Theses on Stalinism in the Gorbachev era

Theses on Stalinism in the Gorbachev era Frank Richards From the perspective of the late 1980s, Stalinism can be seen 1. Stalinism is a as a by-product of the stagnation of world capitalism in the by-product of imperialist epoch. Though the emergence of the Stalinist capitalist decay bureaucracy required the defeat of the working class in the Soviet Union, its survival was made possible by the weakness of the international capitalist order. It is the instability of global capitalism, rather than any inherent dynamic in Stalinism, that explains the consolidation of the Soviet Union and its international influence. At the very moment world capitalism experienced its most profound crisis —in the early thirties—Stalin launched his drive for industrialisation in the Soviet Union. The contrast between economic recession and chaos in the West and planned expansion in the East appeared highly favourable to the Soviet system. The Stalinist regime even appeared progressive in comparison to imperialist countries. The intense rivalries among imperialist powers that were to culminate in the Second World War provided the Stalinist bureaucracy with little time to consolidate its rule. Weaknesses in the world capitalist order in the post-war period allowed Stalinism to extend its influence. Stalinism took over in Eastern Europe, China and Korea and increased its influence in many third world countries. At the time, many observers attributed this to an internal dynamic within the Soviet system. But today it is clear that it was the weakening grip of capitalism in many parts of the world that allowed Stalinism to expand. Stalinism was not driven forward by its own momentum: it simply filled the vacuum left by the collapse of 101 imperialist authority.

For many years it seemed that the new Stalinist regimes were simply replicas of the Soviet system. Today this view is no longer tenable. Even a cursory study of Stalinist states from Eastern Europe, the Far East, south-cast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean reveals societies that have only superficially imitated Soviet social relations. This is even true with the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that were incorporated into the Soviet Union itself. The Stalinist system manifestly lacks any capacity to reproduce itself; the apparently similar courses followed by the different Stalinist states result from a common experience of capitalist failure.

2. Stalinism The incapacity of the capitalist system to develop the productive cannot achieve forces of the world in any consistent or systematic manner economic allowed Stalinism to emerge as an apparently viable alternative.

development However, while Stalinism seemed most appropriate where capitalism was most backward, the more economically advanced a country was, the less applicable the Stalinist model proved to be. Thus, whereas the Soviet system could achieve some success in China, in Czechoslovakia, a country that was fairly highly industrialised before the Stalinist takeover, the new system produced economic regression.

The inappropriateness of Stalinism to countries at a relatively high level of economic development provoked the first major rebellions against the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. Whereas the Stalinist bureaucracy could boast of significant economic achievements in the backward Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe similar methods only produced decline.

Though Stalinism has appeared more relevant in third world countries, the Soviet model has universally failed to effect fundamental social transformation. Even in China the scope of change has been modest by comparison with the Soviet Union.

In more recently established Stalinist states, such as Vietnam, Ethiopia and South Yemen, only limited attempts were made to copy Soviet modes of social organisation.

The Soviet bureaucracy itself is increasingly explicit in recognising that the methods of production and distribution established in the thirties cannot meet the demands of a modern society. Apart from creating the basic infrastructure for an industrial society, the Stalinist system creates more problems than it solves. It offers no mechanism for raising the productivity of labour and it can barely sustain a positive growth rate.

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Though Stalin proclaimed the possibility of building socialism in one country, Stalinism has emerged as an international phenomenon. There are three reasons why Stalinism has transcended its deeply nationalistic origins to achieve world- First, the legacy of Bolshevism and the Communist International gave the Stalinist bureaucracy international legitimacy.

In the eyes of millions of workers around the world in the thirties and forties Stalin was the inheritor of the tradition of the Russian Revolution. The Stalinist bureaucracy used this prestige to transform the international communist movement into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. The worldwide aspiration for proletarian revolution was exploited to win approval for Second, the reputation of the Soviet regime was enhanced by the perception in many parts of the world that it offered a superior model of economic development to the unbearable burden of imperialist domination. Where capitalism was most discredited by war, poverty and degradation, Stalinism had Finally, throughout the third world, Stalinism helped to give political coherence to national liberation movements. In many countries dominated by imperialism the petit-bourgeois leaders of nationalist movements were isolated and lacked the means to mobilise mass support from workers and peasants. Stalinism provided a programme and organisational framework through which conflicting class interests could be reconciled, at least temporarily. Hence even conservative nationalist groupings, such as existed in Ethiopia and South Yemen, were prepared to adopt the policies and the rhetoric of the Stalinist movement.

