whether the reformist option becomes an important political force depends on a number of historically specific factors: the movement of capital, the strength of bourgeois rule, the consciousness of the working class and the balance of class forces. The role of reformism in the relationship between the working class and capital is not static. Through the class struggle social equilibrium is constantly modified as class relations are reorganised.

A section of the working class closely linked to the bourgeoisie is essential for the survival of reformism. This social stratum acts as the medium through which bourgeois class interests are translated into the language of the labour movement. However, it would be wrong to try to pinpoint a particular category of workers as the social basis of reformism. The changing composition of the working class militates against any such definite process of differentiation.

Economic standing, for example, is not decisive: better off workers are not necessarily reformist any more than the poor are revolutionary. To understand the social basis of reformism we have to look at the historical process through which the bourgeoisie has forged at least a limited relationship with a section of the working class. Our analysis shows the decisive role the labour bureaucracy has come to play in fostering bourgeois politics among working class people.

There can be no general theories of reformism.

reproduction of capitalist social relations continually changes the terrain of the class struggle; the working class itself is restructured and the balance of class power is altered. Certain features of reformism - working class organisations, traditions and ideology - run through the time span of the imperialist phase of capitalism.

continuity of institutions has blinded the European left to 3 the changing social environment within which these institutions operate. As a result left-wing theories of reformism tend to be supra historical generalisations.?

We distinguish three distinct phases in the development of reformism. During the last four decades of the nineteenth century the trade unions and political parties of the working class were established, often with the encouragement of the state. The rise of imperialism out of the era of free competition boosted these working class institutions and led to the second phase of reformism: classical social democracy. The grave imperialist crisis and the intense class struggle in the years 1917-21 ushered in the final, protracted stage. Classical social democracy died. Where social democratic parties were not destroyed they either stagnated or were transformed into agencies of social order. The defeats of the working class through the combined impact of fascism and Stalinism created the potential for the revival of social democracy. In the decade following the Second World War reformism had only a limited role to play. It is only now, under the impact of the deepest capitalist crisis since the 'thirties that the labour bureaucracy is moving to reconstitute a social democratic alternative.

Our aim is not to provide a history of the European labour movement. We select from the history of the working class the key experiences that have shaped reformist politics. Section I deals with the history of the theory of reformism, reviewing the ways in which the left wing of the labour movement has tried to come to grips with the forces of the bourgeoisie in its midst. In Section Il we examine the rise of reformism to its apogée in classical social democracy.

Section IIl looks at the defeats of the working class and the role of Stalinism in creating the scope for the regeneration of reformism. Finally we consider the problem of reformism 2

SECTION 1

HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF REFORMISM

Discussions of the problem of reformism began in the revolutionary movement during the middle of the nineteenth century. However, it wasn't until the struggle against reformism became a life and death matter that the need for a cogent theory of reformism became a pressing political priority. The British disease In general, nineteenth century revolutionaries took a narrow view of reformism, seeing it as a temporary aberration from the overall development of the international socialist movement. They usually identified reformism as a peculiar deviation of the British labour movement. Marx and Engels both noted the influence of the British labour aristocracy in stifling revolutionary sentiments in the working class.3 Engels linked the narrow self-interest of the labour aristocracy to the successful domination of the world market 4 Kautsky linked this view of the by British capitalism. labour aristocracy with the sectional outlook of trade unionism. He discerned la tendency to develop a spirit of corporative narrow mindedness, the caste spirit of an aristocracy seeking to achieve a privileged position by comparison with their proletarian comrades and at their expense' However, Kautsky too tended to restrict his analysis of reformism to Britain, portraying the British working class as a special case. While his own party in Germany was becoming more and more reformist in its outlook, Kautsky could write in 1909: 'Now alas, we only learn from England how not to do things, how a big and strong working class becomes powerless as soon as it looses the spiritual tie which binds the various component parts of the labour movement together, and make of it an irresistible whole' 6 The British labour leaders' rejection of Marxism and their clearly expressed adherence to gradualism was in sharp contrast to the formal pronouncements of Continental social democracy. It was thus easy to see reformism as a British disease. However some revolutionaries in the Second International knew that all was not well in social democracy The left wing of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) was acutely aware of the reactionary character reformist wing of the party. Leading revolutionaries like Pannekoek were outspoken in their denunciations of the battle against revisionisin Luxemburg fought a vigorous But the Second International left could not give its opposition to reformism a theoretical or organisational expression.

Lenin's battle against Menshevism formed the basis for a critique of the Russian variant of reformism. But at this time his view of reformism more or less coincided with that of the revolutionary wing of the Second International. In line with the prevalent approach of the SPD left, he noted the unique development of the British working class, the weakness of British social democracy, the strength Liberalism and the reactionary character of British trade unions. Thus he wrote in 1906: Unfortunately, the British working class movement promises to serve for a long time to come as a sad example of how the labour movement's divorcement from socialism leads of necessity to its becoming shallow and bourgeois in character."

4 Lenin's characterisation of the British labour movement was entirely correct - but the phenomenon he was describing was not restricted to Britain.

Despite his limited assessment of the problem, Lenin was not blind to the development of opportunism in the European labour movement, In 1906 he noted the spread of the British disease in his report of the Jena Congress of the SPD: It became more than evident at this Congress that even in Germany, where the traditions of Marxism and its influence are strongest, anti-socialist tendencies towards "pure trade unionism" of the British, ie absolutely bourgeois type, are developing in the trade unions - mark you, Social Democratic trade unions....

'In Germany, as in Russia and indeed everywhere, a narrow or Economism, is linking up with opportunism trade unionism revisionism 10 In the years that followed Lenin became convinced that the tension between the reformist and revolutionary wings of social democracy could not be resolved within a But even as late as 1913 he still single organisation. characterised the social democratic parties as basically socialist. Commenting on another exception - the Australian - Lenin insisted that its dynamic was away Labour Party from Liberalism and towards socialism: Naturally, when Australia is finally developed and consolidated as an independent capitalist state, the condition of the workers will change, as also will the liberal Labour Party, which will make way for a socialist workers' party. Australia is an illustration of the conditions under which exceptions to the rule are possible. The rule is: a socialist workers' party in a capitalist country. The exception is: a liberal Labour Party which arises only for a short time by virtue of specific conditions that are abnormal for capitalism in general, The collapse of the Second International forced Lenin to think again about social democracy. Whereas before he saw Liberal-Labour parties as the 'exception' he concluded in 1916 that 'the fact is that "bourgeois labour parties" a political phenomenon, have already been formed in all the foremost capitalist countries' Lenin's earlier underestimation of the strength of reformism inside social democracy was widely shared by the international revolutionary movement. '4 This partial understanding of reformism was not due entirely to theoretical deficiencies: before 1914 the reformist content of social democratic politics had not been exposed in practice. When the direction of social democracy and the consequences of reformism became manifest at the outbreak First World War a revolutionary critique could advance The Leninist synthesis Between 1914 and 1916, Lenin and his collaborators developed a major critique of reformism. Lenin's theory of imperialism marked a decisive break with the previous debate. For the first time the discussion of reformism took 15 Lenin now directly place on a materialist foundation.

related the emergence of reformism to the period of imperialist expansion. The relative prosperity enjoyed by a section of the working class in the imperialist countries had a number of important consequences: The absence of major wars or revolutions between 1871 and 1914 fostered opportunism which was consolidated through the labour bureaucracy and came to influence significant sections of the labour movement.

2 Economic expansion led to the emergence of a labour aristocracy. The privileged position of this stratum created the basis for its alliance with the bourgeoisie.

3 The labour aristocracy and its allies gained control of the labour movement and used its institutions to win the adherence of the working class to a policy of class collaboration, The extension of bourgeois democracy, the growth of state intervention and the creation of close links between the labour bureaucracy and the state fostered illusions in the character of the bourgeois state.

Many radical historians have reduced Lenin's critique of reformism to his analysis of the labour aristocracy. But his identification of the labour aristocracy as the social basis for reformism is only one part of his theory. Indeed, the role of the labour aristocracy had been widely discussed before Lenin's critique. What was most significant about Lenin's analysis was the link he drew between imperialism and reformism. Through imperialist expansion a section of the working class had been drawn into active collaboration with the bourgeoisie. This collaboration was made possible, not through simple bribes, but through state intervention in social and political life.

The prosperity brought by imperialist expansion made it possible for the state to create the political framework necessary for the integration of the labour bureaucracy and the establishment of class However, the labour bureaucracy on its own could not have influenced the labour movement to adopt a reformist outlook. The role of the labour aristocra vehicles of reformism and chauvinismency was to act as And the road vehicles rolled was provided by the bourgeois labour parties.

These parties could play a mediating role because they were not only bourgeois labour parties expressing the interests of the labour bureaucracy, but also bourgeois labour parties reflecting the immediate concerns of workers. It was through the social democratic parties and the trade union bureaucracies that the alliance between the working class and the bourgeoisie was con- The ruling class consciously set about the task of forging an alliance with the offical labour movement.

Lenin called this strategy 'Lloyd Georgism': the policy of granting reforms to stabilise the wage-labour/capital relationship. Reforms of the type instigated by the British Liberal leader Lloyd George were crucial for providing the political and ideological framework within which reformism could flourish. State intervention in the class struggle in the phase of imperialist expansion was a powerful stimulus to reformist illusions about the neutral and even benevolent character of the state. That's why Lenin's writings on the state (particularly State and Revolution) are an essential component of his critique of reformism.

The consolidation of the position of the labour bureaucracy depended on its recognition of the state. Bourgeois democracy and its institutions assimilated the leadership of the labour movement and created a political framework for stabilising class conflict. Lenin examined this process in 'On the economic basis referred to above, the political institutions of modern capitalism - press, parliament, associations congresses, etc have created political privileges and sops for the respectful, meek, reformist, patriotic office employees and workers.

corresponding to the economic privileges and sops. Lucrative and soft jobs in the government or in the war industries committees, in parliament and on diverse committees, on the editorial staffs of "respectable" legally published newspapers or on management councils of no less respectable and "bourgeois law-abiding" trade unions - this is the bait by which the imperialist-bourgeoisie atracts and rewards the representatives and supporters of the "bour eois labour parties". " 5 State intervention gave reformism its coherence. Through its relationship to the state the labour bureaucracy guaranteed its survival while the state held out the possibility of new reforms. The final element in Lenin's critique of reformism relates to class consciousness. The collapse of the Second See K Marx and F Engels, 'Review May to October 1850', Collected Works, Vol 1, p514. In many ways Marx and Engels critique of petit-bourgeois socialists such as Owen, Proudhon and Duhring are more pertinent to the elaboration of the theory of reformism. However these trends developed among the petit bourgeoisie and not in the labour movement. As a result petit-bourgeois socialism, despite its ideological affinity with modern day reformism represented a specific pre-imperialist political approach. Once opportunism began to manifest itself as a coherent trend Engels was quick to respond. His devastating critique of the Erfurt Programme of German social democracy provides the starting point for Lenin's analysis of the subject. See F Engels, 'Critique of the Erfurt Programme, in East Kent Bulletin of Marxist Studies, No 1, 'Engels to Sorge, 19 April 1896', Selected correspondence, Quoted in M Salvadori, Karl Kautsky and the socialist revol.

ution 1880-1938, London, 1979, p74.

