Iran's national minorities

Iran's national minorities The national question in Iran is of immense importance.

Any threat by one of Iran's minorities of secession or even the demand for autonomy immediately highlights the fragile nature of the regime. This is why the Shah moved so decisively against the Mahabad and Azerbaijan republics in 1946.

He called himself 'Aryamehr' - Light of the Aryans - in an effort to gloss over the fact that Persians are actually a Persians make up about 45 per cent of Iran's population of 35 million; they inhabit the mountainous central areas of the country. They are surrounded by five other main groups, each of which, to a greater or lesser degree, sees itself as a separate nationality - the Kurds, Azerbaijan Turks, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkomans. Besides being divided culturally, Iran's minorities are also divided between the different factions of Islam. The majority are Shi'as, but there are about 4.5 million Sunni Moslems and a smaller number belong to Iran's ethnic make-up %Shia %Sunni %Bahai Total (in million) Persians 16,5 90 Azerbaijan Turks 12.0 95 5 Kurds 3.5 35 65 Arabs 2.0 70 30 Baluch 0.5 20 80 Turkoman 0.5 5 95 Source: Financial Times, 5 September 1979 The nationalities question in Iran reasserted itself after the overthrow of the Shah in February 1979. The Shah's Persianchauvinist regime had crushed any movements which tried to establish separate cultural identities. In the aftermath of the February insurrection the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the principal Kurdish opposition party, emerged from clandestinity and began to organise in the region.

Khomeini's regime quickly recognised the threat posed by the national minorities, and troops were sent in to suppress them. their complete subjugation. Furthermore, the operations against these areas were important for consolidating and strengthening national sentiment behind Khomeini, so much so that when fighting first started in Kurdistan - at the instigation of Islamic Guards volunteers to fight the 'satanic' Kurds were enthusiastically received. One after another the minorities were probed and 'taught a lesson'. The groups in which the Sunni faction predominated received particularly harsh treatment. Turkomans and then Arabs were attacked indiscriminately during April and May 1979.2 In Gonbade-Kabus, the main Turkoman town in northern Iran, dozens of people were killed during fighting in March and April, after Turkoman farmers began taking over land given to top army officers and civil servants 3 The fighting in Khuzestan has exacerbated tensions between Iran and neighbouring Iraq. Iraq has been accused of supplying weapons to the Arabs and casting a covetous eye over the Khuzestan province which it regards as part of the Arab world.

28 The Baluchis have caused the least problem to the new regime. By far the most under-developed of the regions, Baluchistan is still largely dominated by the local Sardars tribal leaders. Its population exists largely by smuggling and livestock herding. They were the last to move against the Shah. However, Iranian Baluchis feel a close affinity with their brethren in Pakistan where nationalist politics are much stronger. The idea of an independent Baluchistan encompassing the Iranian and Pakistani territories could prove to be very appealing at a later date. As Sunnis they presently see little future in a Shia-dominated theocratic state.

The 12 to 14 million Azeris, or Azerbaijan Turks, are by far the largest minority in Iran. The province of Azerbaijan, capital Tabriz, is a very rich farming area. Azeri Moslems are almost all Shia, which explains why they have closer links with Tehran than Sunni Turkey, although they speak Turkish. Over one million Azeris live and work in the Tehran bazaar and prominent members of the government, such as former Premier Mehdi Bazargan, come from the region.

In contrast to the rest of Iran's Shi'as, the Azerbaijanis give their allegiance to Ayatollah Kazem Shariat Madari, rather than Khomeini. Shariat Madari is in fact the senior of the two men in terms of learning. He sees no role for the clergy in politics. Rather, he argues, it should be in permanent opposition because Shia Moslems should regard all temporal authority as inherently imperfect. For advocating these views Shariat Madari, despite his seniority, was excluded from the ruling Revolutionary Council after the fall of Throughout 1979 Shariat Madari made clear his opposition to the dominant role being played by Khomeini and his assumption of the post of 'religious adviser'. His criticisms of the excesses of the revolutionary courts and committees and arbitrary confiscations were popular with the well-to-do farmers and middle class who largely support him. Their alienation from the present regime was reflected in the largescale boycotts of the recent referendum on the Islamic constitution and their support for the now defunct Azerbaijanbased Moslem Peoples Republican Party. Many people were killed when Shariat Madari's supporters took to the streets of Tabriz in December 1979 to protest against the lack of guarantees for minorities in the proposed constitution.

The national question in Iran has not been settled in any of the minority regions. Through armed struggle the Kurds, and to a lesser extent the Arabs, have won a degree of autonomy. But nowhere have cultural and national rights most areas. been guaranteed. Clashes Revolutionaries support the demand for national rights where these demands are being raised. In Iran today this is particularly important to combat the dominant Persian chauvinism. The Khomeini regime is using every opportunity to strengthen Persian nationalist sentiment as a way of consolidating all classes around it. Every effort must be made to ensure that it is not successful.

1 For a fuller analysis of Kurdish politics in Iran up to and after the February insurrection see N Jenkins, Iran: Kurds against Khomeini", the next step, No 1, November 1979.

2 "A threat to the pipelines', Financial Times, 14 July 1979.

Financial Times, 28 March 1979.

Book reviews