The identification of Stalinism with resistance to Western domination gave many national liberation movements a mass appeal, despite the pro-capitalist and anti-proletarian character 1945 was the highpoint of Stalinism as an international phenomenon. At the close of the Second World War the contrast between capitalist barbarism and decay and the potential for economic and political liberation offered by the Soviet Union was at its most stark. Imperialist powers were exhausted and in many parts of the world could not enforce their rule. But the Stalinist bureaucracy could claim much credit for the defeat of Nazi Germany and present itself as the major force for progress 3. Stalinism is a nationalist outlook with an international influence 4. Since 1945 nationalist trends have fragmented the Stalinist movement wide influence. 103 Stalin's cynical superpower diplomacy most appeal as a beneficent alternative.

of their programmes.

in the world. Even in the West, the Soviet Union enjoyed unprecedented prestige. However, after 1945 the conflict between the national interests of the Soviet Union and the international character of the Stalinist movement rapidly gathered momentum. Yugoslavia's revolt against the Kremlin was the first major blow against Soviet control of the international movement. The public breach in relations between Moscow and Peking in 1960, after years of mounting tensions, marked the end of Stalinism as a unitary world movement. Stalinism was subsequently divided into bitterly antagonistic national camps, a process culminating in the war between China and Vietnam.

Until 1945 the Stalinist bureaucracy successfully manipulated rivalries among the imperialist powers. Since the late fifties, the imperialist powers have been able to turn the tables and take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split. The growing fragmentation of the Stalinist movement reveals that it contains no inherent unifying mechanisms; whatever its rhetoric, Stalinism is a fundamentally nationalistic movement. The recent tension between Fidel Castro and Mikhail Gorbachev is only the latest manifestation of this trend.

Since the Second World War Western Communist parties have pursued the logic of Stalinism through to the adoption of national reformist programmes. Now that Communist parties in all countries have become thoroughly 'nationalised' the official communist movement has no more coherence than a gathering of social democratic parties from different countries. The process of nationalising the Communist parties has necessitated the abandonment of revolutionary rhetoric. As a result there is now little to distinguish the Communist parties from social democracy at the level of policy. Without a distinct identity, the Western Communist parties face a fundamental problem of survival. 5. Stalinism no For at least 20 years Stalinism has ceased to offer a positive longer inspires model for any significant section of society. The Chinese emulation "cultural revolution', which began in 1966, generated enthusiasm among sections of the Western intelligentsia. But it was the last example of an event within Stalinism that appeared to have a progressive potential elsewhere in the world. Vietnam and Nicaragua, not to mention Ethiopia or South Yemen, have failed to inspire popular movements in the West.

The Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union has been too 104

preoccupied with ensuring its own survival to devote much energy to promoting its system as a model for the rest of the world.

Indeed, in recent years the Soviet leadership seems to have abandoned all attempts to offer an alternative model of social States that have moved into the Stalinist orbit in recent years have become increasingly hesitant about following the Soviet model. Vietnam, Ethiopia and Angola have carefully avoided taking the Moscow road and have sought to retain links with the West. In the case of Nicaragua, the latest country to come under a form of Stalinist rule, the regime has explicitly rejected any The Soviet Union's current preoccupation with perestroika and extending the role of the capitalist market is a powerful argument deterring other countries from opting for the Stalinist model of development. Indeed Soviet experts are now openly presenting their system as an 'anti-model", a form of social In the West the communist movement is now trying to readjust to the present by rejecting virtually everything it stood for in the past. Desperately committed to exorcising the ghosts of its past, the official communist movement has been trying, since the days of Eurocommunism in the mid-seventies, to present Stalinism as ancient history. They genuinely believe that a change in form amounts to a change in substance. It is up to Marxists to demonstrate that the 'non-Stalinist' Communist parties of today are simply a new expression of Stalinism in Over the past decade the Stalinist bureaucracy has come to recognise the exhaustion of its traditional policies. It now generally understands that any attempt to revive the system is doomed from the start. The sort of reforms and experiments that were debated in the sixties and seventies are now widely, and correctly, regarded as irrelevant to the needs of Soviet society.

During the eighties all sections of the Soviet bureaucracy have come to accept the need for a major economic restructuring of society. Despite much media discussion about the role of "conservatives, there is no significant constituency of support for a return to the methods of the Stalin-Khrushchev-Brezhnev years. More importantly, there is now a substantial body of opinion within the bureaucracy that believes that the Soviet 6. The Soviet Union is shifting towards the restoration of capitalist relations 105 development. organisation to be strenuously avoided different circumstances. policies that appear to resemble the Soviet model.

Union cannot survive unless drastic changes are made.

At the ideological level the Soviet bureaucracy appears to place great faith in the regenerative qualities of the market.