6 K Kautsky, The social revolution, London, 1909, 'The author's preface to the English translation', pili.

See D A Smart, Pannekoek and Gorter's Marxism, Pluto Press, Luxemburg's well-known work Social reform or revolution is devoted to an ideological rebuttal of revisionism.

VI Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 9, p413.

VI Lenin, CW, Vol 9, pp292-93.

'Various trends have grown up within German Social Democracy and are bursting to get out; inside, the party is see thing.

Resolute action is imminent here, A conflict between the reformist and revolutionary Social Democrats is inevitable.'

Report on the work of the International Socialist Bureau, in VI Lenin, CW, Vol 41, p248.

VI Lenin, 'In Australia, 13 June 1913', CW, Vol 14.

13 V I Lenin, 'Imperialism and the split in socialism', CW, Vol 23, In a speech to the Third Congress of the Communist International in 1921, Trotsky noted: 'During the war and even prior to the war the bourgeoisie kept its mechanism in balance - although this escaped our notice at the time - through the medium of the Social Democrats'. See L Trotsky, The first five years of the Communist International, Vol 1, Pathfinder, p181.

Rudolf Hilferding's Finance Capital, published in 1910 was arguably the most comprehensive account of imperialism from a working class (albeit opportunist) point of view. Yet it ignores the problem of reformism altogether. Rosa Luxemburg's Junius Pamphlet (1915), provides a full account of the crisis of social democracy but fails to offer a critique of opportunism and thus draw the political conclusion that a new International was necessary. In contrast Lenin's Imperialism analyses the economic roots of opportunism and develops a critique of it.

The development of these points can be found in the writings of Lenin between 1914 and 1917. Lenin's collaborator Gregory Zinoviey also contributed to the Bolshevik critique of reformism. See their joint Gegen der Sturm published in 1916 V I Lenin, 'Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism', CW, VI Lenin, 'Imperialism and the split...', op cit, p117.

For a discussion on the ideological confusions created by state intervention, see F Richards, 'Revisionism, imperialism and the state: the method of Capital and the dogma of State Monopoly Capitalism', Revolutionary Communist Papers, No 4, February 20 VI Lenin, 'Imperialism and the split...', op cit, p117.

labour aristocracy to the bourgeoisie &f a stratum of the International expressed 'the desertion It was no longer a question of theoretical debate but of a political fight against active collaborators with imperialism.

Hence Lenin argued that there had to be a decisive break between reformists and revolutionaries.

Only by building a new Communist International (CI) could class consciousness be given an organisational expression, The CI and a world wide struggle against imperialist politics in the labour movement were vital to purge the working class movement of its decadent leadership.

The Comintern against social democracy The Bolshevik critique of reformism provided the ideo logical foundation for the CI. The problem that now faced revolutionaries was how to deal with their social democratic opponents. The resolution of this conflict would be decided not by theoretical speculation, but by the class struggle: 'Neither we nor anyone else can calculate precisely what portion of the proletariat is following and will follow the social chauvinists and opportunists. This will be revealed only by struggle, it will be definitely decided only by the socialist revolution.

The revolutionary upsurge at the end of the First World War seemed likely to end the influence of reformism forever. Between 1917 and 1920 the ruling class was forced to rely on social democracy to preserve its rule; throughout much of Europe social democrats stood compromised before the working class. The main aim of the CI was to hasten the demise of social democracy by establishing new revolutionary parties and forcing a split in the official labour movement. This course of action brought rapid results - mass communist parties sprang up throughout However, despite the expectations of many revolutionaries, reformism did not die. Although their influence had been seriously undermined, the social democrats still retained the allegiance of significant sections of the European working class. The Third Congress of the CI in 1921 was preoccupied with the problem of reformism. The result of the discussion at this, and the following, congress was the evolution of the tactic of the united front.23 The united front tactic arose out of the CI's recognition of the need for a protracted period of struggle against the reformist leadership of the working class. Lenin outlined problem: 'None of the Communist Parties anywhere has yet won the majority (of the working class), not only as regards organisational leadership, but to the principles of communism as well'. He proposed that the tactics of the Communist International 'should be based on a steady and systematic drive to win the majority of the working class, first and foremost within the old trade unions. Then we shall win for certain, whatever the course of events' 24 The problem of reformism haunted the CI throughout the next decade. But after 1924 the growing influence of the Stalinist bureaucracy led to the abandonment of scientific analyis in favour of pragmatic speculation. There has been no real development in the theory of reformism since the early 'twenties. Critics of social democracy have either declared reformism obsolete or reduced the problem to the behaviour of a handful of betrayers. Even the most left-wing sections of the working class movement could not go beyond the literal restatement of the Leninist critique.

6

SECTION II

THE CHANGING FACE OF REFORMISM

The rise of reformism Reformism took distinct national roads to its full political development. In Britain, the leading capitalist power, the growth of reformism was intimately bound up with the rise of the labour aristocracy.

The labour aristocracy in its classical sense is the product of capitalism in the period of free competition.

The labour aristocrats were craftsmen who were able to take advantage of their skills to protect themselves from fluctuations in the labour market. They could wrest concessions from the capitalists, exercise a measure of control over their work and avoid to a degree the insecurity of employment that was the fate of the mass of the labouring population. Their experience of capitalism was different from that of the rest of the working class. As far as their social position was concerned they were closer to small employers and traders than to the mass of unskilled workers.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century they enjoyed virtually exclusive rights to organise along trade union lines.

They also gained the right to vote at a much earlier stage than the rest of the working class.

Much discussion of the labour aristocracy is excessively sociological. Most writers tend to emphasise the material standing of the labour aristocracy rather than its position relative to the rest of the working class, other classes and As a sociological concept, the labour aristocracy has become an acceptable part of bourgeois analysis But the sociology of the labour aristocracy illuminates only one aspect of the way in which this section of the working class provided the basis for reformism, The labour aristocracy simply as a group of relatively privileged workers could not play the mediating function required for the operation of reformist politics. To understand this function we have to examine the relationship between the labour aristocracy, the trade unions and The 'new model' trade unions which emerged in the 1850s were the organisations of the labour aristocracy.

These skilled workers' unions used their power to regulate the labour market and restrict entry into their crafts. The new model unions defended sectional privileges against the mass of the working class. They were directed as much against other workers as against the employers, especially as many skilled artisans were 'sub-contractors' employing labourers. Clegg has aptly characterised them as 'primarily associations of contractors'.

But the new model trade unions on their own could not act as instruments for containing the entire working class. For a start they excluded the majority of workers.

And the organisations of the labour aristrocracy were also a threat to the employers. Through the control of their own craft, skilled workers tended to limit the employers' cap.

acity to introduce new work practices. During the 1850s and 1860s the labour aristocracy was able to use its power to encroach upon managerial prerogatives.

The British bourgeoisie was quick to appreciate the problem of unmediated class struggle in its burgeoning factories and workshops: its response was to institutionalise class relations. In the 1860s the ruling class moved to formalise industrial relations by establishing conciliation

and arbitration boards.29 In the following decade the state intervened to provide legal recognition for trade unions, while restricting the scope of strike action through the Trade Union Act of 1871. Subsequent legislation in 1875 and 1876 completed the process of labour's legal recog nition. During the 1880s, the economic depression strengthened the hand of the bourgeoisie and many of the arbitration boards disappeared. But in the next decade the institutionalisation of industrial relations proceeded with renewed vigour, incorporating even the new general unions By the turn of the century the process of integrating the organisations of the working class into the capitalist system was well under way.

Europe The labour aristocracy was not in fact an exclusively British phenomenon. In Europe it existed in a primitive form. The limited expansion of capitalism led to a slow evolution of the working class on the continent. The sector of skilled workers has barely separated from the petit bourgeoisie. As a result trade unions grew very slowly and tended to be local associations of craftsmen. In nineteenth France for example, only the printers could afford to pay union dues, strike benefits and afford the cost of union wasn't simply the small size of the Continental labour aristocracy that prevented it from playing the role of its British counterpart. The slow development of capitalism limited the social power of the European bourgeoisie. As a result it could not afford to make the concessions necessary to integrate the working class. The relation between skilled and capitalists was not mediated through recognised channels and therefore was more violent in character than in Britain. Even in Germany, where capitalism began to develop rapidly the ruling class feared trade unions until the mid 1890s. One far-sighted German observer of English industrial relations who recommended the British approach to trade unionism was denounced violently by his bourgeois colleagues. 32 On the Continent, the absence of mediating institutions gave impetus to the rise of Marxism and syndicalism in the labour movement. Class conflict was direct and the class character of the state stood revealed in its coercive features.

But national differences can obscure the fundamental similarity in the development of the European labour movement in Britain and on the Continent.

The trade unions were in all countries the bedrock of the labour movement. This was the case even in countries like Italy, France and Germany where objective conditions and anti-labour laws led to the establishment of socialist parties prior to the formation of unions. In these countries the social democratic parties attempted to stimulate union organisation. Where they failed - for example in Italy .

reformism lacked a firm foundation in the working class.

At first sight there seems to be a world of difference between the British unions and the Continental syndicalist combinations. The British unions were conservative and shared the capitalist outlook of the employers. For example, British cotton spinners invested personal and union savings in cotton mills and skilled shipyard workers did the same.

In contrast French syndicalists were radical and did not hesitate to denounce bourgeois society.

The difference in outlook between British and European skilled workers resulted from the different political environments in which they operated. Anti-working class legislation and state repression radicalised Continental workers. Hos- 7 tility to the state was the norm as most skilled workers saw the state as an instrument of class domination. But the content of syndicalist union activity was strikingly similar to that of British unions. Syndicalists too were vitally concerned with the state of their industry - the difference with British unionists was that they sought to get rid of the bosses and run their own enterprises through co-operatives.

Skilled workers in Europe were as jealous of their position as their British counterparts. Until the end of the nineteenth century the French labour movement had no room for female and unskilled workers - even skilled workers in new industries like railways were ignored. The potential for class collaboration was waiting to be realised once capitalist 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. For a discussion of this tactic, see F Richards, The united front', in the next step, No 13, May 1981.

V I Lenin, 'Remarks on the Draft Theses on tactics for the Third Congress of the Communist International", in CW, Vol Hobsbawn's Løbouring men remains the best account. Despite its sociological emphasis it also attempts to deal with the changing social position of the labour aristocracy. John Foster's account is more satisfactory on this score. But unfortunately he fails to explain the form through which the labour aristoc racy's outlook became institutionalised in the labour movement. See J Foster, 'British imperialism and the labour aristo.

cracy', in J Skelley, ed, The General Strike 1926, Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, For examples of a narrow focus on the labour aristoctacy outside the context of changing class relations, see A E Musson, 'Class struggle and the labour aristocracy, 1830- 60', in Social History, January 1978, and A Reid, 'Politics and economics in the formation of the British working class, in Social History, October 1978.

One anti-Marxist historian identifies the labour aristocracy as the top 10 to 15 per cent of wage earners. E H Hunt, British labour history 1815-1914, Weidenfild & Nicolson, 1981. Used in this sense the concept of the labour aristocracy means 27 HA Clegg et al, A history of British trade unions since 1889, Vol 1, 1884-1910, Oxford, 1964, p15.

R Price, Masters, unions and men 1830.1914, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p93. This book is one of the most important analyses of class relations in Britain Fublished during the past decade. For an excellent account of this process, see R Price, ibid.

Collective agreements which regulated industrial relations grew from just over 100 in 1890 to around 800 in 1916. See R Price, ibid, p164. F Ridley, Revolutionary syndicalism in France, Cambridge, See G von Schulze-Gaevernitz, Social peace, (English translation), Swann & Sonneschern, London, 1893, He enthused: With the legislation of 1871-1876, the reason for that distrust which hitherto had separated the workers from the upper classes, and especially from their employers, disappeared, It is wonderful how rapidly the revolution has since progressed, changing the Trade Unions, once considered a danger to the an important section of the Liberal Party, ever into state in in ence lad, polin.

The labour bureaucracy The imperialist epoch brought the decline of the labour aristocracy in its classical form. Technological innovation in Britain destroyed craft-based industry and transformed the working class. The classical labour aristocracy was replaced Although relatively by a new stratum of skilled workers.

privileged and socially distant from the labouring masses these skilled workers did not enjoy the secure position of the old artisans. A clear line was now drawn between the upper stratum of the working class and the petit bourgeoisie - the skilled workers were unmistakably now a part of the class of wage earners. New technology downgraded skills and undermined the control over the labour market that gave the labour aristocracy its particular social power. Even the most skilled and best organised workers now faced a degree of economic insecurity. But this section of the working class could still defend its interests through its domination of the trade unions. 34 On the Continent a similar process was taking place, although at a slower pace. The new group of skilled workers became the leading force in the official labour movement.

Between 1890 and 1914 the representatives of the skilled social democratic workers in the trade unions and the parties came to constitute a clearly definable social force the labour bureaucracy. The labour bureaucracy not only expressed the sectional interests of the skilled workers but it also manifested all the prejudices of petit-bourgeois functionaries. In 1915 the bourgeois sociologist commented on the emergence of this bureaucratic layer in There already exists in the proletariat an extensive stratum consisting of the directors of co-operative societies, the secretaries of trade unions, the trusted leaders of various organisations, whose psychology is entirely modelled upon that of the bourgeois classes with whom they associate.

The transformation of labour leaders into labour bureaucrats was made possible by the consolidation of imperialist domination over the world market.

Imperialism provided the material foundation for the growth of a relatively privileged section of the European working class. Economic expansion and a relatively stable labour market tempered working capitalist system. And as the position of the European bourgeoisie was strengthened at the head of a system of global exploitation, it could afford to relax its generally repressive attitude to working class organisations. The trade unions in particular gained ever-increasing recognition from As the empires of the European powers expanded abroad, the trade union bureaucracy flourished at home.

The establishment of arbitration boards and procedures accelerated bureaucratisation of the unions. From the 1870s onwards in Britain the union leaders broadened their sphere of activity. No longer simply wage bargainers, they were recognised as spokesmen for the working class over a wide range of issues. Arbitration procedures gave them a special status in the operation of industry with the full approval of the government. 36 The most dramatic developments took placein Germany.

There the repeal of 'anti-socialist' legislation resulted in a trade unionism. Between 1896 and 1900 trade boom in union membership doubled and passed 600 000 - by 1904 In 1884, the French state it had reached one million.

finally gave workers the right of permanent legal association.

Although the ruling class had long feared and fought the development of unions, within ten years 400 000 workers 38 In the backward were organised into 2200 local unions.

Europe, the bourgeoisie lacked the confidence necessary to recognise the right of workers to organise.

Italian unions formed a loose federation in 1893 but state repression ensured that it remained weak. State violence and legal obstacles prevented the establishment of stable Thus in southern Europe working labour organisations. class action was often violent and the bourgeoisie had major problems in institutionalising relations between capital and In the leading capitalist countries a close relationship emerged between the unions and the state. The German emulated the British example and took it a step further. Bismarck promoted welfare measures as a means of containing the influence of social democracy.

By the turn of the century, the German trade union movement had turned its back on its anti-state traditions.

The trade union leaders saw state reforms as a means of strengthening their organisations.

union congress the unions' traditional opposition to labour procedure was decisively defeated.

contracts and years later at the Frankfurt Congress, the bureaucracy dropped its opposition to participating in municipal labour exchanges and encouraged union officials to enter them on In 1902, the Stuttterms of parity with the employers gart Congress supported the participation of trade union representatives in state bodies dealing with social policy.

Throughout the nineteenth century the British ruling class was reluctant to intervene in the sphere of social welfare. But as imperialist rivalries increased around the turn of the century, and the class struggle threatened to assume more bitter proportions, the British bourgeoisie began to emulate Bismarck. From 1906 onwards the state attempted to cushion the harsh effect of the capitalist labour market on the weaker sections of the working class.

Lloyd George and Churchill were the most prominent advocates of this course of action. Three measures passed in Parliament - the Labour Exchange Act, the National Insurance Act and the Development Act - sought the co-operation and active participation of union leaders.

These reforms were seen as essential for winning the adherence of the labour movement for the status quo. As Churchill told the Daily Mail in 1909: 'With a "stake in the country" in the form of insurance against evil days these workers will pay no attention to the vague promises of revolutionary socialism'.

• This strategy had the desired effect. Prominent working class militant, Jack Murphy, wrote later how this approach 'changed the relation of the state to the trade unions. The unions were drawn closer to the state by the ingenious means of giving them a share in the administration of the state insurance funds'.

State regulation of the wage labour/capital relationship had a dramatic effect on trade unionism. In Britain and Germany trade unions became legitimate institutions with full legal sanction. The growing respectability of trade unions boosted membership and encouraged droves of career bureaucrats, In 1898 the German Free Trade Unions 677 and by the outbreak of the war it was near 3000 € Was had 104 salaried officials, six years later the number unions set up big offices and employed more and more staff, their leaders became more and more closely identified with the capitalist system. When rail workers' leader Richard Bell moved from his union post to high office at the Board of Trade in 1910, it was a sign of the times. Bell had plenty of old colleagues to keep him company. Between 1906 and 1912, 117 active trade unionists were appointed to the Board of Trade. A further 124 received appointments in positions connected with national insurance, 48 went to the Home Office and 85 obtained posts in other branches of 8

the civil service, Liberal ministers indulged in 'positive discrimination' in favour of union bureaucrats - they were and 'sacrifice' the principle of prepared to drop standards recruitment through exams.

Trade union autonomy Union leaders abhorred any political action that threatened the capitalist system. Their organisations depended on a stable labour market and state recognition. And although trade unions were important weapons for the defence of working class living standards, as far as their leaders were concerned they were the best possible compromise with the capitalist system, Any action which threatened capitalalso jeopardised union organisation and the union bureaucracy. British, German and other union bureaucrats therefore rejected the involvement of their organisations in political action and insisted on the separation of the economic and political struggles.

The principle of the autonomy of the trade unions from the social democratic parties was raised in different forms throughout Europe. Its most systematic exponents were the German union leaders. At the 1892 trade union congress, one of their leaders, Carl Legien formulated his argument for union neutrality as a declaration of independence from social democracy.

British trade union bureaucrats saw union neutrality as a positive advantage in dealing with the capitalist state.

Liberal trade union leader Shackleton told the 1910 TUC In the course of our negotiations with the Government from time to time...the advantage has been manifested of having a Trade Union body as distinct from a political body. Our feeling is that if there is not that distinctive Trade Union element we shall always be in the position of fighting the government of the day; and we are desirous of being able to continue our negotiations with any government, apart from the fight that goes on in the country between the three parties. 46 Not every labour bureaucrat was as servile as Shackleton, but they generally accepted the same separation of politics and trade unionism. The principle of union autonomy operated, although in a different form, in countries where the labour bureaucracy was still underdeveloped. In France, where the state had few friends in the labour movement, many workers saw politics as irrelevant to their needs and looked to unions as the prime force for changing society. This syndicalist approach was formally adopted by the CGT, the French union federation at its famous congress at Amiens in 1906 The Charter of Amiens declared the need for trade union 'independence' and rejected collaboration with any political Despite its radical syndicalist rhetoric the CGT's emphasis on autonomy was not in practice much different from that of British or German trade unionists. In Britain and Germany trade union autonomy meant active cooperation with the state - in France it meant a refusal to take political action and hence a refusal to challenge the bourgeois state. The politics of the union bureaucracy With considerable national variations the European labour movement was moving in the same reformist direction. The differences were in the rate at which class collaboration was institutionalised. State intervention transformed trade unionism. Labour 9 legislation and the formalisation of industrial relations stabilised union organisation. Trade unions still operated as the first line of defence of working class living standards.

But a growing gap emerged between the rank and file and union leadership. Workers sought to defend their living standards whereas the union leadership had to weigh up the effect of industrial action on union resources and organisation. Union leaders sought redress for their members' grievances without jeopardising their own position. They looked to the state to recognise its position and to enforce concessions in the interests of industrial peace. When union leaders reluctantly sanctioned strikes, they were careful that this action should not go so far as to threaten that relationship with the state.

Economic growth gave the labour bureaucracy room to wrest concessions for its members while maintaining close links with the state. As a result the trade union leadership strongly identified with the state, the nation and the future of industry. And the rise in living standards enjoyed by a considerable section of the working class ensured that the outlook of the union bureaucracy had a strong resonance in the labour movement. Support for the doctrine of trade union autonomy was widespread in the labour movement. Many workers accepted the restriction of the class struggle to the battle over wages, In practice this meant that the working class had no Hobsbawn estimates that this stratum constituted roughly 15 33 per cent of the British working class. Op cit, p284.

34 Even the new unions of unskilled workers were led by craftsmen like Tom Mann, John Burns and George Barnes.

35 R Michels, Political parties, Dover Publications, New York, 36 C E Shorske, German Social Democracy 1905-17: the develop.

ment of the great schism, Cambridge, Mass, 1972.

37 The rank and file was in no position to oppose this process.

Indeed the establishment of new procedure and arbitration boards often reflected workers' defeats. Price notes they were established precisely the great power that the men wielded over the productive process had been compromised ot defeated". See op cit, p119.

F Ridley, op cit, p17. See G D H Cole, The Second International 1889-1914, Vol 3, part 2, Macmillan, 1956, p713.

CE Shorske, op cit, p14. Cited in J Harris, Unemployment and politics, Oxford, 1972, J T Murphy, Modern trade unionism, Routledge & Sons, 1935, p7. Murphy's study provides a clear analysis of the convergence between the labour bureaucracy and the state. He locates the British reformist predilection for nationalisation as stemming from the period: "The state assumed a new importance to the unions. State socialist ideas spread like wildfire. The demand for the nationalisation of this and that industry became pop- R Schlesinger, Central European democracy and its back.

ground, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953, pp70-71.

4s CE Sone oper, place nowho a presure group 1868.

Cited in R M Martin, op cit, pp118-19.

47 F Ridley, op cit. As a result of its decline as a world power, Britain experienced major industrial upheavals in the decade leading up to the war.