However, pro-market views have not been matched with practical measures to extend market forces. In principle the bureaucracy would like to see Soviet society evolve into a Scandinavian-style mixed economy, avoiding the rigours of full-scale capitalist restoration. But this is an ideal that is impossible to fulfil.

As the Chinese experience has shown, extending market relations in itself provides no long-term solutions for Stalinist societies. The market may raise efficiency in some sectors, but at the same time it encourages anarchie tendencies and fragmentation; the very problems that constantly undermine the Stalinist system. For the market to have a dynamic effect throughout the economy, it must be introduced across the board, not just in particular sectors or regions. It is this all or nothing character of market forces that makes the implementation of perestroika so difficult.

It is not yet clear how the Soviet bureaucracy will resolve the problems arising from its attempt to extend the market. Any attempt at a wholesale restoration of the market risks calling into question the very legitimacy of the Soviet statc. Even modest proposals under the perestroika programme have been thwarted by the inertia of enterprise management or by working class resistance. However, although there is at present little sign of market relations spreading, it is unlikely that the present stalemate can continue indefinitely. Unless fundamental change takes place, the Soviet system faces economic breakdown: if it introduces wider market relations it risks disintegration. The energies of the Soviet bureaucracy are fully engaged in trying to avoid these two grim alternatives.

It is difficult to anticipate the likely course of development in the Soviet Union. The intrinsic volatility of the Soviet system means that the bureaucracy itself is scarcely in control of its own destiny. It is, however, difficult to avoid the conclusion that if present trends continue the result will be either the restoration of capitalism, or the strengthening of forces committed to the capitalist option. Underlying trends are rarely transformed directly into reality, but they do indicate the general direction of events. 106

It is now time to consider what was previously unthinkable: the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the Stalinist world. The barriers to capitalist restoration are weakest in third world Stalinist states where social transformation according to the Soviet model has been minimal. Recent developments in Vietnam, for example, show that there is significant support for capitalist solutions, both inside and Experiments in China, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland reveal that capitalist solutions are being actively considered by their ruling bureaucracies. In many respects much of Eastern Europe has become a laboratory for testing different ways of extending market relations; nowhere are the results being more keenly studied than in Moscow. However, capitalist restoration poses more difficult problems in the Soviet Union, where the Stalinist system has the longest history and the deepest roots.

Moreover, the spread of capitalist relations would inevitably intensify nationalist divisions and demands for autonomy, which would lead inexorably to the Balkanisation and dis- Within the Soviet Union support for capitalist restoration is confused and indecisive. The intelligentsia enthusiastically supports the full-scale introduction of market relations, naively believing that it would be the main beneficiary. Sections of the peasantry and petit bourgeoisie also favour wider market relations, but their passivity means that they cannot play a decisive role in the outcome of events. Within the bureaucracy there is some support for the market, but this exists more at the level of ideas than in terms of a preparedness to see through the practical consequences. The working class is bitterly hostile to the results of economic restructuring: harsher discipline and tougher working conditions. While workers may not be opposed to capitalist restoration in theory, they are a major obstacle to The subjective inclinations of different sections of Soviet socicty will have limited significance in deciding the course of events. The central point that cannot be escaped is that the Soviet Union cannot survive as it is currently constituted. The key question that follows is: can the bureaucracy steer through the programme of reforms launched by Gorbachev, or will it lose control? However, even if perestroika succeeds, it can only strengthen labour discipline; it offers no answers to the problems of economic stagnation, low labour productivity and poor quality. Soon the bureaucrats will have to decide whether to take 7. The possible restoration of capitalism in the Stalinist world depends on many unpredictable factors 107 outside the bureaucracy. integration of the Soviet Union in its modern form.

attempts to extend market forces in practice.

a leap beyond perestroika or sit tight in face of continuing The outcome of the present Soviet crisis depends on a range of unpredictable factors. A key factor is the capacity of the bureaucracy to retain its coherence and limit the tendency to break up along political and national lines. Another important consideration is the pace of economic recession in the West and its impact on the Soviet Union. However, given the precarious balance of forces between Stalinism and capitalism, the return of the country of the world's first proletarian revolution to the The Stalinist countries are today under intense capitalist pressure. The arms race imposes a major constraint on the deployment of resources in the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe endures a heavy burden of debt with the West. The imperialist powers continue to exploit divisions among the How far can imperialist pressure on the Soviet Union go? In the abstract, world capitalism has every interest in extending its influence in the Stalinist world. The growth of markets and spheres of investment in the Soviet Union, China and elsewhere could boost profits and help to offset tendencies towards crisis in the West and Japan. Yet, while the imperialist powers might welcome such a trend in principle, in practice it would create major problems: hence the ambivalence of Western powers For decades Stalinism has provided the international bourgeoisie with a central unifying focus. Cold War propaganda about the East-West divide has always been merely rhetoric; used by the USA to construct a well-coordinated international imperialist order. For 40 post-war years the anti-Soviet thrust of the Western Alliance has kept inter-imperialist rivalries in check and has ensured global political stability. What would they do The current global equilibrium is based on a world order established in the late forties. Through the division of Europe and Asia (Korea, Vietnam and China) a carefully constructed balance was created. The restoration of capitalism in the Stalinist states would threaten the equilibrium that has served imperialism well. Such a disturbance would risk a global Capitalism could not be restored in the Stalinist states without 8. Capitalist restoration in the Stalinist world will intensify conflicts among the imperialist powers 108 economic decay. conflagration. capitalist camp can no longer be precluded.