The First World War put a temporary stop to this process and gave the ruling class a breathing space to reorganise class relations.

particular point of view about anything other than matters concerning living standards. Thus trade unionism, even militant trade unionism, could coexist with a bourgeois social outlook. Bourgeois views, especially on international issues, became influential throughout the labour movement.

An astute German observer commented in 1906 on the narrow trade unionism and broad pro-imperialism of British This powerful position of the worker is not dangerous for Great Britain, for half a century of trade unionism and political training has taught the worker to identify his interests with those of his industry. It is true that he opposes the employer in questions of the level of wages, hours of work, etc, but externally he is at one with the employer in all matters where the interests of his industry are concerned. It is not rare for employers' organisations and workers' trade unions to act together on current economic questions. For example, the Lancashire trade unions supported bimetallism until the Indian currency was put on a gold basis; today they are assisting the efforts to introduce cotton cultivation in Africa.

Schulze-Gaevernitz exaggerated the extent of class collaboration, but nevertheless he was correct to point success of trade union organisation in limiting the scope of The formalisation of class relations transformed the relationship between the union leadership and the rank and file. The union leaders' concern for their members qualified by their interest in sustaining the union machine.

For the ruling class a new source of coercion appeared in the struggle against capital. Workers now confronted not only their boss but also regulations and procedures enforced by the labour bureaucrats. Workers who wanted to defend their living standards had now to consider the likely reaction of the union bureaucracy. The assertion of working class power now implied a challenge not merely to the bourgeoisie but also to the labour bureaucracy.

It should be noted that the relationship between the bureaucracy and the state, although increasingly harmonious, was not free from conflict. Even in the early phase of imperialist expansion working class living standards were always subject to attack and the unions had to fight hard for every gain. Thus, the union leaders could not remain indifferent to politics. Increasingly they became concerned with what went on in Parliament. Trade union autonomy in practice meant, not the rejection of politics extension of trade unionism from industrial relations to Parliament. To complete the picture we have to examine the relationship between the economic and political organisations of the labour bureaucracy.

Classical social democracy Trade unions and socialism At the risk of being one-sided, it is essential to draw attention to the common pattern of trade union development in Europe. The separation of trade unions from socialism and politics - an international phenomenon - had a decisive effect on the evolution of social democracy. As leading Bolshevik trade union spokesman Lozovsky noted in his important analysis of the international trade union movement 'the fundamental question... was the mutual relations etween the political and economic organisations of th vorking class The relationship between trade unions and social democracy is clearest in the case of Britain, where the trade union leaders took the initiative to establish a parliamentary party. They set up the Labour Party to defend trade union interests in Parliament - to press for the enactment of legislation favourable to the labour ment. The Labour Representation Committee (LRC) and later the Labour Party had the task of pursuing trade union political objectives without undermining ations. One astute bourgeois writer has observed that the LRC took over from the TUC functions 'which carried a high risk of disruption for a body as broad based as the TUC, 51 The pursuit of political objectives by trade unions themselves would have undermined the mutually satisfactory relationship between the labour bureaucracy and the state. By divesting their political functions to the Labour Party the trade union leaders removed controversial issues from the union sphere whilst at the same time creating an instrument to push their interests in Parliament.

In Britain the relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party was transparent. The leadership of the Labour Party explicitly acknowledged its own roots in the trade unions. Leading Labour politician Ramsay Mac- Donald wrote in 1908: 'The Labour Party was formed, because Trade Unionism had experienced that a class war led nowhere' 52 In other words, politics had to be taken out of industrial relations and channelled through the representative institutions of bourgeois society.

Many historians have identified the formation of the Labour Party by the trade unions as a distinctly British phenomenon, in comparison with most European countries where the social democratic parties sponsored the trade unions. Others have contrasted the 'Marxist' ideology of Continental social democracy to the reformist philosophy of the Labour Party. But in reality there was nothing unique about the British experience.

It is true that on the Continent Marxism had considerable influence over the working class. Marxism corresponded to the political experience of significant sections of the working class: the underdevelopment of bourgeois democracy, the coercive character of the state. The socio-economic conditions that prevailed in Europe retarded the development of trade unions. The lack of scope for trade union action stimulated the emergence of working class political organisations, One important consequence of this process was the existence of revolutionary tradition and objectives within European social democracy.

However, the later arrival of capitalist expansion and the extension of bourgeois democracy had a considerable impact on Continental social democracy towards the end of the nineteenth century. Increases in living standards, social and political reforms, strengthened reformist ideology within social democracy. The pursuit of immediate gains and short-term goals pushed social democracy away from its pursuit of long-term socialist objectives. And the place in which to fight for immediate improvements was the trade unions. Social democratic politicians began to place greater and greater emphasis on trade unionism; they took an active interest in strengthening trade union organisation and in articulating the interests of the trade union bureaucracy. In the late nineteenth century the right-wing German social democrat, von Vollmar, glorified the trade unions *To enable economic and social struggles to be carried out fruitfully and without needless expenditure of strength and sacrifice. it is necessary to replace inexperienced, incoherent masses blindly staggering from passion and excitement to despair, by an aggregate of workers who know what they want, who have a common mind, education and self-discipline as well as the insight into the whole situation requisite in order to estimate accurately the strain entailed upon their strength and the prospects of pain from it.

From this point of view an enlightened government should itself 10

further the trade unionist organisation of the workers, or at least secure to it a minimum of disturbance.'

For von Vollmar the social democratic struggle for reforms meant the further institutionalisation of the wage labour/capital relationship. Working arm-in-arm the social democratic politician and the trade union leader would police the 'incoherent masses'.

German social democracy may have been established before the German unions, but this sequence of events did not prevent the establishment of the division of labour similar to that between the TUC and the Labour Party.

Most studies of the SPD show that the growth of its reformist wing paralleled the rise of trade unions.

1891 and 1913 the German Free Trade Unions grew from 275 000 members to 2 500 000 and surpassed even the 55 The political consequence strength of unions in Britain.

- the consolidation of reformism - was the same in Ger- 'SPD leaders liked to think that they exercised considerable influence over the politics of union members. To an extent this was rue; but the trade unions undoubtedly had a more profound influence over the party, and one that was specifically reformist. 56 The division of labour between the union leaders and social democracy worked well in Britain and Germany.

However, in France, the socialist parties evolved in a reformist direction with great speed. In 1894 one of the leading French social democrats, Millerand joined the bourgeois Waldeck-Rousseau Government - a regime in no position to make concessions to the working class.

Socialist parliamentarians had little to offer the trade unions. In 1900, when numerous strikers were shot down at Chalon-sur-Saône, the socialist deputies split and 16 of them still supported the Waldeck-Rousseau Government.

French workers naturally became suspicious of socialist politicians and trade unionists refused to affiliate with the socialist party. French syndicalism was thus sustained by the underdeveloped character of social democracy. Militant workers looked to the unions to defend their interests and flourished. The convergence between the leadership of French social democracy and the syndicalist unions was only consummated when they united behind the bourgeoisie's war effort in 1914.

Socialism and social democracy Up to now we have examined social democracy from the point of view of its relationship with the trade unions. But social democracy was not simply an extension of the unions. On the Continent in particular, social democracy began as an expression of the anti-capitalist sentiments of the working class. The social democratic programme proclaimed socialism as its objective and all the European parties counted the revolutionary elements of the working class within their own ranks.

Pure trade unionism was only one anti-socialist influence on social democracy. Imperialism created the conditions in which social democratic parties could operate openly and legitimately. The extension of bourgeois democracy and state reforms took social democracy by surprise.

For years socialist activists had directed their fire against authoritarian coercion and bureaucratic arbitrariness. The growing success of social democracy in the parliamentary field strengthened gradualist ideology and undermined anti-state views. Social democracy did not have to renounce its Marxism 11 or its formal objectives because its successes seemed to be leading to its socialist goals. The fact that socialist politicians had begun to collaborate with bourgeois parties and governments was not seen as antithetical to socialism, but as a pragmatic response to new opportunities. Even revolutionaries could dismiss the involvement of social democratic leaders in anti-working class measures as sordid episodes in an otherwise healthy labour movement.

The growth of reformism was not due to an intellectual crisis in social democracy. The material conditions which allowed for the integration of the trade unions into the capitalist system also house-trained social democracy. Once the social democratic leadership placed day to day gains before its long-term objectives, it became increasingly reconciled with the capitalist system. It came round to the view that the best way to defend the working class was through perfecting the organisation of the social democratic party - not through pursuing the class struggle.

The reformist degeneration of social democracy reflected the growing influence of the labour bureaucracy which was the main beneficiary of state reforms. The party bureaucracy became an important force in its own right.

According to Zinoviev, by 1914 the SPD was run by 4100 party officials and 11 000 salaried employees.

1911 party conference over 60 per cent of the 393 delegates were full-time workers for either the party or the trade The SPD national executive was entirely composed of former labour bureaucrats.

Although the SPD bureaucrats were not wealthy, their social position marked them off from the working class. Guttsman's study notes the benefits accrued by the time-servers: 'Economically the position of the social democratic bureau.

cracy at its lower levels or at the early stages of individual careers corresponded more to that of the faristocracy of labour' _ than to the middle class proper. Yet long-serving officials and men in the most senior positions were clearly enjoying greater benefits than any manual worker, especially if they also received payment from some public office or from a seat on a parliamentary body. In addition, certain benefits in kind, such as official travel, removed them further from a working class milieu.

49 G von Schulze-Gaevernitz, British imperialism, cited in V I Lenin, 'Notebook on imperialism', CW, Vol 39, p450.

A Lozovsky, The world's trade union movement, London, 1925, p19. R M Martin, op cit, p85. J Ramsay MacDonald, Socialism and society, London, 1908, 52 p137. 53 G von Vollmar, 'Social reform in Germany and in France', ir R Ensor, ed, Modern socialism, London, 1907, p146. Von Vollmar represented the petit-bourgeois class interests which had begun to exert an anti-socialist influence on German social democracy. The influence of the petit bourgeoisie was particularly strong in the French and Italian socialist parties. For a case study of the Italian party, see R Michels, n proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano, Turin, 1908. 54 See C E Shorske, op cit, and W L Guttsman, The Germar Social Democratic Party 1875-1933, London, 1981.

55 W Maehl, "The triumph of nationalism in the German Socialist Party on the eve of the First World War', in Joumal of Modern History, No 1, 1952, p26.

56 Ibid. A Norland, The founding of the French Socialist Party 1893.

57 1905, Harvard, 1956, pp118-19.

58 G Zinoviev, Der Krieg und die Krise des Socialismus, Vienna, 1924, p508. 59 W L Guttsman, op cit, p229.

60 Ibid. 61 Ibid, p258.

However, the privileges of the bureaucracy cannot fully explain its conservative outlook, The political framework within which social democracy operated forced it to seek the alliance of the petit bourgeoisie. Success in electoral terms could not be attained by working class votes alone.

Social democracy therefore sought the votes of the petit bourgeoisie and often played down its proletarian nections to secure electoral advantage. The workings of bourgeois democracy allowed the concerns and views of cracerit bourgeoisie to gain a stronghold in social demo- Social democracy still proclaimed its socialist goals but it now played down class violence and class politics. In typical petit-bourgeois fashion it appealed to human rather than class objectives. The French socialist 'Socialism does aim at securing for every human being, by a beneficient and quite natural transformation, these two twin blessings, liberty and prosperity, of which the capitalist regime inevitably robs him. But in thus indicating the end which our party pursues, have answered beforehand the ridiculous charge, so often made hat it expects its ideas to triumph only by violent revolution.

Social democracy rejected violent revolution' because class violence spelt doom for the labour bureaucracy and its petit-bourgeois allies. Social democracy now portrayed state intervention as the main force for socialist transformation. And public ownership of industry was depicted as socialism itself. The ideology of the labour bureaucracy can be most appropdescribed as state socialism.

In Ramsay Mac- Donald's words: 'Socialism could not be defined better than as that stage in social organisation when the state organises for society an adequate nutritive system; and democratic government is the signal that that change is taking place 65 Social democracy's close relationship to the bourgeois state polluted its political outlook. The state as the organiser of the national capitalist class strengthened nationalist trends: social democrats still proclaimed their internationalism but now argued that patriotism and internationalism were compatible. The growth of imperialist competition in towards closer and closer identification with the interests of their national capitalist class.

By the end of the first decade of this century leading German social democrats were often hard to distinguish from bourgeois imperialists. Hilderbrand, Schippel and David argued for German rearmament to ensure with Britain and France on the world market equality comrades moved in the same direction. French socialist deputies voted for war credits required for the colonial campaign in China. British social democrats were the most abject of all. When a leading Fabian, Sidney Olivier was appointed Governor of Jamaica, the British delegates told the 1907 Stuttgart Conference of the Second International that 'this is one of the most important posts greater than that of most ministers in England 65 being in the colonial service, the salary attached to characterised this trend as social imperialism. Social imperialism was the inevitable product of social democracy's relationship with the state in the period of imperialist Conflicts within social democracy Social democracy existed in a state of permanent tension.

This arose partly out of the division of labour between the trade union and political leaders, which attempted to 12 restrict the class struggle to basic economic issues. However, reformist politics led to class collaboration in other spheres - support for bourgeois domestic, industrial and foreign policy. The acceptance of bourgeois views on these matters forced reformists to accept bourgeois interests in industrial relations as well. Thus reformist politicians were often forced to line up against workers in struggle. In Italy and France socialist politicians collaborated with anti-working class bourgeois governments. The support of the Italian socialist party for the Zanardelli-Giolitti Ministry, which shot down strikers in the late 1890s created a temporary break between party and the unions.

At the same time the tendency for social democracy to desert to the side of the ruling class was modified by the party's formal commitment to proletarian interests. Continental social democracy in particular was haunted by the contradiction between its formal commitment to socialism and its collaborationist activity. In contrast to the trade unions, social democracy contained within itself a permanent tension between revolutionary and reformist objectives. This problem did not exist for the trade union leaders whose activities were limited to the fight for small-scale, objectives. Social democracy, however, was continuously taking measures which contradicted its long- The most important source of conflict within social democracy was the antagonism between the bureaucracy and the mass of the working class. The labour movement reflected the interests of the more privileged sections of working class. Unorganised, unskilled and women workers were often not part of the official labour movement. Even the highly organised German labour movement could not draw in the whole of the working class. One study of Hamburg contrasts the rich and powerful party and union organisation to the 'extremists', unskilled workers who were 'not adequately represented in the trade unions, co-operatives or party 69 For the most part the contradictions within social democracy remained under the surface before the First World War. With few important exceptions (Russia, Italy and Holland) organisational splits between reformist and revolutionary currents did not take place. Social democracy was able to contain revolutionary elements within its own ranks. Ironically, the greatest threat to the position of the labour bureaucracy was in Britain. The Labour Party had no mass base and the trade union leadership was forced to carry most of the burden of the mediating role of reformism. In the years leading up to the war the union leadership was increasingly unable to respond to rank and file pressure. Unofficial union bodies proliferated and direct action spread. By the outbreak of the war the organisation of class relations had broken down. One percipient bourgeois study noted: 'the British problem of political assimilation of working class power could not be resolved without the extraneous stimulus of war?° The labour bureaucracy could carry out its integrative role because in general it had not been tested before the outbreak of the war. In these conditions social democracy could flourish and become a mass movement. When in August 1914, the socialist parties deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie the tensions within social democracy

SECTION III

COUNTER-CRISIS SOCIALISM

The collapse of social democracy The outbreak of the First World War exposed the bourgeois character of social democracy. During the course of the war the labour bureaucracy cemented its alliance capitalist class. Social democracy emerged as the central pillar of capitalist stability. Reformist leaders joined war cabinets and the labour bureaucrats in every European country actively backed the war effort of their ruling class.

In the name of the national interest they justified the attacks on the living standards of the proletariat and sent thousands of workers to their slaughter.

The prominent role of the labour bureaucracy was vital for the survival of the capitalist system. But it also had the effect of weakening the bureaucracy's influence over the working class. By the end of the war the labour leadership began to lose touch with its base. Forced to carry through the dictates of the capitalist state, the labour bureaucrats became less responsive to working class pressure.

The devastation of war, famine, poverty and disease, and the near collapse of the bourgeois state in a number of countries gave rise to class conflict on an unprecedented scale. The class struggle was particularly intense in countries on the losing side in the imperialist war. The split in social democracy, the emergence of revolutionary and the Bolshevik revolution, added to the ferment into which bourgeois Europe descended. The labour bureaucrats simply lost control over the advanced section of the work- The greatest revolutionary upsurge that European capitalism has ever experienced took place between 1917 and 1921. In 1917 the Tsar was overthrown and the world's first proletarian dictatorship was inaugurated in Russia. A strike wave hit British capitalism with a vengeance. In November 1918 the monarchies in Austro-Hungary and Germany collapsed. Workers' councils and workers' militias seized control in Austria and there was a revolution in Hungary. Workers' councils emerged in Germany and by January 1919 the strike wave had precipitated a civil war.

This strike movement reached its height in response to the Kapp putsch of March 1920. In May 1920 France experienced its first major industrial upheaval in the post-war period. In September workers occupied factories and seized land in Italy. And three months later a mass strike broke out in Czechoslovakia. This revolutionary upsurge drastically altered the balance of class power. The capitalist class could no longer enforce its interests in the old ways. The bourgeoisie therefore turned to social democracy to save the day. In the countries the capitalists in their desperation begged social democracy to take over government functions.

Reichert, the secretary of the Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists, persuaded capitalists to support the 1918 social democratic government: 'How can we spare capitalism from the threatening socialisation?

Unfortunately, the bourgeoisie as it is in Germany could not be relied upon in things economic-political. We concluded that in the The labour bureaucrats proved to be true allies of the 13 capitalist class. Social democracy took over the government paid lip-service to the demands of the mass movement and concentrated on neutralising the organs of working class power that were thrown up by the upheavals. In Germany and Austria social democracy sidetracked the mass movement into constitutional reform.

proposed radical measures - such as the recognition of workers' councils - to avoid even greater mass pressure.

The ruling class went to great lengths to avoidrevolution.

The German constitution of August 1919 formally recog nised the status of works councils. In Austria, the Works Council Act of 1919 decreed the legal recognition of trade union representatives in factories, Even the French bourgeoisie took pre-emptive action. On 12 March 1920, trade unions became legally recognised for the first time.

Thanks to the labour bureaucracy capitalism weathered the storm. In Austria, leading social democrat Julius Braunthal boasted of the restraint exercised by his party over the working class: 'the Austrian working class has had the abiler, the stator No on born at a ceilit it .

Even in Britain the labour bureaucracy was essential for reestablishing capitalist stability. In February 1919 Churchill explained his respect for strong trade unionism: "Trade was very important, and the more moderate its officials were, the less representative it was, but it was the only organisation with which the Government could deal. The curse of trade unionism was that there was not enough of it, and it was not highly developed to make branch secretaries fall into line with the head office. With a powerful trade union, either peace or war could be made'. Tory leader Bonar Law added his gratitude: and anarchy 73 ganisation was the only thing between us Social democracy was strong enough to mislead the working class. However, the counter-revolutionary role it played during this period led to its demise. Millions of workers saw the SPD organising the repression of German revolutionaries, Others saw how the SPD collaborated with the bourgeoisie while workers faced starvation. The emergence of mass communist parties indicated the declining This point is well argued in G Zinoviev, op cit.

A Millerand, 'The Saint Mandi Programme', in R Ensor, op cit, p54. Ramsay MacDonald echoed Millerand when he stated: "The watchword of socialism is not class consciousness but community consciousness'. J Ramsay MacDonald, op cit, p144.

F Richards, RCP, No 4, op cit, pps-8, contains an analysis of 65 J Ramsay MacDonald, Socialism and govemment, London, 1909, p33. 66 W Maehl, op cit, p30. 67 Cited in J Lenz, Rise and fall of the Second International, New York, 1932, p89. 68 G D H Cole, op cit, p715. A similar pattern of development occurred in France. 72 73

The struggle against social democracy dominated the with full force in Germany. Despite tremendous opporinfluence of social democracy. Throughout Eastern and Central Europe (with the exception of Austria) communist parties became the leading force in the labour movement.

In Western Europe, social democracy lost its hegemony over the working class in France and Italy. In Germany the split in the SPD led to the rise of a promising working class communist party. In Britain however the Labour Party managed to pull through fairly successfully.

The collapse of social democracy coincided with the end of the revolutionary upsurge.

ment was too weak to lead the working class to overthrow capitalism. The economic crisis which hit Europe in 1920 signalled the beginning of a major capitalist offensive. One setback followed another. In August 1920 the Red was halted and defeated, ensuring the isolation of the Russian Revolution. In September 1920 the factory ocmovement of Italian workers was smashed. In March 1921 the uprising of German workers was crushed and the miners' strike in Britain was sold out by the union leaders. From this point onwards the European working class was increasingly put on the defensive.

In organisational terms social democracy was stronger than before. The capitalist class was prepared to help build up labour movement organisations to save its own skin. In government in Germany and Austria, social democracy enjoyed special privileges. But numerical expansion could not disguise the erosion of social democracy's mass base.

The SPD bureaucracy grew, but throughout this In Italy, it could not sustain an active mass membership.

the sell-out of the 1920 factory occupations by the labour bureaucracy was rewarded with special government recog- By the summer of 1921 the fascists were on the move and the organisations of the labour bureaucracy were soon in ruins. The Communist International and social democracy Two themes dominated the discussions in the early communist movement. By 1921 it had become evident that the revolutionary upsurge had subsided and that social democracy still retained considerable influence in the working class. Trotsky posed the key questions clearly: 'Does development actually proceed even now in the direction of revolution? Or is it necessary to recognise that capitalism has succeeded in coping with the difficulties arising from Theresponse to these questions was generally optimistic.