Stalinist powers and keep Moscow on the defensive.

about the future of Stalinism.

without the myth of Soviet expansionism?

creating losers as well as winners among the imperialist powers.

The process of opening up the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would produce a differential response in the West along lines that are already apparent in response to the Gorbachev reforms.

West Germany would eagerly seize the opportunity to extend its influence to the East; Japan would enthusiastically turn to extend relations with its former subject, China; the USA would be in no position to compete with either Germany or Japan in these areas and it would rapidly lose its ascendancy in the Western Alliance. The disintegration of the Stalinist world would also be a major setback for the major imperialist power.

Thus it is unlikely that the imperialist powers could adopt a common attitude towards the extension of capitalist relations in the Stalinist states hence the contradictory character of imperialist pressure on the Soviet Union.

Despite its decline, Stalinism remains a major problem for the 9. Stalinism still working class. Stalinism in the Gorbachev cra of glasnost and discredits Marxism perestroika exerts a pernicious influence over working class politics. The Soviet bureaucracy now explains the disintegration of the Stalinist world as the direct consequence of Marxism- Leninism and the October Revolution. The failure of Stalinism appears to be an irrefutable argument against any attempt to transcend the capitalist system.

Stalinists are now a potent source of reactionary propaganda.

Their self-criticism of their appalling record is presented as a positive endorsement of the market, capitalist exploitation and bourgeois democracy. Throughout the West, representatives of the establishment draw comfort from Stalinist confessions that legitimise the capitalist way of life. For the time being Stalinism can only help to consolidate reaction. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe this will confuse and demoralise the working class. In the West it will reinforce the grip of bourgeois ideology.

In the long run the crisis of Stalinism will benefit revolutionary Marxists. During the decades in which Stalinism appeared to be a dynamic and positive alternative to capitalism, it was difficult to popularise genuine Marxism. The fact that Stalinism was universally accepted as the legitimate inheritor of the Marxist tradition enabled the Soviet bureaucracy to retain influence over key sections of the international working class. At the same time the very existence of the Stalinist states became the most powerful practical argument against Marxism- 109 Leninism in the rest of the world.

The decay of Stalinism now offers the potential to rehabilitate Marxism. After the Gorbachev reforms are implemented it will no longer be possible to blame Marx and Lenin for the failings of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Whatever the short-term cost of capitalist restoration in the Stalinist world, the destruction of Stalinism will remove an historic barrier to the self-emancipation of the international working class.

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At the photo-opportunity all were smiles. When Neil Kinnock, Mario Soares and other leaders of the Socialist International posed for the cameras in London's Westminster one spring day in 1989, they indeed had something to celebrate. For the first time ever, Europe's Socialist parties had agreed on a common manifesto on which to fight for seats in the elections for a new European parliament in June. Moreover, European public opinion seemed to back the socialists in their enthusiasm for the European Community (EC); in a poll taken shortly after publication of the joint socialist manifesto, an average 80 per cent of EC voters favoured more European unity. Since December 1988, in fact, even Britain's traditionally insular electorate had swung from 61 per cent support for European The European Socialist parties of high office the parties of France, Spain and Greece-see in the ECS institutions a chance to further their countries' influence in the world. For Socialist parties languishing in opposition, such as Britain's Labour Party, the EC appears to offer a more promising route to political influence than the conventional highways of local and national government on which it has fared so badly in recent years. For the Socialist International as a whole, greater European forthrightness and a decisive EC line on all matters makes sense in the context of a wider drive for independence The Socialist parties also seek to benefit from the strength of popular aspirations to internationalism. In their commitment to the corridors of Brussels, they hope to turn the widespread desire for greater European unity to their advantage. While the European left has spent most of the eighties worrying that its 1. Introduction: Kinnock, Thatcher and 1992 111 unity to 70 per cent.! from Washington.