Although the leaders of the CI did not expect any immediate victories, they anticipated that communists would, after a political struggle, succeed in ousting social democrats from their position of influence in the working class. The CI's analysis of reformism drew heavily on the experience of the period between 1917 and 1921. In the opening speech to the Fourth Congress of the CI in 1922, Zinoviev identified the social democrats as the vital bulwark of the 'Capitalism exists now by the exclusive grace of the social traitors of the Second International. The working class is sufficiently numerous now, and with one sweep of its arm it could sweep away international capitalism, if it were not for the social democrats, who concenty say the hand of the prollariat when il is ready to However, by 1922 the situation was not as volatile as Zinoviev's remarks suggest: a measure of capitalist rationalisation and the defeats suffered by workers restored a degree of social stability not seen in Europe since before the First World War. 14 CI. But its experience of reformism was not sufficiently assessed in the light of day to day events. Trotsky and his colleagues saw the transient boom that followed immediately after the First World War 'as the most important foundation of the current reformist-pacifist era.

underestimated the impact that the recession of 1921 had the working class. The 1921 crisis created large-scale unemployment and forced the working class Trade union membership fell drastically and many workers However, its inadequate theory of reformism was not the most serious weakness of the CI. The working class does not respond to an economic crisis in a simple mechanical way - the decisive factor is political leadership and political preparedness, Unfortunately the communist parties lacked political maturity and organisational coherence to challenge social democracy. In a sense the break with the in June 1921, 'do we not know that the greatest misfortune of the working class movement in Germany break was not brought about before the war?' 78 The weakness of the communist parties prevented effective challenge to the position leadership. The political confusion and lack of tactical sense of the German Communist Party (KPD) led to the defeat of This setback was symptomatic of the general loss of drive and direction of the CI.

The rise of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the mid 'twenties led to the political degeneration of the CI. It transformed the relationship between the communist parties and social democracy. Previously the communist parties lacked the political experience to fight reformism effectively. Now the Stalinist leadership of the International pushed the weak communist parties in an opportunist direction.

Between 1924 and 1927 the CI began to adapt to social democracy. In China and Poland the CI forced the communist parties to subordinate their organisations to petitbourgeois nationalist movements. In Britain, the Comintern put its faith in an alliance with the labour bureaucracy in the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. When the manoeuvres resulted in disaster for the communist parties the CI ordered a new and sudden about turn: the Third Period (following the post-war upsurge and the stabilisation of the mid 'twenties) began in 1928.

The CI leadership now instructed the communist parties that they should break off all links with the social , the reformists democrats. Denounced as 'social fascists'.

were identified as the main enemies of the working class.

The new priority was to smash the non-communist parties of the working class: "class against class' was the slogan of the Third Period The acceptance of the turn by many communists reflected their frustration with the resilience of their social democratic competitors. It was much easier to denounce reformism than to fight it. The radical invective directed by the communist parties at social democratic politicians has led to the characterisation of the Third Period as a left turn.

This, however, is a superficial assessment of this turn.

most Western parties failed to implement the uncompromising tactics advocated by the leaders of the Soviet party at the Sixth Congress of the CI in 1928. The French Communist Party (PCF) paid lip-service to the 'class against class' tactics while acting with so The Cominterns the reformists in the 1928 elections "left turn' command ran directly contrary to the evolution cutty Italian Communist Party (PCI): it was never carried The real dynamic behind the Third Period was revealed

tunities, the KPD proved unable to deal effectively with the SPD - the tactics of the Third Period were its response.

The thrust of these tactics was not anti-capitalist but anti-SPD. In an attempt to outflank the SPD on the left, the KPD put a stop to all united initiatives with the SPD in the unions. But underneath the violent denunciations of the SPD lay pure reformist politics.

supposed to transform the unions into revolutionary class organisations' were based on demands for higher wages shorter working hours and improved working conditions.

The KPD leadership instructed the party to organise campaigns around elementary trade union demands as a means of mobilising the masses.

economistic approach was no political alternative to the SPD. An investigation of its intervention in factory councils in 1930 revealed that KPD members in their day to day were indistinguishable from their reformist opponents.® One rigorous account of the period comments on the adaptation of the communists to the social democrats behind the rhetoric of the Third Period: 'It is noteworthy.. that although the KPD used "radical" language to justify its break with and pressure on Social Democracy, the programmes by which it sought to attract the radicalised masses wete basically reformist. That is, at a time when the KPD was attempting to prevent the SPD from acting in a reformist capacity s offered itself as a more effective substitute for Social Democracy.

Far from being a left turn the Third Period destroyed the last vestiges of revolutionary politics inside the official movement. The communist parties not only failed to combat social democracy but themselves became increasingly reformist in their political outlook. The growth of nationalism within the ranks of the communist parties was the clearest symptom of their degeneration. The Third Period gave new lease of life to social democracy. The CI's tactics undermined the cause of revolution and ensured that social democracy retained the allegiance of substantial sections of the working class. Workers who sought revolutionary solutions were confronted with the choice between reformist social democratic parties and reformist communist Counter-crisis socialism The cumulative effect of genuine political mistakes followed by the cynical manoeuvres of the Stalinist bureaucracy gave social democracy a new political advantage. But the social democracy of the inter-war period was qualitatively different from that of the pre-war days.

Imperialism was no longer a confident and expanding system. The survival of capitalism required a major restructuring of industry on both a national and international scale. Despite transient upturns the capitalist system remained in slump through most of the inter-war period.

Unemployment became endemic and millions of workers were condemned to year upon year of grinding poverty.

There were a number of important events in the class struggle - such as the British General Strike of 1926 - but in general the European working class was in total disarray.

State coercion and unemployment dealt a severe blow to trade union power and the unions proved increasingly ineffective in defending workers' interests.

Social democracy itself was very much influenced by the setbacks suffered by the working class. The status of the labour bureaucracy came to depend more on the state than on the working class. Through its use of the social democrats as a transitional measure to restore order after the First World War, the bourgeoisie had brought the labour bureaucracy much closer to the state. As the slump persisted 15 the labour bureaucrats became more closely concerned with the problems of maintaining political and economic stability.

By the 'thirties they had become the most ardent advocates of capitalist rationalisation measures.

The concern of the reformists for the problems of the ruling class was only part of the reason for their approval of capitalist rationalisation. The recession gave free rein to employers to impose wage cuts and redundancies: customary trade union tactics were ineffective in conditions of mass unemployment, The failure of traditional reformist politics led the labour bureaucrats to look to the state for a solution.

The increasing scope of state intervention seemed to confirm the viability of the reformist strategy: even the capitalist class had come to recognise the need for state regulation of the economy. The state was forced to take over the management of sections of industry and encourage the introduction of new technology. The labour bureaucracy saw in this process the solution to the economic problems facing the working class.

The rationalisation of capitalist production altered the composition of the working class. Traditional manufacturing industry declined and white-collar and public sector employment grew: the state itself became a major employer. This process was particularly striking in France where white.

collar workers and civil servants became the main social base for social democracy. By the late 'twenties the union of government workers made up almost half of the CGT's membership. Moreover, public sector workers tended to dominate the key positions in the French labour move- 74 W L Guttsman, op cit, p261.

75 I Trotsky, The first five years...', op cit, p181.

*First session, opening of the Fourth Congress of the Com- 76 munist International, 5 November 1921' Bulletin of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, No 1, p5.

77 L Trotsky, "Perspectives of world development', speech made on 28 July 1924, in Europe and America, New York, 1971, p12. 78 V I Lenin, 'Speech on the Italian Question', 28 June 1921, in CW, Vol 32, p463. 79 A useful account of these developments is contained in E H Car, Foundations of a planned economy 1926-1929, Vol 3, part 1, London, 1976, chapter 68. The move towards the left also corresponded to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Having lost control over the Soviet economy the Soviet leadership was prepared to alter drastically its industrial strategy.

W A Hoisington Ji, 'Class against class: the French Communist 80 Party and the Comintern, in International Review of Social History, 1974. 81 See J Barth Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: 1926-1945, PhD diss, Harvard, 1967.

82 W Ireland, The lost gamble: the theory and practice of the Communist Party of Germany between Social Democracy and National Socialism 1929-31, PhD diss, The John Hopkins University, 1971, p99. Tbid, p125. 83 84 Ibid, p117. 85 Ibid, p148. 86 Trotsky perceived the effect of Stalinism in driving workers back to reformism: "The destructive policy of the Comintern, supported by the authority of the workers' state, not only has compromised revolutionary methods but also has given to the social democrats, defiled by crimes and treacheries, the opportunity of raising up again over the working class the banner of salvation'. L Trotsky, 'Our present tasks', op cit, p136.

87 V Lorwin, The French labour movement, p60.

88 M Cozier, White-collar unions - the case of France', ir A Sturmhal, ed, White-collar trade unions, Illinois, 1966, p106

ment. Public sector unions inevitably identified their interests with the extension of state activity.

State intervention transformed the relationships among rank and file workers, the labour bureaucracy and the state. The labour bureaucrats became the greatest enthusiasts for state intervention. And social democracy was born again as a force that boasted of its unique capacity to save the capitalist economy. The fear and demoralisation that prevailed in the working class ensured that the labour bureaucracy could consolidate its links with the state without much rank and file opposition. Gradualism now came to mean not a gradual road to socialism but the gradual transformation of capitalist society. One consequence of the ever-closer identification of social democracy with the state was its strategy of putting the defence of bourgeois democracy against fascism to the fore. Capitalist reform and bourgeois democracy were the social democratic alternatives to endemic recession and fascism. 'Anti-crisis socialism' came into its own.

Socialism was now defined by reformists as synonymous with the reform of capitalism. The most important consequence of this approach was the active involvement of the working class in the restructuring of capitalist relations.

Workers who saw the futility of bargaining over wages were won to the strategy of seeking salvation in the enlightened organisation of capital. The labour bureaucracy's political programme was now full of plans to overcome the capitalist crisis which they borrowed from radical bourgeois economists such as Keynes. In 1931, the leading economist of the German trade union federation (ADGB), Wladmir Woytinsky elaborated a programme of public works, commonly known as the WTB plan. As one study of the ADGB records, the WTB plan was later implemented - by the Nazis: Paradoxically, Hitler's work creation programme, begun after he assumed power, contained some of the basic principles as those of the WTB plan, except it included defence projects.'° The most important effect of counter-crisis socialism was to narrow the horizons of the working class. 'Positive action' became the order of the day - but positive action meant capitalist reform. Belgian socialist de Man, the author of the most famous of the counter-crisis plans, appealed for a constructive approach from workers: The working class movement should abandon its passive attitude towards the economic crisis. It should substitute for its determinist doctrine of crisis...a voluntarist policy having the overcoming the crisis 98bject of reabsorbing the unemployed and of limited but immediate The distance travelled by social democracy from its original objectives was well summed up by the leading Belgian left-reformist Spaak. He welcomed the de Man plan, explaining that 'hitherto we have fought against something ut now we shall fight for something, for the Plan The Popular Front government in France in 1936 demonstrated the disastrous consequences of counter-crisis socialism for the working class. A wave of strikes and occupations was channelled into support for reformist government. The French labour movement soon that planning capitalism could not serve its discoverege Once the working class upsurge was contained, the Blum Government fell and the road was open toreaction.

Anti-crisis socialism could not prevent the final collapse of social democracy. For a period it served a useful ideological role for the bourgeoisie. But the scale of the crisis required measures that were more far-reaching than those proposed by social democracy. The ruling class simply demanded more and more sacrifices and forced the labour bureaucracy to retreat again and again. In the end the employers' offensive required more than the co-operation 16 of the reformists to keep the working class in check.

But right to the end the labour bureaucracy placed capitalist stability before the interest of the working class.

In Italy, Austria and Germany the labour bureaucracy was ready to collaborate with fascist regimes to ensure its survival. Austrian social democracy thwarted working fassistakes ver. The Gthenn AGe had the hesitatint fascist takeover. about accepting the corporatist framework of the new Nazi regime. In 1933, after Hitler's accession to power it participated in the Nazi-sponsored May Day parade. To save its skin the ADGB was prepared to transfer its special relationship with the SPD to the Nazi party. In the last issue of its journal the ADGB wrote in glowing terms about the Nazisponsored May Day parade: We certainly need not strike our colours in order to recognise that the victory of National Socialism, though won in the struggle against a party which we used to consider as the embodiment of the socialist task is put to the whole nation a$ well; because today the idea of socialism (SPD), is our victory A day later the entire leadership of the ADGB was arrested and the German trade union movement was annihilated.

Social democracy wanted to save capitalism but in the conditions of the 'thirties the survival of capitalism required the destruction of working class organisations (or at least their emasculation). In Britain where social democracy was not wiped out (as it was in Germany and Austria) and where it did not lose its working class base (as in France and Italy), it made a gradual transition into an overtly pro-capitalist Labour Party. The labour bureaucracy was further incorporated into the capitalist system during the Second World War and emerged as one of the most respected institutions of British bourgeois society.

The collapse of social democracy did not however lead to the emergence of a revolutionary movement. The European working class was exhausted and defeated; Stalinism discredited revolutionary politics and reformist communist parties took the place of disintegrating social democratic parties. The defeats of the inter-war period led to the liquidation of Marxism. In the absence of a realistic revolutionary alternative a whole generation of workers failed to learn the lessons of their own defeat: this is the legacy of the "thirties that still haunts the working class movement today.

SECTION IV

THE PROBLEM OF REFORMISM

The European left has failed to analyse the specific conditions which have given rise to the modern labour move.

ment. The institutional continuity between today's working class organisations and those of the first 40 years of this century obscures the reorganisation of class relations since the Second World War. Those who label the parties which now claim workers' votes in Europe 'social democratic' risk losing sight of the class dynamic which these parties express. Nor is the repetition of quotations from Lenin and Trotsky much help. To understand working class politics today we have to move away from a narrow focus on and examine the changes within political institutions changing material context within which labour parties

The working class and its organisations Social democracy was the product of working class struggle which gave organisational expression to the anti-capitalist aspirations of the proletariat. Lenin was prepared to support the affiliation of the Labour Party to the Second International even though it was a party not Teally independent of the Liberals' on the grounds that it was 'the first step on the part of the really proletarian organisations of Britain workers' party, 9gonscious policy and towards a socialist Can we view the labour parties of today to the Second World War, social democracy became detached from its working class base and came to rely for its survival on the capitalist class. The social democratic parties that arose after the war were no longer the product of working class struggle. In Austria and Germany the new socialist parties were the creation of the victorious imperialist powers. The USA and Britain both played an active part in re-launching the German trade union movement. In France and Italy the socialist parties were mere shells supported in the main by the middle class and the petit bourgeoisie. The imperialist powers have co-operated in fostering social democratic organisations throughout the socialist parties in Portugal and Spain have both benefited from imperialist Even in Britain, where there was the greatest continuity in the organisations of the official labour movement, things had changed. During the Second World War, the integration of the labour movement proceeded at every level from the cabinet office to the joint consultative committees on the shop floor. In November 1946, The Times boasted of how the bourgeoisie had tamed 'the long and painful transition from barricades to the boardroom has at length been accomplished, and today the TUC exerts its influence not so much through strikes and demonstrations, as through reasoned arguments before an independent arbitrator or an industrial court - or in the Cabinet Room. It is a far cry from Tolpuddle to Transport House.

This was not merely a quantitative advance in incorporation.

The official labour movement had virtually become a government department. The establishment and acceptance of bourgeois-dominated labour organisations was one measure of the defeats suffered by the working class. Another indication of the scale of the problem was the persistence of the labour movement's attachment to imperialism, British workers celebrated Britain's victory as if it was their own - not even recognising the defeat of their class.

In most of northern Europe the labour bureaucracy faced little working class pressure. It succeeded without much difficulty in imposing its revamped organisations on the working class. However in Greece, France and Italy, the intensity of the class struggle prevented this course of action and the Stalinists were called upon to fill the breach left open by the collapse of social democracy.

Stalinism and the working class Stalinism influenced the European working class in two nain ways. First, the sordid record of the Stalinist bureaucracy discredited revolutionary politics. The ruling clas used the Soviet Union as a negative example of revolutionary politics. Anti-communist ideology in the official labour 17 movement gave the ruling class a remarkable degree of influence over the proletariat.

Second, Stalinism acted as a brake on the forward movement of the working class in countries where social democracy could no longer play this role. The bourgeoisie allowed communists to join the post-war coalition government in France and Italy. Radicalised workers turned to the communist parties as a revolutionary alternative to social democracy, only to be betrayed. In their activities the communists had become indistinguishable from the The communist parties reformulated the old state socialist programmes in their 'national roads to socialism'.

Stalinist parties in government were invaluable for the bourgeoisie. In Italy, the PCI argued for its politica produtand the maintenance of factory discipline og a wage truce' tivista, the suspension of 'political strikes' In France, the PCF pursued the same course. It was no empty boast when Varga, a leading theoretician of the official communist movement, claimed in 1947 that: *In all the countries of the European continent the communists are taking part in the government and are playing a leading role in restoring the economies of their countries. 100 The leading 89 G Braunthal, Socialist labor and politics in Weimar Germany, Experiment', in The Economic Journal, March 1938 M Kitchen, The coming of Austrian fascism, London, 1980.

Cited in G Braunthal, op cit, p81.

For an analysis of this process, see the five-part series, The war and the working class', in the next step, Nos 8-12 V I Lenin, 'Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau, CW, Vol 15, p235. The Times, 2 November 1946.

98 For a discussion of this development see M Freeinan's forthcoming article on the British working class and reformism.

99 D L M Blackmer, 'Continuity and change in post-war Italian communism', in D L M Blackmer and S Tarrow, eds, Com.

munism in Italy and France, Princetown, 1975, p31. The role of the Soviet bureaucracy in influencing this development and its relationship with Western communist parties falls outside the scope of this analysis. See F Richards, 'Stalinism, the Communist Party and the RCG's new turn', in RCP, No 1, March 1977. 100 E Varga, "The general crisis of capitalism', Labour Monthly, January 1947, p56.

role' of the PCF was spelled out by its leader Thorez in 1947: 'thanks to the working class the country has recovered in two years, whereas five years were needed to same result after the last war, although the difficulties were "The great merit of the working class of our party is that we, the Communists, were the ones who went and told the working class what had to be said. ...In October 1946 prices had reached 851 and wages 417. This means that there has been a 50 per cent reductig?

in the real purchasing power of wages compared with 1937.

In the short-run Stalinism helped capital to regain firm control over the working class. The long-term impact was equally important - Stalinist politics helped reconcile the aspirations of workers with capitalist reconstruction. Anticapitalist sentiments were contained by radical policies of reform. The Stalinist parties took their place as part of the post-war labour bureaucracy.

Post-war capitalism and the working class The defeats of the working class were not only important in facilitating the creation of a new framework for working class politics. They also paved the way for the restructuring of capitalist relations and for the restoration of profitability. The neutralisation of the working class allowed the unhindered pursuit of imperialist war, the establishment of an American-dominated equilibrium on the world market, the raising of the rate of exploitation and the introduction of new technology. The long post-war boom began. 102 The post-war boom further weakened anti-capitalist politics. Although the expansion of capitalism was uneven, living standards in general rose and unemployment fell.

By the early 'fifties the class struggle in Europe was at its lowest ebb in the twentieth century. In most countries working class militancy could be contained with only a selective use of coercion.

The most significant feature of post-war capitalism has been the massive extension of state intervention in economic and social life. Government regulation and ownership of industry and welfare measures created rapidly expanding social stratum dependent on patronage. State intervention provided the labour bureaucracy with new opportunities for expansion and a growing State intervention strengthened reformist notions in the labour movement. The post-war boom was not seen as the product of imperialist war and working class defeats but as the result of government policy. The loyalty of workers to their state grew even stronger. The class struggle was organised around the state. Its objective was not to smash the state but to make it more democratic, to reform it In the 'fifties and 'sixties the conflict between labour and capital did not assume a political form. Working class militancy grew but it could be contained with relative The polarisation of the labour movement between a revolutionary and a reformist wing that prevailed through much of the inter-war period simply did not exist in postwar Europe. In its place a remarkable class consensus developed. The ruling class had no need of reformist parties to police the working class. Under little pressure from workers, the labour movement parties became more preoccupied with extending their electoral influence in the 18 middle class. Nominally socialist parties began to itse item inhibitions about embracing bourgeois declared emphatically that they were not class but people's parties. In 1958 the Austrian socialist party adopted a new non-Marxist programme and declared that it had "developed from a party of wage earners into a party of all A year later the German, Swiss and Dutch parties took the same step. In 1960 the Swedish party boasted of its classless orientation: "The fight for equality, begun by the workers, has become a broader struggle for equal treatment of all citizens, men arty after another communist parties lomed in too and one part declared adherence to broad class alliances.

Many on the left commented on what they saw as the right-wing drift of reformism.

But the declaration of people's parties and the movement of these parties away from the working class had little to do with the traditional function of reformism in mediating in the class struggle. In general, class relations could be maintained through operation between state and unions, and reformist politics had become irrelevant. They simply undertook the adjustments necessary to boost their middle class vote.

The controversy inside the British Labour Party over Clause Four between 1959 and 1960 was not a debate between left and right-wing reformists. The 1957 Labour Party conference gave a massive vote of support to the policy document Industry and society which expressed the party's pro-capitalist and class collaborationist outlook: "The Labour Party recognises that, under increasingly professional managements, large firms are as a whole serving the nation well. Moreover, we recognise that no organisation, public or private, can operate effectively if it is subjected to persistent and detailed interventions from above. We have, therefore, no intention of Int ying in the management of any fim which is doing a good Left and right were united in support of the efficient operation of the 'mixed economy'. The Clause Four debate was not about the commitment of the Labour Party to British capitalism - that was unquestioned - but about the control of the trade union bureaucrats over the party.

The trade union leaders recognised that the Labour Party's claim as an alternative party of government rested on its ability to win working class aquiescence to its policies. Given the relative weakness of British imperialism, and the likelihood that the measures required to preserve it might prove unpopular with workers, Labour's links with the working class were an important asset. The TUC did not mind Gaitskell's public relations exercises among middle classes - as long as he did not try to burn the party's bridges with its trade union constituency. So Clause Four remained and Labour emerged as a progressive capitalist party with an ineffectual left wing as a feeble reminder of its reformist heritage.

The demise of reformism did not mean that class relations were left to the free play of the market. On the contrary the wage-labour/capital relationship was more organised than ever before. A whole network of institutions - state and para-state bodies, special arbitration collaboratitio no Throughout Furope thousands of union economic councils - supervised class representatives sat on bodies involved in economic affairs, medical ura decide n intral elations in parid lan becary.

ment insurance. institutionalised - incomes policies, national wage agreements and complicated arbitration procedures became Economic expansion and full employment weakened capitalist control over the labour market. Bourgeois indus-

trial relations - and welfare - policies were a response to this situation, rather than concessions to working class demands. Thus governments of diverse political colours - Labour, Conservative, Christian Democrats - pursued essentially similar policies. The most right-wing bourgeois politicians - Macmillan, Adenauer and De Gaulle - were as committed to consensus policies as the staunchest labour bureaucrat. Traditional social democracy became extinct. The bourgeois state dealt directly with the trade union bureaucracy through a complex system of class collaboration.

Working class militancy and class collaboration coexisted relatively harmoniously in circumstances of unprecedented political stability. Labour parties still called themselves 'social cratic' but their social character had changed. The British Labour Party, for example, was still a party based on the working class, it was not a working class party. In fact Lenin had already made this point in 1920: 'Of course, most of the Labour Party's members are working.

However, whether or not a party is really a political party of workers does not depend solely upon a membership of workers but also upon the men that lead it, and the content of its actions and its political tactics. Only this latter determines whether we really have before us a political party of the proletariat. Regarded from this, the only correct point of view, the Labour Party is a thoroughly bourgeois party, because, although made up of workers, it is led by quite in the spirit of the bourgeoisie I factionaries at that, who act reactionaries, and the worst kind of In 1920, despite its reactionary politics the Labour Party was forced to voice the aspirations of its proletarian constituency. It played a reformist role in its attempt to harness these aspirations to the reform of the capitalist system. The interaction between the party and the working class was the most important element in defining its political direction. By the 'fifties this was no longer the case. In the conditions of the post-war boom the Labour Party became almost entirely responsive to the requirements of capital.

Because of the prevailing social consensus and the liquidation of class politics, it could do this and still maintain its The European left took a narrow view of these develop- The persistence of labour parties was interpreted as demonstrating the continuity of reformism: instances of trade union militancy were portrayed as potential threats to reformism. The specific manner in which class relations were organised was ignored. Thus at the onset of the crisis - precisely when reformism began to have a new relevance - it was declared obsolete. Tony Cliff wrote in 1971: 'For revolutionaries the key change is this: the Labour Party is no longer a reformist party in the sense that it still was in the 'fifties and even the early 'sixties. It is committed to the modernisation' of British capitalism in conditions which effectively possibility of serious reforms and which demand the curbing both of real wages and of social expenditure.

In reality precisely the reverse is the case: in the 'fifties and 'sixties reformism had little role to play. It was in the 'seventies, when working class living standards were under attack, that reformism became an important political force once more. The radical left was totally unprepared for this The phenomenal growth of the labour bureaucracy as a result of state intervention provided the social foundation for the revival of reformist politics when the boom came to an end. The trade union bureaucracy had never ceased to play its mediating role in the class struggle and, unlike the radical left, was well prepared for the capitalist crisis of the 19 The reconstitution of reformism The onset of the recession forced the bourgeoisie to reorganise class relations. It had to hold down wages, raise unemployement and cut social services. The labour bureaucracy did its best to ease the transition. Labour institutions had sufficient credibility to win the acquiescence of the working class to capitalist austerity measures. From 1973 to 1978 a class truce prevailed without any major shift in class relations. In France and Italy, Eurocommunism emerged in response to the crisis. PCI leader Berlinguer made a virtue out of austerity and indicated his party's readiness to take on the responsibility of governmental office. The main form that class relations assumed was the Social Contract - an agreement between the labour bureaucracy and the government that exchanged working class sacrifices for the promise of future prosperity.

Through the mid 'seventies a degree of ambiguity prevailed in class relations. The absence of any realistic revolutionary alternative ensured that bourgeois counter- 101 Cited in F Claudin, The communist movement from Comintern London, 1975, p343, Togliatti, the leader of the PCI, need not have feared being outdone by Thorez. Tog liatti stated in January 1947: 'in the last years no political strike has taken place in Italy... This is a country where the unions have signed a wage truce, a pact which is unique in the history of the working class movement, because it determines wage, not a minimum one....This is really the striking and absurd feature of the economic situation in which we live; it is the working class and the unions who are giving the best example and are taking all the necessary steps to preserve the discipline of production, order and social peace'.

Cited in B Salvati, 'The rebirth of Italian trade unionism 1943in S Woolf, ed, The rebirth of Italy 1943-50, London, 102 This point has been discussed at length in revolutionary communist literature, For a theoretical reflection of the boom in the labour movement, see F Richards, RCP, No 4, op cit.

In Britain, almost the entire expansion of the TUC since the war has been due to the increase in its affiliated white-collar membership. A significant proportion of these are public sector See G S Bain, The growth of white-collar unionism, 104 During this period the greatest threat to bourgeois rule came from the colonial wars of liberation.

105 Cited in J Gyford and S Haseler, Social democracy: beyond revisionism, Fabian Research Series, No 292, London, p15.

107 The programme formulated at the PCI's Eighth Congress in 1956 followed the pattern of the classless orientation of the socialist parties. See S Hellman, "The PCI's alliance strategy and the case of the middle class, in D L M Blackmer and S See for example I Cliff, What makes right-wing Labour tick', in Socialist Review, June 1957.

109 Industry and society: Labour's policy on future public owner.

ship, London, 1957, pp48-9.

110 K Marshall's interesting study of trades councils shows the wide-ranging state bodies which have links with this labour movement institution. British trades councils, RCP discussion document, 1981. 111 H Wilensky, The welfare state and equality, London, 1975 112 V I Lenin, 'Speech on affiliation to the British Labour Party', 113 International Socialism, No 48, June/July 1971, pl.

crisis policies went largely unchallenged movement. It was sufficient for the socialist and Eurocommunist parties to formulate a labour movement version these policies to get militant workers to accept them 1i% But while workers broadly accepted the policies of their leaders for saving the national economy they drew back when they realised their consequences in falling wages, rising redundancies and deteriorating services, union bureaucrats too could not remain indifferent to the impact of the recession on the working class.

The ruling class approach also contained a degree of ambiguity. The vast edifice of industrial relations institutions and quangos which had served capitalism so well in the post-war boom had also strengthened the official organisation of the labour movement. But the structure of class collaboration had become a top-heavy burden on a crisisridden bourgeoisie. However, the ruling class could not simply dismantle these institutions without provoking a major confrontation with the labour movement. And this was something that the capitalists wanted to avoid.

The result was that the ruling class and labour bureaucracy continued their collaboration. When austerity began to take its toll the main job of the labour bureaucracy was to educate workers in the realities of capitalism and to curb unofficial militant action.

Iwo contradictory forces militated against the continuation of this arrangement. First, the recession has forced the bourgeoisie to step up its attacks on the working The institutions of industrial relations and the strength of the official labour movement now became a serious obstacle to the bourgeoisie in its drive to reorganise class relations. And second, the severe effects of the recession on the labour movement called into question the traditional methods of class integration. The 'winter of discontent' of 1978 signalled the end of anera of unprecedented class peace in Britain, for example.

In 1978 the bourgeoisie began to dismantle integrationist institutions in favour of more direct forms of class Important anti-union 116 The bourplemented in Britain, France, Italy and Spain.

geoisie was assisted in its attack by the cumulative impact of the recession - unemployment represented a severe threat to trade union organisation. The labour bureaucracy was forced onto the defensive.

The ruling class has not abandoned collaboration with the labour bureaucracy. In France it has recently accepted Mitterand's socialist government. What the ruling class wants to do is to weaken labour movement organisation in order to establish more favourable terms for collaboration.

Thus the Thatcher Government has moved fast to weaken the unions and stamp out unofficial action, stopped short of bureaucracy itself, threatening the position of the union The disintegration of the traditional institutions of class collaboration has had a major impact on the working class. While in the short run it may induce passivity and demoralisation, it forces workers to look for new political solutions. The decline of trade union activity shifts attention to the political sphere.

From the point of view of the labour bureaucracy things cannot go on in the old way. Unemployment threatens the social base of the labour bureaucracy and provokes working class anger: it forces labour leaders to look for new solutions. The success of the socialist party in France, the reactivation of the left wing of the SPD in Germany and the Benn campaign in Britain are symptoms of this search for new solutions.

The requirements of the bourgeoisie for more direct forms of class domination and of the working class to defend its basic interests create the basis for the reconstitution of reformist politics. However, the same forces that have stimulated the reconstitution of reformism also create the conditions for a more profound political differentiation within the working class - for the emergence of a revolutionary movement. The political forms in which social democracy will be reconstituted remain uncertain. Labour parties that have long ceased to involve active workers and have developed close links with the state and the ruling class are not the most adaptable of institutions. At present the labour parties are undergoing a considerable degree of tension in their attempts to secure their relations with the working class. In France, the PCF, the traditional party of workers, is fast losing out to its socialist competitor, both in the electora and industrial fields. In Italy, the PCI and its union organisation face pressure from hitherto insignificant socialist forces. In Germany, the SPD is so bureaucratised that even its mild-mannered left wing has become a problem of major proportions. The British Labour Party has already proved incapable of containing its right wing. The emergence of the Social Democratic Party is symptomatic of the Labour Party's difficulty in making the transition into a new reformist party. The attempt of the Labour left to elaborate a genuine social democratic alternative has caused the greatest upheaval that the party has ever experienced. The further evolution of these parties depends not on the intentions of labour politicians but on the class struggle.

The old parties of the working class are in a state of flux because the recession has put the reconstitution of reformism and the political differentiation of the working class on the agenda. Unfortunately the European radical left has opted for a course of action which can only hinder the advance of the working class. The left claims to be building a revolutionary movement. How? By the devious method of assisting the reconstitution of social democracy now, with the aim of bringing about the political differentiation of the working class at some time in the future.

In France the left has virtually suspended independent operations and liquidated itself in its praise of, and support for the Mitterand Government. In Britain the radical left is either inside or trailing alongside the Labour Party. Indeed the British radical left under the leadership of Tony Benn has become the leading force in the campaign for the reconstitution of social democracy.

For revolutionaries the alternatives are clear. The choice is between helping to consolidate social democracy or assisting the political differentiation of the working class.

The radical left claims to be doing both, but in reality is working for the revival of social democracy. A revolutionary alternative has to be advanced now to ensure that the polarisation of the working class takes place between pro capitalist and anti-capitalist politics - not between two varieties of bourgeois politics. An unrelenting struggle against social democracy is vital to strengthen the working class for its battles today and in the future.

Frank Richards 114 See T Allen et al, 'The recession: capitalist offensive and the working class', in RCP, No 3, July 1978, pp27-44.

115 The sharp decline in militancy indicated by recent strike statistics appears to contradict this point. Simple trade union militancy is, however, a crude indicator of the class struggle: union militancy in the recent past coexisted with class peace. Moreover the decline in trade union militancy contains the potential 116 For an analysis of this process, see 'Breaking new ground', editorial in the next step, No 1, December 1979.

117 See Which way forward for the labour movement?', special 10-page supplement in the next step, No 15, August 1981.

20

BRITISH TROTSKYISM, SOCIAL